This is appeal from judgment of district court affirming decision of Oklahoma County Board of Equalization [Board] that denied plaintiff’s request to declare certain of its property exempt from county ad valo-rem taxes.
Plaintiff, London Square Village [Village] is a non-profit corporation organized and chartered in February 1970 under 18 O.S.1971 § 851 et seq. Village was incorporated by Board of Directors of National Association of the Volunteers of America, a non-denominational Christian religious organization. Volunteers of America is granted tax exempt status as a church by Internal Revenue Service as are its subordinate organizations around the country such as London Square Village.
*1225Articles of Incorporation of Village state purpose of organization to be:
“* * * for those charitable, benevolent and nonprofit purposes hereinabove described and has no stated capital. This corporation shall be without capital stock and no dividends shall be declared nor issued.”
The purposes described are:
“(a) To provide, on a nonprofit basis, housing for low and moderate income families displaced from urban areas or as a result of governmental action, where no adequate housing exists for such groups, pursuant to Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended, [now 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 17157 and 1715z-l]
“(b) The Corporation is irrevocably dedicated to, and operated exclusively for, nonprofit purposes; and no part of the income or assests (sic) of the Corporation shall be distributed to, nor inure to the benefit of, any individual.”
In furtherance of its stated purpose, Village constructed an apartment complex to provide low cost public housing with assistance of United States Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] and Federal Housing Administration [F.H.A.] through Federally guaranteed loans and rent supplements. Apartments are rented to members of public who may make application for financial assistance through “rent supplements.” See National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.A. 1701 et seq. specifically 1715z-l. Prospective renters apply to HUD for supplements which are granted on basis of applicant’s ability to pay. Those who are eligible to receive rent supplements are enumerated in 24 C.F.R. § 215.20 and include among others those with limited income who are elderly, physically handicapped, displaced from their homes by urban renewal or disaster, and military personnel on active duty.
Village collects rents from each tenant less amount of supplement received from HUD and from this pays operating expenses and mortgage payments. Since beginning operation there has been no excess of income over expenses, but in event profit might be shown at end of year, under terms of contract between Village and HUD any surplus must be returned to HUD as credit against rent supplements.
Village has been on the county tax rolls from its inception. It now submits that because of its purpose and operation, its property comes directly within purview of 68 O.S.1971 § 2405(h) or (i), as being “used exclusively and directly for charitable purposes within this State,” and as such should be exempt from taxation.
Village filed its protest with the County Board of Equalization. The Board acting on advice of district attorney, denied protest and Village initiated present action in district court pursuant to 68 O.S.1971 § 2461. The matter was decided by trial court on plaintiff’s stipulation of facts and trial briefs. The court denied Village’s petition, holding subject property not exempt from ad valorem taxation. Village appeals to this Court.
Under Art. X § 6 of the Constitution of Oklahoma, all property used exclusively for religious and charitable purposes is exempt from taxation.
68 O.S.1971 § 2405(h)(i) provides:
“The following property shall be exempt from taxation:
(h) All property of any charitable institution organized or chartered under the laws of this State as a nonprofit or charitable institution, provided the net income from such property is used exclusively within this State for charitable purposes and no part of such income inures to the benefit of any private stockholder, and provided further that its facilities are available to any person regardless of his ability to pay.
(i) All property used exclusively and directly for charitable purposes within this State, provided, the charity using said property does not pay any rent or remuneration to the owner thereof, and *1226its facilities are open to any person regardless of his ability to pay. * * * ”
Whether property is exempt from ad va-lorem taxation depends on purpose for which it is used and such is a question of fact. Tulsa County v. St. John’s Hospital, 200 Okl. 176, 191 P.2d 983; Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okl. 131, 156 P.2d 340; Phi Delta Theta v. State, 175 Okl. 608, 53 P.2d 1129; Cox v. Dillingham, 199 Okl. 161, 184 P.2d 976.
In Tulsa County v. St. John’s Hospital, supra, we quoted from Farmer’s Union Hospital Ass’n of Elk City, 190 Okl. 661, 126 P.2d 244, as follows:
“There is a wealth of these cases, and a variety of schemes of organizations and methods of operation, and many are held exempt and others not. In all of them there is one factor the presence or absence of which means almost more than anything else in determining the issue. That is this: Are the doors of the hospital open to all, poor patients and pay patients alike? If the answer is yes, it is a charitable hospital and its property is entitled to the exemption from taxation provided; if the answer is no, it is not a charitable hospital and is not entitled to the exemption.”
In present case all persons are required to pay rent, rich and poor alike. However, those persons who qualify may receive rent supplements from HUD. Those who are eligible to receive rent supplements are enumerated in 24 C.F.R. § 215.20 and include among others those with limited income who are elderly, physically handicapped, displaced from their homes by urban renewal or disaster, and military personnel on active duty. We agree that low-rent housing for such persons is a worthwhile cause of beneficial interest to society. However, we are of opinion that such housing is not used exclusively for charitable purposes as required by 68 O.S.1971 § 2405(h), (i) when each and every occupant is required to pay for accommodations.
In Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., supra, we cited with approval Parker v. Quinn, County Treas., 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961, wherein it was said:
“ * * * Among the several classes of property exempt are ‘lots with buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable purposes.’ In the case at bar the relief society which owns and manages the property over which this controversy arose was organized and acts exclusively for charitable purposes. It ministers to the poor, sick, and destitute of the community. Its purposes are excellent, and the means adopted commendable; and, no doubt, the state is measurably benefited by having its poor and helpless subjects under the benign protection and care of such society. If, therefore, in the fundamental law, in addition to specifying lots and buildings thereon used exclusively for charitable purposes, rentals derived from such buildings and used for such purposes were also enumerated, we would have no difficulty in this case in declaring the whole property, including the portion rented and held for rent, exempted from taxation; but the lawmakers did not see fit to exempt such rentals in express terms, and we can furnish no aid by construction. Only such of the society’s property, therefore, as is occupied and used exclusively for charitable purposes, is exempt from taxation. It follows that the exemption does not extend to that portion not appropriated by the society to its own use, but held as a source of revenue. * * * ”
Other jurisdictions have held that housing projects are not charitable. Beerman v. Board of Tax Appeals, 152 Ohio St. 179, 87 N.E.2d 474 [1949]; Methodist River Oaks Apartments, Inc. v. City of Waco, 409 S.W.2d 485 [Tex.Civ.App.1966].
Statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed against exemptions. Board of Equalization v. Bonner, 185 Okl. 431, 93 P.2d 1077; Dairy Queen of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 205 Okl. 473, 238 P.2d 800.
Judgment of trial court affirmed.
*1227HODGES, V. C. J., and DAVISON, IRWIN, LAVENDER and SIMMS, JJ., concur. WILLIAMS, C. J., and BARNES and DOOLIN, JJ., dissent.