dissenting in part:
I dissent from Parts II and III.B. of the majority opinion. HLP’s standing to challenge the President’s power to designate entities as specially designated global terrorists should be analyzed using the less rigid standard appropriate when First Amendment rights are at stake. Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Executive Order’s ban on “services” is valid, because I do not agree that a person of ordinary intelligence would be put on notice of whether his or her desired conduct would be considered a prohibited “service.”
I
The majority concludes that HLP lacks standing to challenge the President’s unfettered power to designate entities as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs) because HLP has failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact. In so concluding, the majority finds that using a First Amendment standing analysis for a pre-enforcement challenge is not proper in this case. I disagree.
“Particularly in the First Amendment-protected speech context, the Supreme Court has dispensed with rigid standing requirements.” California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.2003). The majority holds that because IEEPA1 does not, on its face, *1153implicate First Amendment rights, HLP cannot avail itself of the less rigid standing requirements. Our case ■ law, however, does not support the majority’s chosen mode of analysis.
First, no case holds that the standing analysis used in the First Amendment context requires that the challenged statute must on its face implicate First Amendment rights. To the contrary, to invoke that standing analysis, the plaintiff must only show “an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against [him or her].” California Pro-Life Council, 328 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) (alteration in original)). “[S]uch a fear of prosecution will only inure if the plaintiffs intended speech arguably falls within the statute’s reach.” California Pro-Life Council, 328 F.3d at 1095. A fear of prosecution does not mean that the plaintiff must have been personally threatened with prosecution:
“A plaintiff who mounts a pre-enforcement challenge to a statute that he claims violates his freedom of speech need not show that the authorities have threatened to prosecute him; the threat is latent in the existence of the statute .... [I]f [the statute] arguably covers [his conduct], and so may deter constitutionally protected expression ... there is standing.”
Id. at 1095 (quoting Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir.2003)) (emphasis added).
Here, HLP argues that it has a well-founded fear of prosecution because it seeks to engage in activities (for example, providing training in human rights advocacy) that might be deemed “association with” the PKK or the LTTE, or activities which might be deemed to benefit those organizations. Based on those activities, which involve conduct protected by the First Amendment, HLP fears it might fall within the President’s broad power to designate entities as specially designated global terrorists. Because HLP’s First Amendment rights are implicated, I believe our “less rigid” standing analysis is the appropriate framework for this case.
The majority finds that this case is distinguishable from California Pro-Life Council and that the less rigid standing analysis should not apply. The holding of California Pro-Life Council, however, encompasses the facts of this case. HLP is not “nakedly asserting that [its] ... speech was chilled by the statute.” California Pro-Life Council, 328 F.3d at 1095. HLP seeks to support and advocate on behalf of the lawful activities of two organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations. HLP has been deterred from taking its desired course of action out of fear that it will be subject to the President’s designation authority, and all its assets frozen. While this case may be factually distinguishable from California Pro-Life Council, the same risks of self-censorship are present. I therefore dissent from the majority’s standing analysis.
II
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Executive Order’s ban on providing “services” here is valid. According to the majority, the ban is distinguishable from the ban invalidated in HLP III because here, relevant regulations clarify what the term “services” means. It is true *1154that 31 C.F.R. § 594.406(b) provides examples of banned services: “legal, accounting, financial, brokering, freight forwarding, transportation, public relations [and] educational” services are all clearly prohibited. The list then unhelpfully concludes, however, with the phrase “or other services,” thereby vitiating whatever aid the list could have provided in discerning what conduct is banned. Relying on this list, a person of ordinary intelligence would not be put on notice of whether his or her desired conduct would be considered a prohibited “service.”
HLP argues that the term “services” could easily trench upon independent advocacy undertaken for the benefit of a designated group. The majority finds this is not the case, because the government reassures us that it will not apply the regulation to protected speech. The Treasury Department, for example, promises to apply its regulations in a manner “consistent with pertinent Federal law, including, where applicable, the First Amendment....” 72 Fed.Reg. 4206 (Jan. 30, 2007). The government has taken the position and made representations that the term “services” does not reach independent advocacy. I doubt whether such expressed intentions and representations— no matter how earnestly made — could assuage the reasonable fears of entities who stand to have all their assets frozen if the Secretary should change course. Accordingly, I dissent.
. IEEPA authorizes the President to declare a national emergency with respect to "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part oustide the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States[.]” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). Upon declar*1153ing such an emergency, the President may then exercise the authority granted by section 1702. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b). Section 1702 authorizes the President to block any transaction "with respect to ... any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States[.]”