dissenting.
I disagree. The single issue in this appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant, Hudson Area Schools, was deliberately indifferent to the harassment directed at DP. A school district is not deliberately indifferent unless it knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the student’s health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).1 It must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and, further, it must actually draw that inference. See id. Deliberate indifference presupposes that the school knows of a Title IX violation, but it “refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance. The premise, in other words, is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998); see also, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651, 654, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (deliberate indifference established when school district knows of peer harassment, but it “refus[es] to take any action” and “ma[kes] no effort whatsoever” to end the harassment); accord Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that deliberate indifference is shown when “school officials are aware of the misconduct but do nothing to stop it ... ”) (emphasis added).
This standard “does not mean a collection of sloppy, or even reckless, oversights; it means evidence showing an obvious, deliberate indifference to [the] abuse.” See Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir.1996). Ultimately, a Title IX recipient is deliberately indifferent to peer-on-peer harassment “only where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” See Davis, supra, 526 U.S. at 648, 119 S.Ct. 1661. The response must be of such a degree that it facilitated or “subjected” the victim to harassment. See id. at 644-47, 119 S.Ct. 1661. Although this is a sad case, the plaintiffs have clearly not met the high legal standard for deliberate indifference. See Gebser, supra, 524 U.S. at 304, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that only “few Title IX plaintiffs ... will be able to recover damages under this exceedingly high standard”).2
The relevant inquiry in determining whether the school district was deliberate*452ly indifferent is to examine its responses to the known instances of harassment. DP claims that he was harassed almost every day, but the record reflects that he did not report much of the harassment.3 When he did report the harassment at times throughout the years, he sometimes could not identify the harassers.4 Obviously, the school district is not responsible for failing to stop harassment of which it was not made aware, nor can it be held responsible for failing to punish harassment by unknown individuals.
When DP complained and the harassers were identified, however, the defendant responded to each incident with action appropriate to the nature and severity of the harassment. The students who called DP “Mr. Clean” were taken to the school counselor’s office for a meeting with DP, where they were counseled and then apologized. The student who wrote the offensive remarks on the back of his note cards was swiftly reprimanded and he, too, apologized. The student who defaced DP’s planner was orally reprimanded, while a student who taped the “Mr. Clean” poster to his locker was suspended from school for one day. With respect to the locker room assault after baseball practice, NH was reprimanded and his parents were notified (even though DP told the authorities that NH was only “playing around”), and LP was suspended for the rest of the school year, criminally prosecuted, and formally expelled. Significantly, as the district court observed, and as the majority appears to recognize, no identified perpetrator ever harassed or caused problems for DP after being disciplined by the school. There were no repeat offenders, so the only reasonable conclusion from the undisputed facts in the record is that the school’s actions, with respect to those offenders, were 100% effective.5
In addition to investigating all the reported claims of harassment and punishing the offenders so that they never once re-offended, the defendant took additional steps to help DP. For example, his science teacher, Ted Adams, agreed to be extra vigilant in looking out for him. See J.A. at 825. DP’s mother testified that this gave her “a new sense of relief’ because “Mr. Adams was always in the hall watching for [DP], keeping an eye out for him.” Id. Other teachers agreed to keep watch on him as well. Id. at 761, 813. Another of his teachers offered suggestions on how to help DP better cope with his peer-related problems, such as enrolling in extracurricular social programs like band, science *453olympiad, and other activities. Id. at 525, 817. School counselor Susan Mansfield invited DP to attend both group and individual counseling sessions for students having problems with their peer relationships. Id. at 470-71. The school district also took the unusual step of sending a school social worker and psychologist to his home to meet and evaluate him during his (and their) summer break. Id. at 374, 570. He was given extra time to take his exams, he was given seating preferences to avoid students with whom he might have problems, and he was referred to a social worker for counseling several times each month. See id. at 42. The school provided DP with an individualized evaluation program following his ninth grade year. He earned As and Bs, and, as part of his curriculum, he took college courses (at school district expense) which allowed him to take advanced classes, to become fluent in Japanese, and to graduate early from high school.
The school took additional steps that warrant closer review and discussion. First, Principal Greg Rozeveld offered to meet DP every day to provide assistance while he was in middle school, but the majority seems to fault the school district for the timing and circumstances under which these meetings occurred. See Maj. Op. at 440-41. When DP was in the seventh grade, the Pattersons spoke to Principal Rozeveld and told him that they were planning to withdraw DP from school. The parties had a very long meeting during which, according to Ms. Patterson, Mr. Rozeveld said that he “really hated to lose the good ones, the good kids,” and he asked if there was “anything he could do to help.” He offered to meet and counsel DP every day and “start interceding himself.” DP’s mother explained that Principal Rozeveld offered to meet with DP for two interrelated reasons: he wanted to help him academically, and he wanted to “build[] the trust” so that DP would not feel like he was “all alone.” The Patter-sons were “grateful for somebody offering to help,” so they accepted Principal Rozev-eld’s offer and kept DP in school. DP’s mother testified that the first time DP met Principal Rozeveld it was “very nice.” However, the next two or three times that DP went to his office, Mr. Rozeveld was in a meeting or otherwise unavailable. DP’s mother explained to DP that “sometimes that is going to happen, emergencies come up.” It appears that because Principal Rozeveld (as head of the middle school) could not always be guaranteed to be in his office at the time DP’s teachers sent him down during class, it was decided that DP would be sent down at the end of the day along with the students who were having their planners signed. DP did this and met with Principal Rozeveld for a number of weeks, but DP then decided he did not want to continue going because he was concerned the other students might start to think he was a “problem student.” See J.A. at 844-850. That was his choice. It is undisputed that Principal Rozeveld offered to, and did, regularly meet with and counsel DP until DP stopped the sessions. It is also undisputed that Principal Rozev-eld did this to keep DP in school, to improve his grades, to build his trust, and to prevent him from feeling alienated. That DP might have preferred to meet with Mr. Rozeveld at a different time and under different circumstances does not take away from the fact that — rather than being deliberately indifferent — Mr. Rozeveld was unquestionably trying to help DP through this difficult time.
Second, the school district placed DP in a “resource room” for part of each day while he was in the eighth grade which, everyone agrees, worked very well for him. The majority states that the resource room reduced the actual amount of harassment *454directed at DP, see Maj. Op. at 447-49, n. 7, and it faults the school district for discontinuing that room once DP entered high school. See id. at 441-42, 447-49. The undisputed facts do not support such an inference. It is true that the resource room was available to DP for one hour each day while he was in the eighth grade. He went there to meet his science teacher, Mr. Adams, and “just kind of wind my day down with him, do my homework.” See J.A. 621-22. It was the equivalent of study hall. Because DP claims that the harassment occurred in his classes, in between his classes, in the hallways, at lunch, and in the locker areas, it simply does not follow that a study hall for an hour each day could have reduced the harassment to an appreciable degree. In fact, not even DP claims that it did. Rather, he testified that eighth grade was “going good” on its own, and he had “no clue” what caused this positive turnaround. See id.6 What is established by the undisputed facts is that the time spent with Mr. Adams helped DP cope with his peers which, in turn, helped him better deal with the harassment and learn more effectively. Indeed, DP testified that even though he was sometimes picked on and called names in the eighth grade, the harassment did not “bother” him during the time that he was meeting regularly with Mr. Adams. See J.A. at 622. This distinction between meeting with Mr. Adams and being in the resource room is important, for there is nothing in the record to indicate that the resource room itself reduced the actual amount of harassment, as the majority suggests. Rather, it appears that the resource room was effective because of Mr. Adams. DP could not continue getting daily assistance from Mr. Adams once he entered high school, however, because Mr. Adams worked exclusively for the middle school. Nevertheless, even though he did not work for the high school, the defendant granted Mr. Adams special authorization to meet with DP for 20-30 minutes each week (which he did), even after DP entered the ninth grade. See J.A. 854-57. If the defendant was deliberately indifferent to DP and his situation, surely it would not have authorized the middle school science teacher to meet and counsel him every week after he started high school. No reasonable finder of fact could find that there was deliberate indifference with respect to Mr. Adams and the resource room.
And lastly, the school district had various policies and programs dealing with harassment and bullying. All students were well aware that such conduct would not be tolerated. The student athletic code, for example, provided that students were expected to “behave appropriately in the locker room. Horseplay and vandalism will not be tolerated by the coaches or the athletic department.” See J.A. 54. Violations of this policy were punishable as provided for under the code. The student handbook (which applied to all students, not just athletes) prohibited vandalism, physical confrontation, and inappropriate language, and it also provided for punishment to violators. See id. at 82-88. There were two school-wide programs implemented which dealt specifically with *455peer harassment and bullying, “Bang, Bang, You’re Dead” and “Flirting and Hurting.” The majority refuses to consider the policies and programs because it finds evidence that they were “not explained to every student and teacher.” See Maj. Op. at 450 n. 10. For this, the majority cites an affidavit from a former student and classmate of DP’s who, although she recalls the teachers reviewing the student code of conduct with students, does not “recall ever receiving any serious instruction about bullying, teasing or harassment of other students.” See J.A. at 145 (emphasis added). The majority next relies on an affidavit by a temporary substitute teacher (DP’s brother) who taught at DP’s middle school for less than four months and who affirms that he did not receive instruction on the policy for bullying and harassment. See J.A. at 228. The majority also cites to an affidavit signed by the plaintiffs’ expert witness who has opined that, in any event, “no matter how powerfully presented, [onetime programs such as “Bang, Bang, You’re Dead”] have not been demonstrated to have a significant lasting impact on a school’s climate or culture or reducing or eliminating bullying or harassment.” See Maj. Op. at 450 n. 10. Although this evidence (accepted as true for purposes of the summary judgment motion) may speak to the overall effectiveness of the policies and programs, and may be relevant if negligence were the standard, its relevance to the issue of deliberate indifference is questionable. Cf. Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 229 (1st Cir.1996) (defendant had an inefficient and ineffective anti-harassment policy and “leisurely” responded to harassment complaints; whether the policy could have been more effective and better-implemented may have some bearing on whether defendant was negligent, but noting that is not the standard for deliberate indifference). The affidavits relied on by the majority do not create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of deliberate indifference. The majority has not cited any case law, and my own research has uncovered none, holding that good faith (although inefficient) policies and programs addressing peer harassment and bullying may be considered in the deliberate indifference context only if the students subjectively perceive them to be “serious instruction;” only if temporary substitute teachers are aware of them; and only if they have been first shown to have “significant lasting impact.”
In light of the above, it seems to me that the district judge properly found that there were no genuine disputed issues of material fact and that, as a matter of law, the school was not deliberately indifferent. As already noted, deliberate indifference is a high standard to meet, and the analysis is very deferential to schools. Relying on Davis, supra, the Sixth Circuit has described the appropriate legal standard as follows:
The recipient is liable for damages only where the recipient itself intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (discussing Gebser v. Lago Vista School Dist., stating liability arose from recipient’s official decision not to remedy the violation). “[T]he deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, ‘cause [students] to undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable’ to it.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 645, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839.
Vance v. Spencer County Pub. School Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir.2000). The Sixth Circuit’s language is particularly on point in this case:
The recipient is not required to “remedy” sexual harassment nor ensure that *456students conform their conduct to certain rules, but rather, “the recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-649 [119 S.Ct. 1661]. The deliberate indifference standard “does not mean that recipients can avoid liability only by purging their schools of actionable peer harassment or that administrators must engage in particular disciplinary action.” Id. at 648 [119 S.Ct. 1661]. The standard does not mean that recipients must expel every student accused of misconduct. See id Victims do not have a right to particular remedial demands. See id. Furthermore, courts should not second guess the disciplinary decisions that school administrators make. See id.
“The Supreme Court has pointedly reminded us, however, that this is ‘not a mere “reasonableness” standard’ that transforms every school disciplinary decision into a jury question.” Gant, 195 F.3d at 141 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 649, 119 S.Ct. 1661). In an appropriate case, there is no reason why courts on motion for a directed verdict could not identify a response as not “clearly unreasonable” as a matter of law. See Gant, 195 F.3d at 141.
Id. The majority glosses over this high legal standard rather quickly, see Maj. Op. at 446, and it seizes upon the following additional language in Vance:
[W]here a school district has knowledge that its remedial action is inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in light of those circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known circumstances.
231 F.3d at 261. The majority seems to interpret these two sentences to mean that even if the school district takes disciplinary action in response to all known harassment, and even if that action is 100% effective against the individual harassers, it may be liable if there is subsequent harassment by new offenders. There is no authoritative case law to support such an interpretation. For this sweeping expansion of Vance, the majority relies heavily on a single out-of-circuit district court case, Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified School Dist. No. 464, 377 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.Kan. 2005). The district judge in that case did, indeed, reach the same conclusion as the majority. However, there are two reasons why it cannot be relied upon.
First, it is merely one district judge’s opinion and has no authoritative value. Indeed, this very same panel recently noted that mfra-circuit district court cases are of limited value. See United States Student Ass’n Foundation v. Land, 546 F.3d 373, 383 n. 8, 385 n. 10 (6th Cir.2008). It seems to me, then, that the opinion of a single district court judge from outside this circuit is an even thinner reed upon which to base an expansion of this court’s jurisprudence.
Second, and more significantly, it is not persuasive regarding the applicable legal standard. I do not believe the district judge’s opinion in Theno and the majority’s opinion today are justified by the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Vance, nor are they otherwise consistent with any circuit’s ease law. The harassment in Vance was far more egregious, and the response thereto was far less appropriate, than in this case. The student in Vance was subjected to widespread harassment and physical abuse. She was the victim of frequent and vulgar name-calling (“whore” and “gay *457girl,” etc.), and she was touched inappropriately in almost every class. She was stabbed in the hand with a pen during one assault, and, on another occasion, two students held her down and tried to rip off her clothes while another student took off his pants and said that he was going to rape her. School officials “talked to” the offenders, but, incredibly, did not take any further disciplinary action against them. The harassing conduct not only continued, but it increased. In fact, the offenders confronted her after they had been “talked to” specifically in order to harass her again. Even though “ ‘talking to the offenders’ produced no results, [the school] continued to employ this ineffective method.” See 231 F.3d at 262. It was this factual background which led this court to conclude that if a school district “has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known circumstances.” Id. at 261. Vance thus confronted the situation where the harassing students re-offended after they were disciplined (i.e., the discipline “produced no results”), yet the school knowingly continued to use the same ineffective method. This conclusion has no application whatsoever to the present case where the reprimands and other forms of discipline were extraordinarily effective as to the known offenders. The facts of this case are plainly distinguishable from Vance. Again, the defendant here investigated DP’s complaints, and the offending students were counseled, reprimanded, suspended, and/or expelled, depending on the nature of their specific misconduct. No student who received discipline ever bothered DP again. The undisputed facts thus establish that the school district’s actions were 100% effective with respect to those students.
On this point, a decision out of the Third Circuit is very similar and persuasive. See Doe v. Bellefonte Area School Dist., 2003 WL 23718302 (M.D.Pa. Sept.29, 2003), aff'd 106 Fed.Appx. 798 (3d Cir. Aug.4, 2004).7 The student there was ridiculed and harassed by his fellow students for years. He was called “queer,” “gay boy,” “pixie,” “faggot,” and “peter-eater,” among other things. He was pushed at school and physically assaulted at the bus stop. He reported some (but not all) of the bullying and harassment, and the school took varying degrees of disciplinary action when the harassment was reported. Some of the offenders were given verbal warnings and reprimands, some were counseled about the seriousness of the harassment, some were given detention, and others were suspended. Notably, every time the school warned or disciplined an offender, “that perpetrator never bothered Doe again. The School District’s method of dealing with specific, identified perpetrators involving Doe was one hundred percent effective.” 2003 WL 23718302, at *9. Based on the 100% success rate with the individual offenders, coupled with the school agreeing to be extra “vigilant” of the problems and having an anti-harassment policy, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district because “no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the School District was deliberately indifferent to the harassment of Doe, or that its responses to the harassment of which it was aware were clearly unreasonable.” Id. at *9-10
The plaintiff appealed, arguing, as the plaintiffs do here, that the school “should *458have treated the pattern of harassment as a systemic problem,” and its failure to do so was deliberate indifference. 106 Fed.Appx. at 799. He argued that the school’s response was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstance that the harassment continued, even though “each subsequent incident involved a student other than the student that had been disciplined in any of the prior incidents of harassment directed at Doe.” Id. In affirming, the Third Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court’s guidance to lower courts in Davis, and held:
The relevant inquiry for purposes of evaluating whether the School District here was deliberately indifferent to known circumstances of harassment is to review its response to reported incidents of harassment. Each and every time Doe complained, the School District responded with reasonable actions which eliminated further harassment between Doe and the student(s) involved in each incident. Students were suspended and others were given warnings and counseled regarding the seriousness of harassment. In addition, the School District circulated memoranda to faculty and staff putting them on notice of the reported harassment of Doe and requesting assistance to prevent further incidents. Doe was provided with a special means of reporting any additional harassment through the school psychologist, whom he knew personally. The School District also held assemblies and enacted policies addressing peer-to-peer harassment. Such actions are not clearly unreasonable.
Nor was the School District deliberately indifferent because it did not undertake the specific remedial action that Doe desired given what he perceived to be the “systemic nature of the harassment.” Davis does not require school districts to purge their schools of actionable peer harassment or to engage in particular disciplinary action. Id. at 648 [119 S.Ct. 1661], We will refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by the School District which effectively eliminated each reported source of harassment. We do not minimize the unfortunate verbal abuse that Doe was subjected to during his high school years, but the School District was not deliberately indifferent because additional harassment occurred under new and different circumstances. We will affirm the judgment of the district court.
Id. at 800 (emphasis added).8
More importantly, it seems to me that the majority’s decision today is inconsistent with a recent decision from this court. The plaintiff in S.S. v. Eastern Kentucky Univ., 532 F.3d 445 (6th Cir.2008), who had physical and mental disabilities, was harassed by fellow students. The harassment was systemic and it lasted for three *459years. Among many other things, the students called him “gay,” “queer,” “bastard,” and “retard;” they pushed and tackled him in the hallway and lunchroom; they threw paper towels at him that had been soaked with water or urine; they threw bleach on him in science class; and they slammed his head into a glass sneeze-guard, the latter incident necessitating a trip to the hospital and treatment for a sprained neck. On one occasion, a student sexually assaulted the plaintiff by grabbing plaintiffs genitals and saying “Now I’ll see if you are a woman.” After a fight between the plaintiff and “one of his frequent attackers,” the police were called to the school.9 When these incidents were reported, “they were investigated, and responsive action was taken.” See S.S. v. Eastern Kentucky Univ., 431 F.Supp.2d 718, 728 (E.D.Ky. 2006). The school responded to the incidents of which it was made aware by conducting interviews to decide who was at fault and disciplining those who were; instructing S.S.’s classmates not to taunt him; speaking to the students about the name-calling; adding extra monitoring; at times separating S.S. from students with whom he had problems; assisting the police in regards to the fight noted above; and contacting the parents of students involved.
Despite these efforts, the harassment continued, and S.S. filed suit against the school under the Americans with Disabilities Act.10 He argued, in relevant part, that the school did not adequately respond to, and end, the harassment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, and, on appeal, the Sixth Circuit confined its analysis to the deliberate indifference issue. To illustrate the distinction between when the issue should be left for the jury to decide, and when it can be decided on summary judgment, this court discussed two district court cases that it believed were “instructive,” K.M. v. Hyde Park Cent. School Dist., 381 F.Supp.2d 343 (S.D.N.Y.2005); Biggs v. Board of Educ. of Cecil County, Maryland, 229 F.Supp.2d 437 (D.Md.2002).11 In K.M., the student endured peer harassment for years. The school had notice of the harassment, but it took no steps to help or protect him and no one was disciplined. On those particular facts, the district court properly denied summary judgment for the school. Biggs, by contrast, involved similar peer-on-peer harassment, but in that case the school took action whenever there was a reported incident, including counseling the victim, meeting with the offenders and threatening them with suspension, notifying the parents, and alerting teachers to the problem. Because such responses established that the school district was not deliberately indifferent, the district court properly granted summary judgment for the school. The Sixth *460Circuit observed that the facts of S.S. “closely mirrored” Biggs and it went on to conclude that the school was not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law, even though its efforts were unsuccessful and even though the widespread harassment continued. This court explained that “meeting with the students, communicating with parents, and disciplining the offending students” simply did not “give rise to an inference that [the school] was deliberately indifferent to S.S.’s situation or that it had an attitude of permissiveness that amounted to discrimination.” See 532 F.3d at 455-56. Insofar as the defendant here took essentially the same action (investigating, counseling, extra monitoring by staff, seating preferences to separate DP from problem students, meeting with and disciplining the students found at fault, contacting parents, and assisting the police — the sum of which was 100% effective against the individual harassers), this case is a close fit to the scenario in S.S.
That is not to say, of course, that a school may avoid liability merely by taking some action, however minor, in response to known harassment. See Vance, supra, 231 F.3d at 260 (rejecting the argument that as long as a school district “does something in response to harassment,” then it has not acted with deliberate indifference) (emphasis added). The pertinent inquiry is whether the response was appropriate under the particular circumstances. Quoting the Title IX guidelines, Vance described an “appropriate response” to known harassment as follows:
[Schools] should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred and take steps reasonably calculated to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and prevent harassment from occurring again.
Id. at 261 n. 5 (emphasis added). Thus, a school acts appropriately if it investigates what has already occurred, reasonably tries to end any harassment still ongoing by the offenders, and seeks to prevent the offenders from engaging in such conduct again. That is exactly what happened in this case. It is manifestly unreasonable to read the guidelines and Vance as holding that a school district may be responsible for not preventing future harassment by entirely separate and new harassers. To suggest otherwise, as the majority does, comes extremely close to requiring that schools be “purged” of all offensive behavior and be completely harassment-free, which the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit have unequivocally held is not required — or possible. See Vance, supra, 231 F.3d at 260-61 (citing and quoting Davis).
Whether the defendant, from an objective viewpoint, could have (or should have) done more to stop the harassment is not the appropriate inquiry. “Lack of objective reasonableness, ie., a failure to act as a reasonable person would have acted, does not by itself equal deliberate indifference.” See Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 129 (6th Cir.1994). Nor does liability turn upon whether the school successfully remedied the harassment. The only question is whether the school “intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment,” and whether its response was so “clearly unreasonable” and inadequate that it facilitated and subjected DP to harassment. Vance, supra, 231 F.3d at 260; see also Davis, supra, 526 U.S. at 642-47, 119 S.Ct. 1661. Based on the undisputed facts in the record, any reasonable juror would have to answer that question “No.” Therefore, as a matter of law, the district court properly held that the defendant was not deliberately indifferent.
*461For these reasons, I believe the district court’s decision should be affirmed and I respectfully dissent.
. Farmer is an Eighth Amendment prisoner case, but the standard is “applicable to the school context.” Williams ex rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local School Dist., 400 F.3d 360, 368 (6th Cir.2005).
. The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts "must bear in mind that schools are unlike the adult workplace and that children may regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among adults. Indeed, at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their peers.” See Davis, supra, 526 U.S. at 651, 119 S.Ct. 1661 (citation omitted). I do not minimize the harassment at issue for it was very serious, but it appears that at least some of DP's peer-related problems were caused by his heightened sensitivity to the unfortunate reality that “in the school setting, students often engage in insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected to it.” See id. at 651-52, 119 S.Ct. 1661. According to his teachers, DP was at times highly sensitive and had poor social skills which made it difficult for him to "distinguish[ ] between camaraderie and being picked on,” which, in turn, alienated him from the other students. See Joint Appendix ("J.A.”) at 553-54; accord id. at 102. It should be noted that these socialization and peer-related problems existed long before he entered the Hudson school district, apparently even dating back to daycare. See id. at 532.
. To point to one example, the majority states that DP was teased, called names, and pushed and shoved "on a daily basis” while he was in tire sixth grade. Maj. Op. at 439. Despite the daily nature of this harassment, DP admits that he made only "a total of a couple reports regarding [the] incidents that took place1' during that school year: one or two reports to Principal Greg Rozeveld and teacher Gwen Marry. See J.A. at 648.
. DP was unable to say, for example, who vandalized his hall locker. The school conducted an investigation into the matter, as the majority acknowledges, see Maj. Op. at 442, but it was unable to determine who was responsible.
.The incident that took place in the seventh grade when DP intervened in a dispute between two female students and, in the process, was slapped by one of the girls, see Maj. Op. at 440, does not give rise to an inference of deliberate indifference. He told the teacher what occurred, but he claims that nothing was done. Assuming that to be true, it is apparent that the slap was unrelated to the type of harassment at issue in this case. By his own testimony, DP was not the intended victim — he got involved because he was defending the other girl — nor does it appear that this incident was in any way related, or similar, to the harassment which is the subject of this litigation. Indeed, he never had any other problems with the girl. See J.A. at 677-79.
. I emphasize that it was DP himself who testified that the resource room was the equivalent of a study hall (“I would just kind of wind my day down with [Mr. Adams], do my homework”), and, furthermore, not even he claims that it reduced the actual harassment ("Q: What happened to cause that turnaround? A: I have no clue.”). J.A. at 621-22. DP explained that other students in the resource room needed help with their homework, but he "just needed Mr. Adams in there in case I needed him.” DP thus benefitted from time in the resource room because Mr. Adams was his "go-to person” and "one of the only staff members at the school that I felt like I could trust.” See DP's Depo. at 67-69.
. Although this is an unpublished case and has no precedential value in this circuit, a decision of a three-judge panel from a sister court of appeals has to be more persuasive than a single district judge’s opinion from outside this circuit.
. Bellefonte, as noted, is quite similar to this case. The Third Circuit found it significant that the offending students were given warnings and counseled about the seriousness of their actions; each time the school took action the harassment by that particular student stopped; the teachers were advised and agreed to be vigilant about future harassment; the plaintiff was given the means to report harassment through a faculty member whom he knew and trusted; and the school district had an anti-harassment policy. Each of these factors is present here. I also note that in deciding Bellefonte, the Third Circuit impliedly rejected the interpretation of Vance suggested by the majority today, even though it was urged by the appellant on appeal. See generally 2004 WL 3759879, at *20-21, *25-28 (appellant’s brief) (interpreting and citing Vance for the view that if a school district discovers that its response to known harassment is inadequate against "systemic harassment” (even though it may be effective against the individual harassers), then the school must take "additional actions” to avoid “new liability”).
.These facts are set forth in the district court opinion granting summary judgment for the defendant, 431 F.Supp.2d 718 (E.D.Ky.2006), which the Sixth Circuit stated was “an accurate description of the numerous incidents that underlie S.S.'s claims.” See S.S., supra, 532 F.3d at 449. Although there was a dispute as to whether all of the events happened as the plaintiff described, or whether he was himself responsible for initiating many of the confrontations, the court assumed, as it was required to do on summary judgment, that the plaintiff's evidentiary assertions were true. See, supra, 431 F.Supp.2d at 727-28.
. Although the action was not filed under Title IX, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the ADA claim pursuant to, and applied the deliberate indifference standard under, the framework set forth in Davis. See 532 F.3d at 453-54.
. I note that the Sixth Circuit looked to these out-of-circuit district court cases merely for illustrative purposes and not, as the majority apparently does with Theno, as a significant basis for its holding.