concurring.
I concur in the outcome and part of the analysis, but write separately because I do not agree that we are entitled to conduct a plenary re-interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), as the lead opinion does in Sections III.A and III.C.l. Therefore, I cannot join the lead opinion’s statement that “we have determined that, under the provisions of her contract with Goodyear, Nance effectively resigned by not reporting in.” Put simply, I do not believe that this determination on the meaning or application of the CBA is ours to make. I also disagree with Section III.B, which mischaraeterizes my position.
I.
I agree that Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 *559L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), disallows the use of claim preclusion (res judicata) to bar Ms. Nance’s action from federal court. Indeed, “[t]here is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction.” Id. at 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011. But, I do not agree that Alexander and its progeny disallow the use of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) to bar the re-litigation of any issue raised anew in the subsequent action. Specifically, I do not agree that Alexander or its progeny explicitly disallow the use of issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of an issue that is solely dependent on an interpretation or application of the CBA (such as the resignation-under-the-CBA issue in this case) and, hence, otherwise specifically committed to the expertise of the arbitrator. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53-54, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (“Thus the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights, and this authority remains regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VIL”); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (“While courts should defer to an arbitral decision where the employee’s claim is based on rights arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement, different considerations apply where the employee’s claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.”); Wright v. Univ. Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78-79, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998) (“That presumption [favoring arbitration of contractual disputes] does not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret the terms of a CBA.”). Having said that, however, I am not inclined to hold that an arbitrator’s decision, standing on its own, should necessarily receive preclusive effect. If the arbitrator’s decision had been appealed and we were instead confronted with a prior decision from this court, my opinion might be different. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984).
To be sure, Alexander, 415 U.S. at 50-54, 94 S.Ct. 1011, holds that, based on the same underlying facts and circumstances, a plaintiff may have a remedy based on either a contractual right or a statutory right, without necessarily having a remedy based on both (i.e., the absence of a remedy based on one does not foreclose a plaintiffs right to seek, and receive, relief based on the other). Specifically, Alexander holds that an arbitrator’s decision that an employer did not violate the nondiscrimination clause of its CBA (i.e., the contractual right) does not preclude that employee from seeking a decision from a federal court that the very same conduct does violate Title VII (i.e., a statutory right). The analogous construct in the present case would be that the arbitrator’s decision that Goodyear did not terminate Ms. Nance under the terms of Article X of its CBA does not preclude Ms. Nance from seeking a decision from the federal court that the very same conduct does constitute “termination” without regard to the CBA, i.e., under a federal statute. But that is not what the lead opinion says here. The lead opinion says that Ms. Nance has a right to have a federal court decide whether Goodyear terminated her under the CBA based on the court’s re-interpretation and reapplication of Article X of the Goodyear CBA. The broader implication — and, presumably, the intention — of this assertion is that a plaintiff has a right to a federal-court re-determination of any finding, even those that are entirely dependent *560on the terms of the CBA (and the expertise of the arbitrator).
Not only is this assertion inconsistent with Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53-54, 94 S.Ct. 1011, Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737, 101 S.Ct. 1437, and Wright, 525 U.S. at 78-79, 119 S.Ct. 391, as were cited in the foregoing paragraph, it would also empower a plaintiff to collaterally attack even an express holding of a prior panel of this court. Suppose Ms. Nance had appealed the arbitrator’s decision that she had resigned — a decision based entirely on the arbitrator’s application of Article X of the CBA. And suppose a panel of this court had affirmed that decision. If it is true, as the lead opinion asserts, that Ms. Nance could thereafter re-litigate that same issue (i.e., the proper interpretation and application of Article X of the CBA, in regard to whether she resigned) under the auspices of a civil rights action, then the prior panel’s holding on that issue would be nothing more than an advisory opinion. I submit that, because we have no authority to render advisory opinions, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), our ability to hear appeals from arbitrators’ decisions is henceforth in doubt.
This brings me to my second point. If, as I have hypothesized, the parties had appealed the arbitrator’s decision directly, we would not have reviewed that decision de novo. On direct appeal, we would have reviewed that decision under the deferential standard that we recently set out in Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, 475 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc) (confining our review of an arbitrator’s decision to: (1) whether the dispute was committed to arbitration; (2) whether the arbitrator was, at least arguably, construing or applying the contract to resolve the dispute; and (3) whether the decision was tainted by any “procedural aberration,” such as fraud, conflict of interest, or dishonesty). Consequently, if the parties had appealed the arbitrator’s decision directly and we had before us a prior, judicial decision from a panel of this court, then I believe we would now face a different question regarding issue preclusion.
Since the arbitrator’s decision in this case was not appealed, however, we are not confronted with a prior decision from a panel of this court, but only a prior decision from an arbitrator, albeit a decision on an issue that is indisputably entirely dependent on an interpretation or application of a term in the CBA and, hence, otherwise specifically committed to the expertise of the arbitrator. From an issue preclusion standpoint, I read Alexander and its progeny as prescribing de novo review of disputes and questions concerning interpretation or application of federal statutes, regardless of the contract, but not disputes and questions concerning only interpretation or application of the contract or CBA. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (“Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII.”). Therefore, I believe that, by conducting a de novo review of the meaning and applicability of Article X of the Goodyear CBA with respect to the resignation-as-determined-by-the-CBA question, we have allowed a plaintiff to collaterally attack the arbitrator’s decision in a way that contradicts our Michigan Family Resources precedent, merely by filing a statutory-rights-based claim in federal court, regardless of its merit,1 and thus, to cir*561cumvent the deferential standard of Michigan Family Resources on an issue that is purely contractual.
To repeat, I simply do not believe that we are entitled to interpret or apply the contract de novo in this context, when we could not do so on direct review. I believe the proper approach to this type of situation — one which reconciles Alexander and Michigan Family Resources — is to review an arbitrator’s decision on a purely contractual claim under the Michigan Family Resources standard, and review statutory-rights-based claims under a de novo standard, in accordance with Alexander. I believe this fits the case law and affords all of our precedent its due respect.
II.
The lead opinion fails to rebut my explanation of Alexander and my practical reconciliation of Alexander with Michigan Family Resources. Its contention that the present case cannot be distinguished from Alexander relies on a mischaracterization of Alexanders premise as a purely contractual question of whether Mr. Alexander’s employer had “just cause” for firing him under the terms of the CBA, which the lead opinion equates to the question of whether Ms. Nance “resigned.” But, in actuality, the Supreme Court framed Alexander as follows:
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court found that the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to petitioner. It then held that petitioner, having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement, was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the District Court’s opinion. We granted petitioner’s application for certiorari.
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 43, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (citations, footnote, and paragraph break omitted; emphasis added). Thus, in Alexander, the arbitrator resolved a “claim of racial discrimination” under the “nondiscrimination clause of the [CBA],” even though discrimination is a matter of federal statutory law and not the type of issue properly bargained away in a CBA or for determination by a labor arbitrator; whereas the arbitrator in the present case resolved a claim that Ms. Nance had resigned when she failed to call in, as prescribed by the terms of the Goodyear CBA, which is exactly the type of issue properly relegated to collective bargaining, and hence, appropriately determined by an arbitrator.
Indeed, the whole point of Alexander was that the issue to be resolved — the “claim of racial discrimination” under the “nondiscrimination clause of the [CBA]”— was the type of issue committed to federal statute and to determination by a federal court, not the type of issue properly relegated to a CBA or to determination by a labor arbitrator. Thus, the lead opinion’s contention that the present case cannot be distinguished from Alexander is unpersuasive, inasmuch as the point of Alexander was to draw this very distinction: some issues are properly submitted to federal courts (i.e., federally protected rights), while other issues are properly submitted to labor arbitrators.
*562The lead opinion asserts that “Alexander and its progeny” expressly provide for a dissatisfied employee to collaterally attack an arbitrator’s decision in a way that otherwise contradicts Michigan Family Resources. This argument is specious. The lead opinion cites four Supreme Court cases2 and eight Circuit Court eases,3 but not one of those cases does what the lead opinion does here — re-interpret the CBA and apply it to the facts of the case to reach its decision. In short, the lead opinion offers no controlling precedent to justify its approach.
Not only is there no controlling precedent to justify this approach, there is no reason behind it either. There is no good reason to create a system in which a dissatisfied employee is allowed to collaterally attack an arbitrator’s decision in a way that contradicts our established precedent, or that might well lead to contradictory results from two panels of this court in a case arising from common circumstances, involving the same parties, and concerning the identical issue. Hence, the lead opinion’s only recourse is to argue that Alexander and its progeny represent a sweeping proclamation by the Supreme Court disallowing the use of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) to bar the re-litigation of any issue raised anew in the subsequent action (thereby expressly allowing collateral attack and the possibility of inconsistent judgments). But, the lead opinion does not explain why the Supreme Court (or any court) would do this, when courts go to such lengths to avoid these consequences in every other aspect of the law. The simple answer is that it would not.
The fact is that the Supreme Court did draw a distinction- — -between those issues to be resolved under a CBA (by an arbitrator) and those issues to be resolved under federal law (by a court). The lead opinion — apparently recognizing my point— proclaims that: “whether [Ms.] Nance resigned without notice might mean one thing under Goodyear’s CBA, but it might very well mean an entirely different thing for the purposes of an ‘adverse employment action’ under the ADA.” Having said this, however, the lead opinion fails to realize what it had said just one sentence earlier (and what I have been saying all along) — “While the expertise of arbitrators lies in the application of facts to the terms of an employee’s contract or collective bargaining agreement, the expertise of federal courts lies in the application of facts to anti-discrimination statutes.” The arbitrator is peculiarly qualified to decide the question of “whether [Ms.] Nance resigned ... under Goodyear’s CBA,” while the court is peculiarly qualified to decide “whether [Ms.] Nance resigned ... for the purposes of an ‘adverse employment action’ under the ADA.” It is that simple.
But, after acknowledging that these are two different questions, each peculiarly suited to a decision-maker with unique expertise, the lead opinion decides to treat them the same, dismissing the arbitrator’s expertise and assigning them both to review by the federal court, despite its ree-*563ognized lack of expertise as to the first question. As “support” for this decision, the lead opinion offers nothing more than an itemization of the shortcomings of the arbitration process as a whole. Indeed, if the issue confronting us were whether an arbitrator’s decision should be entitled to some respect or deference by a court of law, I would say this argument is a good one. But that is not the issue confronting us, and that argument does not address the issue that we do confront.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I reiterate my position that I read Alexander and its progeny as prescribing de novo review of disputes and questions concerning federal statutes, regardless of the contract, but not for disputes and questions concerning only the contract. The meaning or interpretation of the contract should be decided by the arbitrator and reviewed pursuant to our deferential standard, as set forth in Michigan Family Resources, 475 F.3d at 753.
III.
Finally, even if I agreed to treat the arbitrator’s decision as “merely evidence,” as the lead opinion does, I would question its admissibility in this case on an eviden-tiary basis, as this “evidence” is almost certainly hearsay. To be sure, Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60, 94 S.Ct. 1011, said “[t]he arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate,” but Alexander-decided February 19,1974 — predated the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Alexander Court was not confronted with present-day hearsay concerns. I realize that, in other post-Alexander scenarios, courts have admitted arbitrators’ rulings as hearsay exceptions, pursuant to public records exception, Fed.R.Evid. 803(8), or the residual exception, Fed.R.Evid. 807. In such cases, the parties argued the admissibility of the particular arbitrator’s decision and the district court rendered a decision pursuant to those arguments. I believe this to be the proper approach. But, here, the lead opinion disregards the hearsay aspect of the arbitrator’s opinion and renders a decision that could be read in either of two ways: (1) an arbitrator’s opinion is per se admissible, despite its hearsay character or questions of reliability or relevance; or (2) the admissibility of an arbitrator’s opinion is to be determined by the factors set forth in Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 fn. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1011, regardless of its hearsay character. I find either of these objectionable.
“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801. If we are to treat the arbitrator’s decision as merely evidence, then that decision is almost certainly hearsay — i.e., the arbitrator’s decision is a statement made by a declarant (i.e., arbitrator) who is not presently testifying, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., arbitrator’s opinion on the matter). And, trial courts do not render sua sponte decisions on the admissibility of hearsay evidence; that is for the parties to raise and argue, which was never done in this case.
Finally, the lead opinion’s suggestion in its footnote three that the Supreme Court “approved of this approach” in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984), is seriously inaccurate. In footnote thirteen to McDonald, the Supreme Court stated: “an arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence” (emphasis added), and then quoted Alexander regarding the “weight to be accorded an arbitral decision” upon its admission. There was no *564discussion whatsoever of its admissibility subject to a hearsay challenge.
IV.
For all of the forgoing reasons, I concur in the judgment but not the entire analysis.
. One need look no further than Section III. C.l. of the lead opinion, which contains a *561detailed inquiry into the interpretation and application of Article X of the Goodyear CBA, even though the arbitrator had already resolved this issue definitively, and even though the lead opinion ultimately concludes that Ms. Nance’s claims lack merit.
. Wright, 525 U.S. at 70, 119 S.Ct 391; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011.
. Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 918 (8th Cir.1986); Gonzalez v. S. Pacific Transp. Co., 773 F.2d 637, 643 (5th Cir.1985); Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consol. Freightways, 687 F.2d 140, 141-42 (6th Cir.1982); Aleem v. Gen. Felt Indus., Inc., 661 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir.1981); Lyght v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F.2d 435, 438 (6th Cir.1981); Wiedemann v. Oklahoma City, 76 Fed.Appx. 931, 932 (10th Cir.2003); Grappe v. Kansas City S. R.R., 71 Fed.Appx. 302, 303 (5th Cir.2003); Williams v. Perry, No. 00-7366, 2000 WL 1506086, at *5-7 (2d Cir. Oct.6, 2000).