District Judge, dissenting.
By its action today, this Court unjustifiably chooses to adopt, albeit for an interim period, and to give the judicial imprimatur to a reapportionment plan, Act No. 82-629, as modified by the Court, which this Court knows fails to pass muster as not being an abridgment of the right to vote of minorities in the western “black belt” legislative districts of the State of Alabama. As a result, this Court winks at Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, and turns its back on the specific group of people that section was intended to protect. Accordingly, I must dissent.
I
Some additional background, which the Court fails to give, is appropriate.
The main opinion correctly notes that the Attorney General of the United States has failed to preclear either of the two reapportionment plans, Act No. 81-1049 and Act No. 82-629, submitted to him pursuant to Section 5, thereby leaving the Alabama legislature without a legally enforceable reapportionment plan for the impending 1982 elections. Both the main and concurring opinions also correctly conclude that as a result this Court is faced with the unfortunate exigent circumstances of having to choose an interim reapportionment plan from several proposed plans, each of which has not received the detailed consideration it deserves, so that the election process may go forward. However, both the main and concurring opinions overlook the fact that the fault for these unfortunate circumstances lies squarely with the Alabama legislature because it has failed to act in a timely fashion as required by the law with which it is all too familiar.
*244As early as 1962, this Court indicated to the legislature what its responsibility was and continues to be: that periodic, timely reapportionment according to the requirements of the law is first and foremost a matter for consideration and determination by the legislature. Sims v. Frink, 208 F.Supp. 431, 441 (M.D.Ala.), aff’d sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Nevertheless, even though the legislature was aware that the population variances in its current districting plan for both the House and the Senate exceeded what was allowed under the Fourteenth Amendment and further that any new reapportionment plan would have to be precleared by the Attorney General pursuant to Section 5, it was not until October 21, 1981, less than eight months before the machinery for the 1982 elections was to move into gear with the qualification of persons as candidates, that the Alabama legislature passed a new reapportionment plan for the 1982 elections, Act No. 81-1049; it was not until January 1982, almost three months after the plan was passed and less than six months before the election process was to begin, that the plan was submitted to the U. S. Attorney General for preclearance pursuant to Section 5; and it was not until April 1982, less than two months before the election process was to begin, that the submission was deemed “complete” by the Attorney General. As to the second plan, Act No. 82-629, it was not passed by the legislature and submitted to the Attorney General until June 1982, as a result of a suggestion by this Court that the legislature try to cure the defects in Act No. 81-1049 before the impending election deadlines.
And yet this Court, twenty years after Sims v. Frink, primarily in the name of exigency, ignores Section 5 and imposes on a people who are not in any way responsible for the unfortunate circumstances facing this Court a plan which the Attorney General has found fails to meet Section 5 standards.1 I am of the opinion that, in view of the legislature’s nonfeasance as demonstrated above and in view of there being at least one plan more acceptable than Act No. 82-629, this result is unwarranted.
II
Both the main and concurring opinions allow, based upon premises which are unsupported by the record, the use of the state’s facially unacceptable redistricting plan, Act No. 82-629. Moreover, the Court has before it at least one, if not two, plans which merit use before the state’s plan; and yet the Court still allows the State of Alabama to implement its plan in violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
The plans which the parties now urge upon the Court are generally described as follows. Act No. 82-629, the legislative plan, provides for three safe black senate seats and twelve safe black house2 seats, resulting in the same number of safe black seats as is provided by the 1972 court-ordered plan. This plan is apparently modeled to some degree after the 1972 plan in order to preserve the present boundaries of the present incumbents’ districts. Consequently, the district boundaries in Act No. 82-629 are oddly drawn and pay no respect to county lines. The plan fragments many black communities, including House District 36 in Jefferson County, splits many of the western “black belt” counties into two or more house districts, and groups black majority counties in the “black belt” with majority white “non-black belt” counties. The defendants themselves have conceded that two districts of Act No. 82-629 contain substantive violations of Section 5. That is, these two districts have large retrogressions *245in black voting strength from the 1972 plan to the present plan.3 See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976). As noted above, the Attorney General has refused to preclear those portions of the plan dealing with the western “black belt” districts and House District 36 in Jefferson County.
The plaintiffs’ proposed modifications of Act No. 82-629 attempt to resolve the objections of the Attorney General in the “black belt” and in Jefferson County, while at the same time doing the least possible violence to the remainder of the plan. The modifications, by honoring the plaintiffs’ stated policy of preserving county lines and avoiding fragmentation of black communities, create one additional safe black house district and one additional safe black senate district in the western “black belt” counties.4 The Jefferson County modification, which the Court adopts, increases the black population of District 36 from 39% to 53.2% by “unpacking” one of Act No. 82-629’s black districts, House District 44. The plan also does have a ripple effect, changing the boundaries of approximately 28 other districts.
The plaintiffs’ plan B is notably different from any other plan before the Court. This plan directly addresses the potential of racial gerrymandering created by leaving redistricting boundaries to the unbridled discretion of the legislature. It succeeds to a large extent in maximizing the preservation of county boundaries while maintaining a ± 5% population deviation. This plan results in sixteen safe black house districts and three safe black senate districts, an increase of approximately three black representatives over Act No. 82-629.
The attacks by the Court on the plaintiffs’ plan — that is, their modifications and plan B — in an attempt to justify its acceptanee of a plan which violates the Voting Rights Act are without basis in the record. Even assuming that the criticisms have some merit — which they do not — they still do not warrant the Court’s rejection of the plans in favor of one which fails to meet Section 5 standards.
The Court in the main opinion, after acknowledging the Attorney General’s pending concerns with Act No. 82-629’s potential abridgment of the right to vote of minorities, goes on to reject the plaintiffs’ modifications because they do not solve the vote dilution in the “black belt” counties. This criticism is unsupported by the record. The modifications in fact create two additional safe black districts. They also address the concerns, expressed by the Attorney General and echoed by many “black belt” citizens who spoke at the public hearing before the Joint Reapportionment Committee of the state legislature, regarding the legislative plan’s calculated departure from county lines in drawing its districts.5
Second, the main opinion rejects both the plaintiffs’ modifications and plan B because they require too extensive changes in the legislative plan. All parties, however, agree that correction of Act No. 82-629 to meet the Attorney General’s concerns would require changes in approximately 30 districts; the plaintiffs’ modifications reach no further.
Finally, in view of the legislature’s refusal to address adequately the Attorney General’s concerns after being put on notice by the rejection of Act No. 81-1049, the main opinion’s rejection of the minimum changes essential to correct the objectionable areas in Act No. 82-629 is unjustified. Deference to the legislature does not extend so far as to allow the Court to reject the remedy of a plan to which the Attorney General has *246objected. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon,U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 1522 & n.7, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982) (per curiam). Nevertheless, it is clear in this case that the Court’s deference to the legislative plan has precluded its giving the plaintiffs’ proposals the consideration deserved.6 Such deference to a legislative plan which the Attorney General has refused to preclear, under the circumstances in this case, exceeds the limits of fairness and equity.
The concurring opinion, unlike the main opinion, addresses the merits of the alternative plans. After having also acknowledged the apparent problems with Act No. 82-629, the concurring opinion goes on to adopt the legislative plan, apparently in the view that it is the lesser of several evils. The thrust of this opinion’s criticism of the plaintiffs’ proposals is that they “discriminate” against whites.7 This criticism is unfounded. The grounds for this criticism appear to be, as to the modifications, that they unnecessarily created additional majority black senate seats outside of the “black belt” by packing already safe black house seats. All parties concede that in order to address properly the Attorney General’s objection in the “black belt” the modifications would extend or ripple outside the “black belt.” The modifications did not exceed the predicted necessary ripple effect.8
Moreover, the plaintiffs’ modifications created only one additional safe senate seat (district 28) — and this seat was in the “black belt.”9 There was also one 61% black population senate district created (district 26), which is not by definition a safe seat.10 There is no evidence whatsoever that these modifications were inappropriate responses to the Attorney General’s objections regarding the configuration of house and senate districts in these areas. To the contrary, the safe black senate seat resulted from natural configuration and the 61% black senate seat was created to offset retrogression elsewhere.
Nor is there any evidence in the record that any other of the ripple effects of the plaintiffs’ modifications were unwarranted. In view of the fact (1) that the modifications had to extend outside the “black belt” counties and (2) that the modifications’ prevention of overall retrogression necessarily created counter effects in other areas, there is simply no evidence from which it can be concluded that the plaintiffs’ modifications unnecessarily created additional black districts.
Other than the modifications themselves, the Court has no evidence that the modifications discriminate against whites. There*247fore the concurring opinion bases its conclusion of discrimination, as it must, solely on the fact that the modifications result in two additional safe black districts. If such evidence, when considered with the fact that there are now only three black senators out of 35 and thirteen black representatives out of 105 in a state which has a black population of 26%, were enough to support a claim of discrimination, the force of the evidence would be in a direction opposite to that claimed in the concurring opinion of the Court.
As to plan B, the concurring opinion states that the proposal is not racially neutral because the burden of its tendency to pit incumbents against each other falls most heavily on whites. Again, initially it must be noted that only sixteen of 140 of Alabama’s present legislators are black. The fact that this plan pairs no two blacks against each other is offset significantly by consideration of these figures: the likelihood of two of the sixteen black incumbents being paired against each other, or of one black incumbent being paired against a white, is considerably less than the likelihood of two of 119 whites being paired against each other, even assuming a random drawing of districts.
Neither the plaintiffs’ modifications nor plan B, however, contain a random drawing of districts. Rather, both plans address the Attorney General’s concern regarding the legislative plan’s failure to honor the integrity of county lines; they do this in an attempt to avoid the potential for racial gerrymandering inherent in the state’s approach to redistricting. Finally, the plaintiffs’ proposals, which draw their districts based upon county lines, are drawn not on a blank slate but on a map already occupied by incumbents residing in oddly configured districts. The results are inevitable: incumbents are forced to run against each other and, because the overwhelming number of legislators are white, most of those paired against each other are white. Such is the cost of a plan designed along neutral lines to minimize racial gerrymandering of blacks. To draw from such a plan the inference of deliberate discrimination against whites refuses to blacks in this state any neutral guidelines to prevent racial gerrymandering.
Most importantly, even assuming that the concurring opinion’s criticisms of the plaintiffs’ plan are true, the established violations of Section 5 by Act No. 82-629 are significantly more egregious than the speculative concerns the concurrence poses as to the plaintiffs’ proposals. The speculations cannot justify the adoption of a plan with clear violations of Section 5.
Ill
The Court in both the main and concurring opinions also fails to give Section 5 the consideration it is due.
The Voting Rights Act was enacted with the express intention of “rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination in voting,” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315, 86 S.Ct. 803, 812,15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), and Section 5 of the act was specifically designed to provide more stringent protection for minority voting rights in areas where minorities have historically been the subjects of pervasive discrimination. Id at 308, 315, 86 S.Ct. at 808, 812; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548, 556, 89 S.Ct. 817, 822, 826-27, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Alabama is one of those areas. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U.S. at 329, 86 S.Ct. at 819.
To enforce minority voting rights in these areas, Section 5 requires that before a state covered by the Voting Rights Act may enact a change in a voting procedure, including a state reapportionment plan, see, e.g., McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 153, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 2238, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981), it must first obtain a ruling from either the Attorney General or the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia that such plan “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. To obtain this preclearance under Section 5, the covered state must carry the burden of proving the absence of a discriminatory purpose or ef*248feet. Such an extensive and strict remedial measure was needed because previous legislation and the attempts of courts to implement the legislation had proved ineffective in combatting the various ingenious methods used by officials in some states to prevent minorities, in particular blacks, from the full and free exercise of their franchise. The measure was designed to place the “burden of proof” on the covered states so as to protect minorities in those states from again running the risk of having their franchise taken away by last minute pieces of legislation. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, 383 U.S. at 313-16, 86 S.Ct. 810-12.
But today, what was not to have occurred under Section 5 has occurred, for the people of the western “black belt” are now subjected to a last minute measure by a state legislature — a measure which the Attorney General has found, according to the evidence presented to him, fails to meet Section 5’s standards.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that a district court in fashioning an interim reapportionment plan should follow the appropriate Section 5 standards, including the body of administrative and judicial precedent developed in Section 5 cases, McDaniel v. Sanchez, supra, 101 S.Ct. at 2235 (1981), and further, that a district court in fashioning an interim plan is obligated to give “deference” only to those parts of a legislatively drafted plan which have been found by the Attorney General to meet Section 5 standards, Upham v. Seamon, - U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982) (per curiam). In view of these principles, the history of Section 5 as well as the facts that the Alabama legislature for over twenty years has failed to meet its obligations under the law, that the present exigent circumstances are due totally to the inaction of the legislature, and that the legislature has presented this Court with a plan which fails to meet Section 5 standards, I am of the opinion that in such circumstances, as are now presented to this Court, it is time that in the balance some “deference” be given to persons whom laws, such as Section 5, were intended to protect.
IV
In conclusion, I am of the opinion that this Court has unwarrantedly imposed upon the people of the western “black belt” of this state a legislative plan which is violative of federal law, dealt Section 5 of. the Voting Rights Act a severe blow, and allowed the Alabama legislature to bootstrap itself, by its own knowing nonfeasance, into a position which it could not otherwise have had under federal law. In this, I cannot concur.
ORDER
Pursuant to the opinion of this Court made and entered this date, it is
ORDERED that Act No. 82-629, which was enacted by the Alabama Legislature after the Attorney General of the United States objected to Act No. 81-1049, be modified as set out in the Appendix to this opinion, and, as modified, implemented as an interim plan with the express provision that if the Attorney General of the United States objects to said plan and the objection is not overruled by the District Court for the District of Columbia, or if this Court subsequently sustains plaintiffs’ other objections to this interim plan; then, in either of those events, the interim redistricting plan shall not be effective for any election after December 31, 1983.
This Court will consider plaintiffs’ other objections to Act No. 82-629 if the Attorney General does not object to Act No. 82-629 within the time prescribed by the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as amended. If the Attorney General objects to said Act (other than to request the adoption of the Court’s modification), and such objection is not overruled, or if this Court sustains plaintiffs’ other objections to Act No. 82-629, the Legislature may attempt to enact a valid plan. If such plan is not approved by the Attorney General or if it does not meet any objections which may be found by this Court to be present in the present redistricting plan, as modified, this Court will proceed to draw a permanent court-ordered *249plan for the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature.
. Contrary to what the main opinion implies, the Attorney General specifically stated that “we are unable to conclude on the basis of the State’s explanation of these matters that the burden under Section 5 has yet been met respecting the House and Senate districts in these areas.” Thus, the Attorney General found that the State had failed to meet the Section 5 standards based on the present record.
. Not included in the figure as a safe black district is House District 103 which is 64.9% black; the current representative from that district is black.
. One, District 45, drops from 89% black to 67% black; and the other, District 88, drops from 56% to 48.7% black.
. The additional safe house seat is labelled District 84 in the plaintiffs’ modifications; it corresponds to Act No. 82-629’s District 90. This district consists of parts of Choctaw County and all of Greene and Sumter counties.
The additional safe black senate seat is la-belled District 28. It is composed of all of Wilcox, Sumter, Greene, Hale, Perry, and Lowndes counties and parts of Dallas and Choctaw counties.
. Plan B, as noted above, addresses these same concerns state-wide.
. The main opinion also suggests that plan B must be rejected because it has not been subjected to the intensive scrutiny which the legislative plan has endured. This suggestion was refuted by the plaintiffs. Plan B was submitted for consideration by the state legislature and rejected. It has also been submitted to, and considered by, the Attorney General.
. It is ironic that the main opinion rejects the plaintiffs’ modifications in part because they do not do enough to relieve vote dilution in the black belt, whereas the concurring opinion rejects the modifications on the ground that they do too much and discriminate against whites.
. The necessity of the extension of the modifications outside the “black belt” was demonstrated by the modifications submitted by the defendants, who refused to extend outside the “black belt.” These modifications, purportedly submitted in response to the Court’s order to address the concerns of the Attorney General, actually caused a retrogression of black voting strength.
. This district was composed of Act No. 82-629’s house districts 83, 86, and 90.
. The only other house districts to which the concurrence’s “packing” allegations might conceivably apply are house districts 98 and 99 in Mobile. Those districts were, however, already “packed” under the 1972 plan; the plaintiffs’ modifications therefore act only to prevent retrogression, measured strictly by percentages of black population, in those districts. The legislative plan measured by the same standard, in contrast, causes retrogression in both districts.
The senate seat (district 33) of which these two house districts are parts under the plaintiffs’ modifications was already a safe senate seat under Act No. 82-629. There is thus no basis for the charge that the plaintiffs used the modifications as a guise to create black senate seats elsewhere, for these seats already existed.