Dissenting.
¶ 1 I conclude that the Commonwealth proved that the officers in question had the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention of Appellant, and, therefore, I would affirm the judgment of sentence. As such, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 My review of the record reveals that on February 27, 2001, Mardi Gras festivities were taking place on South Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Reports from the Philadelphia Police Department suggested that significant underage drinking was likely to occur in that area during these festivities. Accordingly, several Pennsylvania liquor control officers were assigned to a detail to identify patrons in South Street bars who appeared to be under the age of twenty-one and who were drinking alcoholic beverages.
¶ 3 The Pennsylvania liquor control officers specifically targeted a bar called “Name That Bar” on South Street, and officers wearing street clothes went thereto. Upon entering the bar, the officers approached patrons who looked under twenty-one years old and asked them to produce identification. Those patrons identified as being under the age of twenty-one were separated from the other patrons. Appellant, who was in the bar at the time, revealed that she was seventeen years old, and she was detained along with the other patrons. While standing near Appellant, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Officer Cynthia Taylor saw that Appellant was upset and Appellant indicated that she had not been drinking alcohol while in “Name That Bar,” although she had been drinking alcohol earlier in the evening. Based upon Appellant’s admission, she was charged with underage drinking, 18 Pa. C.S.A § 6308, and she subsequently filed a motion to suppress.
*750¶ 4 I conclude that the lower court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. Following the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Pennsylvania Courts have recognized that under limited circumstances, police officers are justified in investigating a situation and may conduct brief, investigatory detentions of individuals, so long as the police officers reasonably believe that criminal activity may be afoot. Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673 (1999); In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116 (Pa.Super.2002). In determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists, we must look to the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa.Super.1998). A police officer must demonstrate reasonable suspicion by pointing to articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 698 A.2d 571 (1997). A law enforcement officer who “lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest” but possesses reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, is not required “to simply shrug his shoulders and allow.. .a criminal to escape.” Commonwealth v. Lagamba, 418 Pa.Super. 1, 613 A.2d 1, 5 (1992). “Merely because a suspect’s activity may be consistent with innocent behavior does not alone make detention and limited investigation illegal.” In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116, 121 (Pa.Super.2002).
¶ 5 Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, I conclude that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity when she was briefly stopped at “Name That Bar.” Here, the police observed Appellant, who appeared to be under the legal drinking age, in an establishment whose primary purpose is to sell alcohol, during a time when, based on the officers’ experience, a substantial amount of underage drinking occurred. I conclude that the circumstances justifying the investigative detention in this case are stronger than those in other cases in which this Court has found sufficient reasonable suspicion to necessitate an investigative detention. For example, in In re C.C.J., 799 A.2d 116 (Pa.Super.2002), a panel of this Court concluded that officers had a reasonable suspicion to justify a stop when they observed a juvenile, who appeared to be of a school age youth, on the public street during a time when school was in session. We specifically concluded that the apparent age of the appellant, together with the time of day, was sufficient for the police to suspect that the appellant was a truant. While it was not illegal for the appellant to be present on a public street, in light of other circumstances, such as the time of day and fact the appellant was a minor, the police were justified in investigating the matter further.
¶ 6 As in In re C.C.J., the apparent age of Appellant, along with the place, time, and circumstances surrounding her presence in “Name That Bar” were sufficient for experienced officers to briefly detain Appellant for investigative purposes. In fact, I conclude that it would have been a dereliction of their duty for Pennsylvania liquor control officers not to further investigate for underage drinking in circumstances such as those presented here.
¶ 7 Finally, I find the Majority’s comments regarding the corpus delicti rule unnecessary and inconsistent with this Court’s scope of review. The Majority includes comments on an issue which was not properly preserved in the court below. My review of the record reveals that Appellant failed to object under the corpus delicti rule, and, therefore, any challenge thereto has not been preserved. Pa. R.A.P. 302.
*7511f8 Judges ORIE MELVIN and GRACI joined the Dissenting Opinion by STEVENS, J.