dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that since the appellant was not informed that he had 30 days within which to perfect a direct appeal, his delay of 4 years, 8 months in filing a P.C.H.A. Petition was implicitly explained and, therefore, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. I cannot condone such an abuse of the Post Conviction Hearing Act.
During the proceedings held on April 19, 1977, the Honorable John C. Dowling took the time on 2 occasions to inform the appellant of his right to file a direct appeal.1
THE COURT: The only rights you have, after you are found guilty, would be to file an appeal, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court or Superior Court in which the only thing you could question- then really would be the voluntariness of the pleas, the legality of any sentence imposed and the jurisdiction of the Court. Other than that, you are pretty well precluded when you plead guilty from raising any other matters. Is that understood?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir.
(N.T. at 17).
THE COURT: ... Now you have been sentenced, Mr. Hairston, and you have the right to file a direct appeal from your judgment of sentence to the Superior Court. If you wish to file such an appeal and are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be provided as it has been *455heretofore, counsel will be provided for you free of charge.
(N.T. at 140).
It is admitted that the appellant was never informed that he had only 30 days to appeal. See: Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. However, he knew he had a right to appeal. Did he think that this right was perpetual? Moreover, if the appellant believed that his claims had any merit, why did he wait so long to file for post-conviction relief?
A lapse of time in filing a P.C.H.A. Petition is a factor to be considered in assessing its merit. Commonwealth v. Courts, 315 Pa.Super. 124, 461 A.2d 828 (1983); Commonwealth v. Courts, 315 Pa.Super. 108, 461 A.2d 820 (1983); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 306 Pa.Super. 516, 452 A.2d 844 (1983). Thus, a lengthy, unexplained delay in raising an issue will buttress the presumption of knowing and understanding waiver; conversely, the immediate attempt to gain review of alleged error at the earliest possible time would have the opposite effect. Commonwealth v. Alexander, 495 Pa. 26, 432 A.2d 182 (1981).
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Kale, 312 Pa.Super. 69, 458 A.2d 239 (1983), a panel of this Court (per Judge WIEAND) held that the appellant’s failure to completely explain delays, varying from 7 years, 6 months, to 2 years, 10 months, in filing requests to withdraw guilty pleas, barred consideration of the claims which the appellant sought to assert. So too, under the present circumstances, it is my opinion that the appellant has waived his claims under the P.C.H.A. See: Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 446 A.2d 591 (1982), (Justice ROBERTS, concurring). He has not alleged any extraordinary facts that would explain the 4 year, 8 month delay between sentencing and the filing of the P.C.H.A. Petition. Certainly, the failure to inform the appellant that he had but 30 days to appeal does not excuse such a considerable lapse of time.
The Post Conviction Hearing Act was designed to give a convicted defendant a final chance to vindicate his constitutional right to due process of law to the extent that ques*456tions raised had not been previously adjudicated or waived. Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 469 Pa. 107, 364 A.2d 927 (1976); Commonwealth v. Murray, 315 Pa.Super. 417, 462 A.2d 264 (1983). The P.C.H.A. was never meant to afford defendants endless opportunities at bombarding the judiciary with frivolous appeals, nor to make a mockery of the concept of judgment finality. Accordingly, I would hold that the merits of the appellant’s case have been waived and affirm the lower court order denying post-conviction relief.
. Furthermore, W. Wayne Pushon, deputy .district attorney of Dauphin County, informed the appellant of his right to file post-trial motions alleging any errors which may have taken place in the degree of guilt hearing. (N.T. at 18).