concurring.
I agree with the majority that Miranda does not require the suppression of appellee’s statements. In matters concerning the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, this Court is of course bound by the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1494-1495, 12 *563L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) mandates that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from “custodial interrogation” of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards (i.e., the Miranda warnings) effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court defined “custodial interrogation”, and in so doing delineated the scope of Miranda, in stating:
By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added).
This test for “custodial interrogation” has been consistently applied in this Commonwealth, with a nuance added by subsequent developments.
[TJhis jurisdiction’s test of 'custodial interrogation’ examines more than actual deprivation of freedom. Pennsylvania’s test for custodial interrogation is
whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation____
Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 306, 412 A.2d 517, 521 (1980) (numerous citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 577, 459 A.2d 311, 314 (1983).
Viewing the totality of the circumstances 1 in this light, it is apparent that appellee was neither physically deprived, nor could he have harbored a reasonable belief that he had *564been deprived, of his freedom of action in any significant way. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that Miranda warnings were not required and that the lower courts erred in suppressing appellee’s statements.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this concurring opinion.. While a particular factor may capture most of a court’s attention in any given case, it is clear that, in determining whether a “custodial interrogation” has taken place, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the defendant was actually in custody or reasonably believed that his freedom of action had been significantly restricted. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565, What Constitutes ‘Custodial Interrogation' within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of his Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation.