dissenting.
In Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983), we held that no duty exists under the common law which would impose liability upon a social host who serves alcohol to an adult guest for conduct of the guest which results in injury to himself or to a third party. We recognized that it is the consumption of alcohol, rather than the furnishing of alcohol to an individual, which is the proximate cause of any subsequent occurrence.
*167In the instant case, however, the majority opinion concludes that liability of a social host may arise from the act of furnishing alcohol to a minor and that such liability may extend to harm suffered by the minor. By adopting this legal premise, the majority today is effectively overruling Klein1. The analysis employed by the majority is clearly inconsistent with that enunciated in Klein, and for that reason I must dissent.
The majority attempts to reconcile the inconsistency based upon a perceived public policy to protect minors and the public from the potentially harmful effects of alcohol.2 This public policy is gleaned from § 6308 of the Crimes Code which imposes criminal liability on a person under 21 who attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or transports alcohol. Although the legislature may have determined that persons under 21 are incompetent to handle alcohol, as the majority suggests, it is evident that the legislature has defined the offense so as to render the minor culpable for his own conduct which violates the statute. A minor could not defend his conduct by demonstrating that an adult had furnished him with the alcohol. Thus, the statute which the majority interprets as evincing a policy to protect minors does not shield them from their acts which contravene the statute.
*168The majority attempts to distinguish underage drinkers from those over 21 years by stating that minors are deemed incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol. This distinction is irrelevant, however, to the issue of whether a social host who furnishes alcohol to a minor may be held liable for injuries sustained by the minor or a third party as the result of the minor’s actions.
It is not the knowledge of a social host of the ability or inability of a guest to handle the effects of alcohol, or knowledge of a person’s condition, which would give rise to a duty not to furnish alcohol to the guest. We declined to impose liability on that basis in Klein, when we refused to recognize a cause of action, urged by the Appellants therein, against a social host who serves alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person who the host knows, or should know, intends to drive a motor vehicle. I cannot agree, therefore, that liability should be imposed on a social host serving alcohol to a person under 21 based upon the rationale that minors are incompetent to handle alcohol. If it is consumption by an adult guest, rather than the furnishing of alcohol by a host, which is the proximate cause of subsequent occurrences, then it is not less compelling to conclude that it is a minor’s voluntary consumption of alcohol which is the proximate cause of harm which results.
I find it inconceivable that a minor or an innocent third party who suffers harm under the factual circumstances alleged in the instant case may assert a cause of action against the social host who has dispensed the alcohol, yet an innocent third party who suffers harm under the factual circumstances set forth in Klein would be precluded from asserting a similar cause' of action. These inapposite results arise solely from the fortuitous circumstance of the age of the tortfeasor, rather than the conduct of the social host. I would hold, consistent with Klein, that no cause of action exists against a social host for providing alcohol to a guest under the facts alleged in this action. This matter is better left to legislative action than to judicial gymnastics.
. The majority has not determined that the duty arises under the factual circumstances presented in this case because of the employer-employee relationship which existed between the plaintiff and defendant.
. The public policy which the majority interprets as imposing a duty to a minor and innocent third parties upon a social host who furnishes alcohol to a person under 21 cannot be realistically distinguished from the public policy recognized by the legislative enactment of the "new drunk driving law”, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(4). The legislature has recognized that the public must be protected from operators of a motor vehicle who drive under the influence of alcohol. We did not interpret this legislation, however, as creating a duty upon a social host who has provided alcohol to one who he knows, or should know, is about to drive, for injuries sustained by the guest or a third party in an automobile accident. To the contrary, we held in Klein that no such duty exists. The reasoning applied in Klein should be applied to this case as well, rather than upon "public policy” which may be manipulated to support what the majority believes is a better result.