concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the Majority, but write separately to clarify what could be construed as an inconsistency with prior law in this Commonwealth concerning the waiver of the defective recharge on strict liability (Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts) under Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974) (holding that failure to make a timely, specific objection to an alleged trial error results in waiver of that issue for post-trial and appellate purposes). Such a result could occur from the manner in which the facts are recounted by the Majority as to what transpired prior to and after the instructions to the jury.
The Majority recites the following scenario: counsel for appellant submits a point for charge, the point is denied and counsel fails to object specifically to its exclusion after the jury is (re)charged. As the preceding facts stand, unembellished, this Court’s decision in Brancato v. Kroger Co., 312 Pa.Super. 448, 458 A.2d 1377 (1983), petition for allocatur denied July 8, 1983, would hold the issue preserved for review. See also Saylor v. Rose, 319 Pa.Super. 560, 466 A.2d 686 (1983) (Prior to jury instructions, appellee presented a point for charge that was not read by the trial judge. Although there is no mention as to whether appellee took exception to the denial, it was raised in post-trial motions and the trial judge granted appellee a new trial. We affirmed on appeal without discussing the question of *259whether the issue was preserved in accordance with Dilliplaine).
In Brancato, after quoting from Broxie v. Household Finance Co., 472 Pa. 373, 372 A.2d 741 (1977), we held that because the appellant had submitted a point for charge that was denied by the trial court, she need not have made a specific, timely objection to the charge as given to have the propriety of the denial preserved. Either action, i.e., submission of a specific point for charge or a specific, timely objection to the charge, would suffice to preserve the matter for review.
At first blush, the situation instantly may appear to be controlled by Brancato. However, upon close scrutiny of the facts, the disparity becomes apparent. To start with, it is true that counsel for DiSerafino sought to have his point concerning product liability read to the jury, and was initially denied that request before his objection to the charge was acknowledged as valid by the trial judge and counsel for Bucyrus-Erie Corporation in light of Azzarello v. Black Brothers, Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (Inclusion of “unreasonably dangerous” verbiage in charge to a jury on product liability is reversible error). Counsel for appellant reaffirmed the influence of Azzarello by noting to the court, “Your Honor, that’s why I set out in full 402A without the words unreasonably dangerous.” (RR. 217a) At this stage, appellee’s acquiescence to recharging the jury was conditional. That is, he remarked, “Well, I’m agreeable if Frank [appellant’s counsel] is that you just read number one as he’s quoted it and tell them that this replaces anything you may have said earlier.” Id. To accommodate all concerned, the trial judge responded, “All right. Do it that way.” Id. Counsel for appellant then proceeded to discuss another objection he had to the charge on the issue of joint liability of the employer and manufacturer.
Thus, based on the record before this writer, there is reason to believe that the recharge that was thereafter read to the jury was, in fact, that which had been previ*260ously submitted, by appellant’s counsel and denied. Although the appellant’s counsel did object after the recharge, it was in regard to certain court rulings concerning the admissibility of photographs depicting appellant’s decedent husband on the job site. (RR. 236a-241a) It had nothing to do with the court’s recharge as to strict liability under Section 402A.
Consequently, in light of the aforesaid, we have neither a Brancato-type situation, since from all of the evidence on hand it appears that the recharge was a verbatim (“quoted”) recitation of appellant’s counsel’s submitted point, nor do we have a specific objection to the charge as finally given. Ergo, counsel for appellant has failed to present a viable argument as to the (re)charge to the jurors.