*659Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen :The majority opinion clearly misses the point in this case.
This is not the situation wherein an invitee falls and is injured on the step of a staircase in á commercial establishment that is slightly uneven due to wear and tear. If such were the facts, proof of negligence would be absent and the entry of a directed verdict proper. However, the proof and facts herein manifest much more than that. The instant plaintiff fell, not because the step was merely worn. She fell because of the existence of a trap on the stairway caused by the combination of a depression in the wooden portion of the step plus a metal strip which extended above the depression for approximately one-quarter of an inch. Such a condition was unreasonable, dangerous and should not be permitted to exist in a business place where the customers have every right to expect reasonably safe conditions.
The majority opinion cites the cases of Radies v. Reading Liederkranz German Singing and Sport Society, 197 Pa. Super. 509, 178 A. 2d 789 (1962); Chapman v. Clothier, 274 Pa. 394, 118 A. 356 (1922) and Copelan v. Stanley Company of America, 142 Pa. Super. 603, 17 A. 2d 659 (1941), in support of its conclusion that no negligence is present in the instant case. In these cases the steps were worn but no part of the step was protruding as in the instant case. In the case of Stais v. Sears-Roebuck and Company, 378 Pa. 289, 106 A. 2d 216 (1954), this Court sustained a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, involving a factual situation wherein the metal strips on the step were "flat and flush-down." However, the strip was not screwed down and thus protruded when the plaintiff stepped on it. Chief Justice BELL, in his dissenting opinion in the Sears case, pointed out that there was "no evidence that it was worn." *660Herein the tread was worn one-quarter of an inch or more. This may very well be "normal wearing of the steps on the stairway" as stated by the majority opinion but many very dangerous conditions result from normal wearing. The question is not whether the condition exists because of normal wearing but whether the store owner has satisfied the duty he owes to his customers to exercise reasonable care for their safety.
I would reverse.