(dissenting). I would find error in the trial court’s charge on the defendant’s testimony and credibility.
The defendant in this case testified on his own behalf. Thereafter the court charged the jury as follows: “In weighing the testimony [the defendant] has given you, you should apply the same principles by which the testimony of other witnesses . . . [is] tested and this necessarily involves a consideration of his great interest in the outcome of this ease. You should consider the importance to him of the outcome of the trial just as you will consider the interest of any other witness. An accused person having taken the witness stand comes before you just like any other witness and is entitled to the same consideration and must have his testimony *526measured by the same tests as applied to other witnesses including, particularly, his interest in the verdict, which you may render.” (Emphasis added.)
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty; Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S. Ct. 394, 39 L. Ed. 481; Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471, 81 S. Ct. 1587, 6 L. Ed. 2d 963; and if he does not testify, no comment can be made upon his failure to do so. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106. The charge in this ease placed a penalty on the defendant’s decision to testify by relegating his assertion of innocence to a less credible category of testimony than that of the complaining witness. By creating such a circumstance, the charge under consideration substantially undermines the presumption that the accused is innocent by permitting the jury to attribute a motive to the defendant that can only attach if he is indeed guilty as charged. “[T]he accused’s right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal is the very foundation of due process. . . . ‘Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man ... to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.’ Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543.” Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 546-47, 363 A.2d 49. To single out the defendant for exercising his right to testify is equally as repugnant as commenting on the exercise of his right to remain silent.
The better rule is to limit the charge to a general statement of the elements by which all witnesses’ testimony should be weighed and not to single out *527the defendant’s testimony as worth less than that of any other witness. See State v. Bennett, 172 Conn. 324, 338-40, 374 A.2d 247 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting) ; State v. Jonas, 169 Conn. 566, 578-80, 363 A.2d 1378 (Bogdanski, J., concurring and dissenting) ; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 453 F.2d 101, 107 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S. Ct. 1205, 31 L. Ed. 2d 253; Garvin v. State, 255 Ind. 215, 217-22, 263 N.E.2d 371; State v. Bester, 167 N.W.2d 705, 706-10 (Iowa); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 265-67, 165 So. 2d 345; State v. Finkelstein, 269 Mo. 612, 618-22, 191 S.W. 1002; Graves v. State, 82 Nev. 137, 138-42, 413 P.2d 503; Stewart v. State, 484 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tenn. Crim. App.); and cases cited at 85 A.L.R. 577; see also Bryson v. State, 291 So. 2d 693 (Miss.); State v. Bruyere, 110 R.I. 426, 293 A.2d 311.
I would therefore find error, set aside the judgment and order a new trial.