concurring and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the mere fact that Wayne and Janice Nolan might be “legally responsible” for Robert’s negligence is insufficient to entitle Nationwide to a summary judgment in this case. Whether the Nolans are, in fact, “legally responsible” for Robert’s *133negligence is an issue for the jury (assuming evidence is offered to support a theory upon which liability could be predicated). Evidence of contributory fault would have made the Nolans vicariously liable had a third party been injured ■ as a result of Robert’s negligence. That vicarious liability would have made the Nolans “legally responsible for the use” of the auto, which would bring them within the policy definition of “an insured,” which would trigger the exclusion for “bodily injury to any insured.”
If a jury finds negligence on the part of Wayne or Janice Nolan sufficient to impute legal liability for Robert’s negligence, then he or she would be excluded from recovering under the liability provisions of Nationwide’s policy. If there is evidence to support such legal liability, it can be resolved by a separate interrogatory instruction to the jury.
Thus, I concur with the reversal of the summary judgment in this case; but dissent insofar as the majority opinion affirms the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Nolans can recover against Nationwide, without regard to whether a jury would, in fact, hold them “legally responsible” for Robert’s negligence.