Dissenting Opinion by
Justice YÁÑEZ.This case involves professional real estate agents and appraisers portraying property as having utilities when it did not. Because there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Lopez knew or should have known about these misrepresentations and negligence by the close of the transaction, I dissent.
The jury was asked to answer the following question in reaching its verdict:
By what date did or should Porfirio G. Lopez, Mary M. Lopez or Lino Lopez, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered all of the false, misleading, deceptive acts or practices, breaches of warranty, fraudulent, or negligent acts?
ANSWER WITH A DATE IN THE BLANK BELOW:
Answer: November 29, 1990
The jury’s task was to decide this fact issue based on a preponderance of the evidence. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). In considering a factual sufficiency point, we must assess all the evidence and reverse for a new trial only if the challenged finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shocking to the conscience, or clearly demonstrating bias. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986); Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. In considering an insufficient evidence point, an appellate court must defer to the jury, so as not to pass judgment upon the credibility of witnesses or merely substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. DeLeon v. Pickens, 933 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
It is undisputed that no one ever explicitly informed the Lopezes the property lacked utilities in 1990. The majority is satisfied that if the Lopezes knew the land was unplatted in 1990, then they knew or should have known to further investigate the availability of utilities. I disagree. Even if the Lopezes were informed the land was unplatted at the closing, nothing suggests they should have been aware of the significance of unplatted land with regard to utilities.
According to the majority, the jury’s finding is supported by evidence that at the closing the Lopezes were informed: (1) the land was not platted; (2) that if the land was not platted they “should seek the advice of an attorney regarding [their] ability to connect utilities to the property or otherwise improve the land;” and (3) that the land was subject to the platting ordinance. The majority also relies on Mary Lopez’s “contemporaneously” written notes to signify knowledge the land was unplatted.
A close examination of the record reveals scant evidence to support a finding that the Lopezes even knew or should have known the property was unplatted by the date of closing, much less that it lacked utilities. No document presented to the *796Lopezes stated that the land was unplat-ted. The only evidence even remotely suggesting the Lopezes were aware the land was unplatted was elicited from Scherer, the closing officer. Scherer testified she had no independent recollection of anything said by any of the parties at the November 29, 1990 closing, but she was certain she read a document entitled “Purchaser(s) General Acceptance,” to the Lo-pezes because it was her procedure to read the document verbatim to buyers and place a line through any inapplicable provisions. Mary Lopez testified that at the closing no one reviewed any of the documents with her line by line.
The Purchaser(s) General Acceptance letter, signed by Mary and Porfirio Lopez, contained the provision “[iff the property is not platted I have been informed that I should seek advice of my attorney to determine if there would be any difficulty improving the property and securing a permit from the City to do so. ” (emphasis added). Scherer concluded that because the document had two other paragraphs marked out, and the language referring to platting was not altered, she must have revealed to the Lopezes that the property was “unplatted.” Lucille Skaggs, another escrow agent employed by the same company as Scherer, testified that the letter at issue is a form document used for platted and unplatted property alike and that an escrow agent would not mark out this language pertaining to unplatted land because it is a standard exception.
A close examination of Scherer’s testimony reveals she never used the term “unplatted” in her discussion with the Lo-pezes or explained the significance of platting as it relates to utilities. On cross-examination, Scherer testified as follows:
Q: You said earlier that you had no independent recollection of this transaction.
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And you were asked if you told the Lopezes the property was un-platted and you said, yes.
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. How can you say that you told them if you have no independent recollection?
A: It’s not my independent recollection. It’s the procedure of my closing practice that I do this.
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Q: [I]n what context would you have told a purchaser if the property was platted or unplatted? How would that come up?
A: It’s usually described in the legal description whether it’s filed for record in the platting records.
Q: Okay. So how would you tell somebody, then? If you were being — if we were at a closing, right now, and you had a document, how would you tell somebody this fact; how would you phrase it to them?
A: It depends on the question they asked.
Q: No. You said that you would have told them, earlier. We’re not talking about any questions. We’re talking about what you would have told them at closing. How would you have told them this?
A: That the property is — described in field notes, and it is not filed for record.
Q: Okay. And would you tell them anything else?
A: No.
Q: Okay. And they’re supposed to know from that that it’s unplatted?
A: I cannot say.
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Q: [D]id you use the word “unplatted,” or did you just describe this process that you told me about and that’s supposed to mean unplatted?
A: I would have — I guess, I would have to say that the meaning would have to be that it was unplatted, (emphasis added).
*797Even if Scherer was correct in surmising she informed the Lopezes at closing that the land was “described in'field notes” and was “not filed for record,” these ob-' scure references simply do not suggest they should have known the land was un-platted.
The majority also states Lopez was informed to seek the advice of an attorney regarding his “ability to connect utilities to the property or otherwise improve the land.” Scherer never testified that she informed the Lopezes to seek the advice of an attorney regarding the connection of utilities, but rather that she read the Purchaser(s) General Acceptance letter, word for word, to the Lopezes. The document refers only to difficulties in improving the land and securing permits, not to the ability to connect utilities to the property.
I also disagree that the jury finding is supported by evidence Lopez had notice the land was subject to the platting ordinance. Both Scherer and Skaggs emphasized that the closing documents explained that the title 'policy was subject to all city zoning and building ordinances. The title commitment received by the Lopezes prior to the closing briefly refers to the platting ordinance. However, any reservations by the title company are wholly irrelevant to whether the Lopezes had facts before them to cause them to investigate the misrepresentations about utilities. There is no evidence that the closing officer, or anyone else, actually discussed the substance of the platting ordinance with the Lopezes, which prohibits not only the connection of utilities to unplatted property, but also the sale of unplatted property.
Based on this record, the jury could not have properly inferred that Seherer provided the Lopezes sufficient facts about the unplatted nature of the property to cause them to inquire about a lack of utilities.
In relying-on Mary Lopez’s handwritten notes to establish that the Lopezes knew or should have known the land was unplat-ted, the majority overstates the evidence. The notes do not “indicate a need to call officials in the City Planning Office to discuss ‘platting’ ” as the majority concludes. There are two references to “Harry Power,” “planning,” and the city planning department phone number in Mary’s notes. One reference has the phrase “1-2 Light Industrial” next to it; the' other has the word “plated” next to it. These notations appear on separate pages with other names and phone numbers apparently related to the property. At trial, Mary nev-■e'r explained the reason she had Power’s name and the planning department’s number in her notes. Moreover, there is no evidence the notes were taken at the time of the closing or that the closing officer had provided the information at the time of closing. In fact, Mary testified the notes were made prior to the closing and during the process of purchasing the property, not at the closing. The jury could not properly infer notice that the land was unplatted or lacked utilities from these unexplained notes.
The majority asserts there is sufficient evidence that a reasonably prudent person would have conducted further investigation into the availability of public utilities. The law required Lopez to exercise only reasonable care and diligence to discover facts, conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry leading to the discovery of the injury. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Becker, 930 S.W.2d 748, 756 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
The Lopezes testified they did not understand the significance of platting at the time of closing. City planner Harry Power testified that he regularly interacts with the public on platting matters and that, in his experience, the public generally does not understand the significance of platting. The only evidence suggesting that ordinary persons understand platting is Skaggs’s comment that the buyers in Corpus Christi are “sophisticated” and are generally aware when property is in a *798subdivision or unplatted. Nonetheless, both Skaggs and Scherer admitted that if they were placed in Lopez’s position, where an appraiser told them in writing that the land had utilities and a real estate agent told them the property had utilities and was ready for improvements, nothing in the standard closing documents would have caused them to question these representations. On this evidence, where professionals associated with the real estate industry, who are presumably familiar with platting and its significance, would not have questioned the presence of utilities under the same circumstances, the evidence does not support a finding that an ordinary person such as Lopez was in possession of sufficient facts to cause him to investigate further.
The Lopezes testified the first time they learned the land was not platted was in early 1994, after they sought to place a security light on the property. The power company advised the Lopezes it was unable to put the light on the property and referred them to city hall to obtain a building permit. According to the Lopezes, the city planning department subsequently informed them the land had no utilities.
The jury’s finding that the Lopezes knew or should have known to investigate the availability of public utilities at the time of closing is based on too many weak inferences to survive factual sufficiency scrutiny. The overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence shows that the Lopezes did not and should not have known of the property’s lack of utilities in 1990. For this reason, I would hold the evidence is factually insufficient to support the finding, and reverse and remand for a new trial.
Justices HINOJOSA and CHAVEZ join in the dissent.