dissenting, joined by Justice LÓPEZ, Justice STONE, and Justice EVANS.
Although the question of whether a duty exists ordinarily is a question of law, in some instances it may require the resolution of disputed facts or inferences which are inappropriate for legal resolution. See, e.g., Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.1991); Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. *4381990); Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied). A jury question will arise when “the existence of a duty depends upon the factual setting and the interplay of factual and legal questions.’ ” See Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662. This is such a case.
The majority initially rejects the argument that Traylor is liable based on its right of control. However, Williams, Tray-lor’s traffic superintendent, testified that Traylor was in charge of moving lane closures depending upon the length of time that was involved. The testimony was conflicting with regard to the length of time the Paige employees would have been conducting the moving lane closure had their work not been interrupted. This conflicting evidence raises a question of fact as to whether Traylor had a right to control the moving lane closure Paige was conducting.
The majority also rejects the argument that Traylor was hable because it was aware that Paige was routinely violating safety guidelines by directly connecting the arrow board to the work truck for use as a moving lane closure. The evidence as to whether Paige’s actions violated the guidelines and whether Traylor knew or should have known of the violation is in conflict. James Wallace, the plaintiffs’ expert, testified that the manner in which Paige conducted the moving lane closure violated the guidelines. The State was paying Traylor approximately $1 million for traffic control. Does this not imply some legal duty on Traylor to see that it is done safely? Traylor was permitting Paige to use its arrow boards with actual knowledge of the manner in which the arrow boards were being used. Williams, Traylor’s traffic superintendent, watched Paige connect the arrow board to the work truck on the night Alaniz was killed and later observed Paige employees conducting the moving lane closure. In Mitchell, the Texas Supreme Court held: “Whether or not the railroad knew or should have known that ice had formed on the steps and grab irons of the engine is, when the evidence is in conflict, the type of issue which is properly and best resolved by the finder of fact.” 786 S.W.2d at 662. Similarly, given the conflicting evidence presented in this case, whether or not Traylor knew or should have known that Paige was violating safety guidelines is “the type of issue which is properly and best resolved by the finder of fact.” Id.
The majority ignores the disputed facts and inferences which give rise to a jury question as to whether a duty exists. As Chief Justice Phillips recently stated in Lozano v. Lozano:
Circumstantial evidence often requires a fact finder to choose among opposing reasonable inferences. And this choice in turn may be influenced by the fact finder’s views on credibility. Thus, a jury is entitled to consider the circumstantial evidence, weigh witnesses’ credibility, and make reasonable inferences from the evidence it chooses to believe.
44 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 171, 175, 2000 WL 1826568, at * 18 (Tex. Dec. 14, 2000) (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).1
Because I believe the issue of duty was properly submitted to the jury, and the *439jury’s answers were properly buttressed by evidence, I respectfully dissent.
. The December 14, 2000 opinion was superseded on rehearing. The quoted language remains unchanged in the new opinion. See Lozano v. Lozano, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 499, 503-04, 2000 WL 33216152, at *18, - S.W.3d-,-(Tex. Mar. 8, 2001) (Phillips, C J., concurring and dissenting).