dissenting.
The Court in this case considers whether when sentencing a defendant to prison following a revocation of probation, the court must give credit not only for time served in a county jail as a condition of that probationary term but also for time on *431parole after release from the county institution. It confirms the conclusion of the Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 256 N.J.Super. 126, 606 A.2d 835 (1992), that the sentencing court should have counted the time spent on parole from the county-jail term, as well as the jail time itself, in the calculation of credit to which defendant was entitled on resentencing. Ante at 430, 621 A.2d at 15. I disagree with the Court’s determination.
The Court notes the reasoning of the Appellate Division that focused on N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1d, which provides that a term of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation “shall be governed by the Parole Act of 1979.” Under the Parole Act, time served on parole cannot exceed the term of the original sentence. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.65. Harmonizing those statutory provisions with decisional law (e.g., In re Clover, 34 N.J.Super. 181, 111 A.2d 910 (App.Div.1955), and Serio v. Liss, 300 F.2d 386 (3d Cir.1961)), the Court approves the Appellate Division’s conclusion that “ ‘calculation of a defendant’s total maximum term of imprisonment [should] include any time served on parole.’ 256 N.J.Super. at 132, 606 A.2d 835.” Ante at 427, 621 A.2d at 13.
The Court also notes the Appellate Division’s observation that the 19,82 amendment to the Parole Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51a, denying credit for parole time on resentencing for a violation of parole, does not provide a clear answer to the question in this case — how to calculate parole time for a violation of probation — because (1) that section does not clearly contemplate a county-jail term imposed as a condition of probation, and (2) that statute does not purport to address the question of credit for a probation violator. Ante at 427, 621 A.2d at 14.
Our courts have consistently acknowledged the distinction between probationers serving a county-jail sentence and persons serving straight county-jail terms or state-prison terms. That settled distinction is understood to have been incorporated *432in the sentencing provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice. In State v. Kreidler, 211 N.J.Super. 276, 511 A.2d 733 (App.Div.1986), the court held that the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d presumption of imprisonment for persons convicted of first- and second-degree crimes refers to “straight sentencés of imprisonment authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(3) and not to split sentences of imprisonment to be served as a condition of probation authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2).” Id. at 279, 511 A.2d 733. See also State v. O’Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 414, 522 A.2d 423 (1987) (a split sentence cannot be imposed on a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense that carries a presumption of imprisonment); State v. Hartye, 105 N.J. 411, 419— 20, 522 A.2d 418 (1987) (the presumption against imprisonment in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e does not bar imposition of a split sentence).
In my view, there is no equivalency between a county-jail term imposed as a condition of probation and either a state-prison term or a straight county-jail term. See State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402, 406, 621 A.2d 1, 3 (1993) (Handler, J., dissenting). A probationary county-jail term serves a function and purpose different from a straight or unconditional prison term. Ibid. Hence, one could soundly argue that so-called “parole” from a probationary county-jail term is something of a misnomer. It is not the functional equivalent of parole from an ordinary prison term; rather, it more closely approximateis “probation” because the county-jail term itself is a' condition of probation, and usually, as in this case, a prisoner released on parole from such a sentence will following “parole” be required to serve out a probationary term. Indeed, the custodial element of a probationary term may begin af any time during the probationary period and may be reduced at any time before the probationary period has expired. Hartye, supra, 105 N.J. at 419, 522 A.2d 418.
I believe that approach — to treat parole from a probationary county-jail term as a variant of probation — is the one intended by the Legislature to be followed in these cases. Névertheless, according to the Court, that approach was seemingly foreclosed *433by the Legislature when it chose to subject such conditional county-jail terms to the Parole Act of 1979 under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1d. The Court, however, takes the legislative direction too literally and makes too much of the label of “parole.” The Court thus accepts the legislative categorization of the supervised release from a probationary county-jail term as parole in its conventional or ordinary sense. Then, unable to resist applying the logic of traditional law, the Court treats conventional parole as the legal equivalent of imprisonment. As a result, the Court is satisfied to award credit to a probationer against a “term of imprisonment” for the time spent by the probationer on so-called parole from a split county-jail sentence imposed only as a condition of probation. Ante at 428, 621 A.2d at 14.
However, as the Court itself notes, various jurisdictions have taken differing approaches to the problem of how to treat parole time. See Roman v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 104 N.J.Super. 222, 249 A.2d 609 (App.Div.1969) (rejecting argument that “time spent on parole is time spent in confinement, the ‘prison walls being pushed back,’ ” id. at 225, 249 A.2d 609); Commonwealth v. Kriston, 390 Pa.Super. 543, 568 A.2d 1306 (1990) (stating that imprisonment means “confinement of an individual to a correctional or similar institution,” id. 568 A.2d at 1307); and St. Peter v. Rhay, 56 Wash.2d 297, 352 P.2d 806 (1960) (interpreting the phrase “term of imprisonment” to mean the term during which an inmate is actually imprisoned, id. at 352 P.2d 807). Ante at 429, 621 A.2d at 14.
The Court also acknowledges the decision of another panel of our Appellate Division handed down just one day before oral argument of this appeal in this Court, State v. Oquendo, 262 N.J.Super. 317, 621 A.2d 24 (1993), which the Court now overrules.
I would subscribe to the conclusion of the majority of the Appellate Division in Oquendo. There the court held that *434N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1d should be construed to mean “that a defendant who violates probation shall receive credit on a resentencing for such a violation only for the time he actually spent in custody for the offense for which he was originally sentenced to probation.” Id. at 429, 621 A.2d at 14. To my way of thinking this recognizes that parole from a probationary county-jail term should be considered as a form of probation rather than as conventional parole, just as the jail term itself is regarded as probationary in purpose, even though the inmate is certainly entitled to have time actually spent behind bars treated as “custody” for purposes of computing credit on resentencing.
I dissent.
For modifying and affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI . and STEIN — 6.
For reversal — Justice HANDLER — 1.