concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the majority opinion affirming the motion court’s judgment on the guilt phase of the trial, but I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion overturning the imposition of the death penalty due to purported ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase.
In the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in which the Supreme Court set the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, there is an important word of caution:
It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [citations omitted] A fair assess*309ment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In this case, unfortunately, the “distorting effects of hindsight” permeate the majority opinion, which is fraught with one-sided accounts of the record and an undue emphasis on small and mainly cumulative evi-dentiary points that, even taken together, could not have made a difference in the outcome.
Tellingly, the majority opinion provides only a cursory statement of appellant’s penalty phase evidence of mitigation. In fact, four defense witnesses were called— appellant’s parents, Lorraine and Bill Hutchison; a friend, Frankie Young; and a clinical psychologist, Dr. Lester Bland— who testified about appellant’s family and school background and his social and intellectual impairment. Lorraine Hutchison and Dr. Bland did so at length.
Lorraine Hutchison testified that appellant was a “very loving little boy,” that he had a “big heart,” that he was close to his family, and that he played on youth league baseball teams. She also testified, however, that he was diagnosed with hyperactivity and attention deficit disorder for which he was prescribed Ritalin, and that he was placed in special education. She explained that they did not have a lot of problems with appellant as a child, but rather “special problems” due to his hyperactivity. She then related that eventually appellant dropped out of school and that he began abusing drugs and alcohol, which necessitated family counseling. Eventually the family moved from their home in Palm-dale, California, to Missouri, because Palmdale was a “bad area” and she did not want to raise her younger son there. She added that once in Missouri, appellant entered an apprentice program with his father in the construction trade.
Next, Bill Hutchison testified, confirming his wife’s account of his son’s background, and reiterating the family’s efforts to help their son through his difficulties. He added that he and his wife were caring for their son’s children and that he visited their son at every opportunity.
Frankie Young then testified that she and appellant were close friends, that she had known him for over a year, and that appellant had stayed at her residence on occasion. She also related that appellant helped her by babysitting her children and doing household chores. Additionally, she stated that appellant was “part of the family,” that he never treated her with disrespect, and that she never felt threatened to have him with her family.
The bulk of the appellant’s penalty phase evidence was presented by Dr. Bland, who holds a doctoral degree in clinical psychology and who has extensive experience in evaluating prison inmates at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield. Dr. Bland began by stating that he interviewed appellant for two to three hours, taking a complete life history and conducting a psychological evaluation. Dr. Bland related that appellant had been in special education classes throughout elementary school and that he had dropped out of school in the tenth grade. After conducting various intellectual screening tests, Dr. Bland found that appellant had an IQ of 78, and that due to his intellectual deficit, he functioned in the bottom eight percent of the population. He then administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised, the verbal section, which revealed appellant’s IQ to be 76. After administering another test, he found that appellant *310performed at the fourth-grade level of reading ability. Dr. Bland then added that his personal, clinical observations of appellant were consistent with the test results.
Dr. Bland also testified about appellant’s history with alcohol and drug use including an overdose of methamphetamine and appellant’s use of alcohol and drugs the night of the murders. He also related appellant’s version of the crime, including appellant’s assertion that he did not kill the Yates, and appellant’s fear of his co-defendants. In conclusion, Dr. Bland testified that appellant was competent to stand trial and that he did understand the charges against him, but that appellant suffered from “borderline intellectual functioning and personality disorder, not otherwise specified.”
Dr. Bland’s written report was also admitted into evidence. This included appellant’s account of his family life, and his express comment that he had a good relationship with his mother and father. The report also reviewed appellant’s time in special education and his problems in school, as well as the diagnosis of hyperactivity and an additional diagnosis that he was “manic depressant.” Appellant also reported being sexually molested by an uncle at the age of 11. The report also discussed appellant’s addiction to drugs and alcohol, his treatment with a social worker and psychiatrist, and his acknowledgment that he was not compliant with drug treatment. The report also discussed appellant’s two children and his common law wife, and his efforts to get a job.
In sum, appellant’s penalty phase evidence in mitigation was extensive and comprehensive, and counsel painted appellant in the best light possible by highlighting his redeeming qualities and by attempting to garner sympathy by focusing on his many difficulties as a child and young adult. The majority’s conclusion that counsel “did not investigate Hutchison’s medical, educational, family, and social history and did not present available evidence of Hutchison’s emotional and intellectual impairment” is a gross mischaracterization of the record.
Finally, it bears mention that the majority’s repeated reliance on the holdings of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) overlooks the facts of that case. In Wiggins, counsel elected to focus their efforts in penalty phase by “retrying the factual case,” rather than introducing evidence in mitigation, except to show that the defendant had no prior convictions. Id. at 2533, 2543, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Counsel did not even inquire about defendant’s life history and social history, and as a result was wholly unaware of the fact that defendant had been subjected to repeated instances of sexual abuse and molestation. Id. at 2541, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The gist of the opinion, of course, is that counsel could not have made a reasonable strategic choice to forego evidence in mitigation without having conducted a reasonable investigation. Id. at 2543, 123 S.Ct. 2527. In the case at hand, though, as the record shows, counsel for Hutchison made that reasonable investigation.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel in either phase of the trial and affirm the motion court’s judgment in all respects.