concurring.
I join in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to express my disagreement with the rationale utilized by the majority in reaching that result.
The majority bases its finding that trial counsel was ineffective upon counsel’s failure to verify the accuracy of Poiridex*237ter’s statement that he had been convicted of receiving stolen property. I believe it was entirely reasonable for counsel to have relied upon Poindexter’s own statement that he had been convicted, particularly when, as here, that statement was confirmed by Poindexter’s mother.
However, I do not believe it was reasonable for counsel to fail to object, when during cross-examination of Poindexter, counsel was made aware that Poindexter had not yet been sentenced for the underlying offense. At that point, counsel should have objected on the basis of our rationale in Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Pa. 205, 314 A.2d 299 (1974), and thus, was ineffective for not doing so. Once counsel understood that Poindexter had not been sentenced on the charge for which he was being impeached, there was no reasonable basis for counsel to fail to object.
Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, I concur only in the result reached by the majority.
MONTEMURO, J., joins in this concurring opinion.