dissenting.
I dissent because I believe Wal-Mart Stores “set up” a meritorious defense to Kelley’s workers’ compensation claim. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).
A meritorious defense is one that, if proven, would cause a different result in retrial of the case. Holliday v. Holliday, 72 Tex. 581, 10 S.W. 690, 692 (Tex.1889). A party is not required to prove the truth of a meritorious defense before the party is entitled to a new trial. Dir., State Employees Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex.1994). The facts in support of the meritorious defense may be set forth by affidavit or other competent evidence. Guar. Bank v. Thompson, 632 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex.1982). It is sufficient that the affidavit or other competent evidence setting forth the meritorious defense be part of the record; it does not have to be offered into evidence in order to be considered by the trial court for the meri*646torious defense element or any other element of the Craddock test. Evans, 889 S.W.2d at 268.
The Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission found that Kelley did not sustain a compensable injury to her upper back and neck. Kelley appealed this decision to the county court at law. A copy of the commission decision was attached to Kelley’s original petition. In its motion for new trial, Wal-Mart alleged as its meritorious defense that the commission was correct in concluding that Kelley is not entitled to income and medical benefits for the alleged injury. The commission decision attached to Kelley’s original petition was incorporated by reference in Wal-Mart’s motion. At the hearing on the motion, Wal-Mart’s counsel referred the court to the commission decision and stated that Wal-Mart “intended to use” the decision “at trial” as evidence to show that Kelley had not sustained a compensable injury to her neck and back. No objection was made by Kelley’s counsel to Wal-Mart’s reliance on the commission decision in support of its meritorious defense claim.
In ESIS, Inc., Servicing Contractor v. Johnson, 908 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied), this court held that under the Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission v. Garcia, a commission appeals panel decision is competent and probative evidence that may be considered by the fact-finder in an appeal of the commission decision to the trial court under chapter 410 of the Texas Labor Code. ESIS, 908 S.W.2d at 559-61; see Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 528 (Tex.1995). Thus, the commission decision is competent evidence, which if admitted at trial, would constitute some evidence to support Wal-Mart’s defense that Kelley did not sustain a compensable injury to her neck and back.1.
The majority erroneously holds, however, that the commission decision cannot be relied on by Wal-Mart to set up its meritorious defense because an authenticated copy of the commission decision was not attached to the motion for new trial. The rules of civil procedure governing motions for new trial contain no such hypertechnical requirements. Rule 320 states that a motion for new trial must “be in writing and signed by the party or his attorney.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 320. The motion must also state the complaint in such a way that it “can be clearly identified and understood by the court.” Tex.R. Crv. P. 321. Complaints and objections couched in general terms “shall not be considered by the court.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 322. Nowhere in these rules, Craddock, or cases applying Craddock is there a mandatory requirement that an affidavit or other competent evidence offered in support of a motion for new trial must be “attached” to the motion as a condition for consideration by the trial court.2
*647Nor is there any requirement that an affidavit or other competent evidence supporting the meritorious defense element be authenticated to be considered by the trial court. Authentication is a “condition precedent to admissibility.” Tex.R. Evtd. 901(a). Because it was not necessary that the commission decision be admitted into evidence to be considered by the trial court for determining whether Wal-Mart had a meritorious defense, the decision did not need to be in admissible form to be considered by the trial court for such purpose. See Evans, 889 S.W.2d at 268.
The historical tendency has been to grant a new trial in a default judgment ease liberally. Miller v. Miller, 903 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1995, no writ). The law prefers that cases be disposed on their merits whenever possible, rather than by default. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Fin. Leasing Servs., Inc. v., Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied). To comport with this preference and the rules governing motions for new trial, I would hold that because the commission decision was filed of record with the trial court by Kelley at the time of the motion for new trial, incorporated by reference in Wal-Mart’s motion, and clearly identified by Wal-Mart as evidence that it would offer at trial in support of Wal-Mart’s defense without objection by Kelley, the commission decision should have been considered by the trial court in determining whether Wal-Mart set up a meritorious defense. I would farther hold that this evidence is sufficient to set up a meritorious defense to Kelley’s workers’ compensation claim. See ESIS, 908 S.W.2d at 560.
■ For these reasons, I would reverse the default judgment and remand the case for trial on the merits.
. The majority agrees that the commission decision is admissible but apparently does not believe it is entitled to be given any weight on the issue of whether Kelley sustained a com-pensable injury. According to the majority, the decision is "only proof of the commission’s decision, not of its correctness.” Majority Op. at 644. This conclusion is in direct conflict with the supreme court’s decision in ' Garcia and our decision in ESIS. See Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 528 (recognizing that jury may accord weight to commission decision on issue of compensability but is not required to do so); ESIS, 908 S.W.2d at 560 (rejecting argument that commission decision should not be admitted because jury may have accorded “special weight” to it on issue of course and scope).
. None of the cases cited and relied on by the majority hold that a meritorious defense is not "set up” for the purpose of meeting the Craddock test merely because an affidavit or other evidence supporting the defense is not attached to the motion. See Evans, 889 *647S.W.2d at 267. In Evans, affidavits supporting the other two elements of Craddock were attached to the motion for new trial and the issue before the court was whether the attached affidavits must be offered into evidence to be considered by the trial court. Id. The question of whether the affidavits or other evidence must be attached to the motion for consideration by the trial court was not addressed.