dissenting.
Prior to his trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress his confession, asserting that he had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights.
Appellant was then a juvenile, and he waived his rights without being given an opportunity to consult with an interested adult or counsel. Under the well-established standards by which we judge the voluntariness of a juvenile’s waiver, this appellant’s waiver was ineffective and the confession obtained pursuant thereto was involuntary and should have been suppressed. Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 372 A.2d 797 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 471 Pa. 238, 369 A.2d 1285 (1977); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975); Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975).
By alleging to the suppression court the ineffectiveness of his waiver of the Miranda rights appellant raised — and preserved — the very issue which the rule in McCutchen has been developed to answer. See Commonwealth v. Jamison, 474 Pa. 541, n. 2, 379 A.2d 87, n. 2 (1977).
The rule in McCutchen is specifically designed as a criterion for determining whether a juvenile’s waiver was knowing and intelligent. In Commonwealth v. Starkes, supra, this Court reasoned that in determining the validity of an alleged waiver, all attendant factors and circumstances must be considered and evaluated, and that
“[a]n important factor in establishing that a juvenile’s waiver of his constitutional rights was a knowing and intelligent one would be evidence that, before he made his decision to waive those rights, he had access to the advice of a parent, attorney, or other adult who was primarily interested in his welfare.” Commonwealth v. Starkes, supra, 461 Pa. at 185-6, 335 A.2d at 701; quoting Com*477monwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 394, 329 A.2d 286, 288 (1974).
The issue in a McCutchen -type case is the effectiveness of the purported waiver. The function of the McCutchen rule is to establish one of the requisites for an effective waiver. It is, of such, no more than one of the factors to be considered in the determination of the ultimate issue. If the required consultation has not been provided, the mandated conclusion is that the waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. If the McCutchen standards were met, any other factors present in the case will be considered to determine the ultimate issue.
When an appellant has alleged that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary he has put in issue the validity of his waiver. He has thereby preserved the issue of ineffective waiver for appellate review. As in our review of any issue, we may then decide the question on the basis of all the facts and circumstances, including any violations of the juvenile’s right to consult.