Browning v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge,

dissenting. I would reverse and remand this case so that continued services toward the goal of reunifiying appellants with their three children can be provided.

The appellants, who are both poor and “hoarders,” first came to the attention of DHS when they were homeless and sought help. Throughout the course of this case, the strongest allegations against appellants in regard the mistreatment of the children themselves had to do with the occasional use of inappropriate babysitters and lack of cleanliness. There was additional evidence presented about the oldest child’s emotional problems, the younger boy allegedly not “speaking” and the baby being “congested” due to lack of heat, but there was no evidence attributing the first two conditions to appellant’s care of the children. There was no evidence of physical abuse, drug-use problems, or significant medical neglect of the children at any state of the proceedings.

At the termination hearing, the trial court in essence found that appellants had not made sufficient improvement toward cleaning their home. After viewing pictures taken of the home just a few weeks prior to the termination hearing, the court noted that the Brownings’ home was “virtually in the same unacceptable condition.” However, I agree with appellants’ contention that the court’s ruling is clearly erroneous because there is a lack of evidence that the home was unsafe for the children. The evidence, at best, would only minimally support termination as to the infant in this case. There was some testimony that the clutter and junk would make it unsafe for the infant to crawl around. With that testimony in mind, there was no evidence presented that the home would be unsafe for the two older children. In fact, the primary safety issue DHS cites in its brief is an incident where a CASA worker observed a “rat,” which DHS embellishes by referring to this incident as rat and mouse “infestation.”

Alternatively, DHS presents the Brownings’ inability to budget and failure to complete the case plan and urges this court on its de novo review to affirm the case on this basis. DHS points out that Carla has refused budgeting services, has only attended one counseling session, and has missed eight visits with her children. DHS argues that this failure to comply with DHS’s recommendations demonstrates an indifference to rectifying the situations leading to the removal of the children. In the cases discussing indifference, this court has considered repeated failure to correct underlying problems. See Ullom v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 12 S.W.3d 204 (2000) (continued physical abuse to child after it was removed from the home constituted manifest indifference to remedying the circumstances warranting removal). Appellants’ two older children were originally removed from the home because appellants were homeless and did not have a refrigerator in which to keep one child’s medication. Since their removal, appellants have maintained a stable home up until the time of the termination hearing. Moreover, Carla has obtained employment as a CNA at the Searcy Health Department; has completed parenting classes; had all of her utilities, except for a telephone, turned on; and attempted to rectify circumstances with the home when pointed out to her. Although Carla refused DHS’s assistance with budgeting, there was testimony that she contacted one of her church members to assist her with a budget. The testimony also shows that while Carla missed visits with her children on some occasions, she otherwise visited them consistently throughout the duration of this case. In this case, there was substantial progress, rather than evidence of manifest indifference. See Trout v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 84 Ark. App. 446, 146 S.W.3d 895 (2004).

Finally, while the description and the photographs of the appellants’ house are indeed distressing, the evidence presented falls short of demonstrating either that appellants are unfit or that it is in the best interest of these children to terminate their parental rights. See J. T. v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997).

Hart, J., joins.