Opinion of the Court by
Chief Justice LAMBERT.KRS 500.050(2) provides that a misdemeanor prosecution must be commenced within one year after the offense is committed. A misdemeanor prosecution for assault was timely commenced against Ap-pellee, Robert Sowell, but was dismissed *617without prejudice due to the inability of the Commonwealth to produce the complaining witness at trial. More than ten days after entry of the order of dismissal, the case was redocketed via motion, and again set for trial. The question we must address is whether a case dismissed without prejudice may be redocketed and proceed as if there had been no dismissal or whether new process is required. We hold that a dismissal without prejudice is a final and appealable order, and that after dismissal without prejudice and loss of trial court jurisdiction, a defendant must be recharged. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
On August 2, 1999, Sowell allegedly assaulted Bonita Clarke and her son, and allegedly damaged Ms. Clarke’s property. An arrest warrant was issued for Sowell’s arrest on September 15, 1999, but Sowell was not arrested until May 17, 2000. So-well was charged with two counts of fourth-degree assault and a single count of criminal mischief, all misdemeanors. The case was set for trial on May 30, 2000, but continued until June 9, 2000. The prosecuting witness, Ms. Clarke, however, did not respond to the subpoena for her attendance or appear for either trial date. On June 9, 2000, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice.
More than ten days after the date of dismissal without prejudice (July 12, 2000), but still within the KRS 500.050(2) one-year period of limitation, the Commonwealth moved to redocket the case. The district court granted the motion and set the trial date for August 7, 2000. Thereafter, Sowell filed a motion to dismiss stating that the prosecution was not timely under KRS 500.050(2), and the district court granted the motion. On appeal, the Jefferson Circuit Court reversed on grounds that the Commonwealth had complied with KRS 500.050(2) because Sowell received notice of the charges against him within the one-year period. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review, reversed the circuit court, and held that finality of the dismissal without prejudice by expiration of the time allowed in CR 59.05 and RCr 12.04 barred redocketing the case. Upon the Commonwealth’s Motion, this Court granted discretionary review.
At the outset we will examine the meaning and effect of the phrase “without prejudice” in a dismissal order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines dismissed without prejudice as “[rjemoved from the court’s docket in such a way that the plaintiff may refile the same suit on the same claim.” 1 CR 54.01 defines final order or judgment as “adjudicating all of the rights of ah of the parties in an action or proceeding....” In several cases we have held that a dismissal without prejudice is a final and appealable order.2 Notably, in Wood v. Downing’s Admr., we held that an order dismissing without prejudice “fixed absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in this suit in relation to the subject matter of the litigation, and put an end to the suit. It was a final appealable order.”3 Notwithstanding the “without prejudice” language, an order of dismissal adjudicates all rights. Nothing remains to be done.4
*618The Commonwealth argues that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final adjudication of the merits of the claim, and therefore the original process is sufficient to resurrect the dismissed case. The Commonwealth relies on Commonwealth v. Hicks5 for the proposition that a dismissal without prejudice does not act as a final judgment on the merits. However, the Commonwealth reads Hicks too broadly and inconsistently with case law holding that a dismissal without prejudice is a final and appealable order.6 In Hicks, we merely held that an order of dismissal without any notation to the contrary would be treated as with prejudice barring subsequent prosecution of the same charge.7 The holding in Hicks was strictly limited to construing whether an order of dismissal without any notation to the contrary was “an adjudication upon the merits.”8 Hicks does not address the issue presented here.
Upon our determination that an order of dismissal without prejudice is nevertheless a final order, we must determine whether it may be vacated by the trial court and within what period of time. Where, as here, the criminal rules do not provide a time in which an action may be taken, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply.9 Under CR 59, a final judgment or order may be vacated only in accordance with the ten day provisions of the rule. Thereafter, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act.10 As such, a party has ten days after entry of a dismissal order, with or without prejudice, to move to set aside that order and continue prosecution under the original complaint, or timely appeal from the order of dismissal. As the dismissal here was without prejudice, but was nevertheless a final order, the Commonwealth could have moved to vacate it within ten days, filed a timely notice of appeal, or it could have brought the charge on new process. But it could not merely redocket the old case as the trial court had lost jurisdiction to vacate its order of dismissal. This proposition was firmly established in Stephenson v. Boswell, where we held:
The dismissal of this action, which we affirmed, terminated it. Whether the original dismissal was with or without prejudice, this proceeding has been finally disposed of.... Since it has been finally adjudicated that plaintiffs have no claim against the defendants, the trial court properly refused to redocket this controversy.11
A similar holding is found in Commonwealth v. Smith, where a felony indictment was dismissed because the defendant could not be located.12 After several years the Commonwealth moved to redocket the case. The trial court denied the motion to redocket reasoning that it lacked the authority after an order dismissed the case.13 We held:
When an indictment is dismissed, unless the matter be then referred to the grand jury, it is a final order in that case. After the term at which the order is entered, the court has not the power to set it aside. Should the court or the *619prosecution desire to retain control of the case after the term, it may be done by an order filing the indictment away, to be redocketed on motion of the commonwealth. But, without such reservation, an unconditional dismissal is an end of that case. If, therefore, the commonwealth desires to reinstate the prosecution, it may do so by procuring another indictment, or by warrant of arrest sworn out before an examining magistrate, and then proceed as in other original prosecutions. The order dismissing the indictment, though a final order, does not bar another indictment or prosecution.14
Upon the foregoing, we conclude that the order of dismissal without prejudice was a final order or judgment for purposes of CR 59 relief or appeal; that ten days after entry of the order of dismissal, the trial court lost jurisdiction to alter, amend or vacate the order; and that the Commonwealth’s remedy was by appeal from the order of dismissal or the timely bringing of a new charge and the issuance of new process.
For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
COOPER, KELLER, and SCOTT, JJ., concur. JOHNSTONE, J., dissents by separate opinion in which GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.. (8th ed.2004).
. Wood v. Downing's Admr., 110 Ky. 656, 62 S.W. 487, 488 (1901); C.I.T. Corp. v. Teague, 293 Ky. 521, 169 S.W.2d 593, 593 (1943); Grubbs v. Slater & Gilroy, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky.1954).
. 110 Ky. 656, 62 S.W. at 488.
. Signer v. Arnold, 436 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.1969).
. 869 S.W.2d 35 (Ky.1994).
. See n.4.
. Hides at 37.
. Id. at 38.
. RCr 13.04. See Silverburg v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky.1979).
. Commonwealth v. Gross, 936 S.W.2d 85 (Ky.1997).
. 319 S.W.2d 457, 457 (Ky.1959).
. Commonwealth v. Smith, 140 Ky. 580, 131 S.W. 391, 392 (1910).
. Id.
. Id.