concurring.
I concur in the analysis of the majority opinion as far as the particular issues addressed therein. I also concur because I believe the case must be remanded in view, of the fact that a portion of the damages alleged are potentially recoverable if the case is proven. I write separately, however, because of concerns related to the damage claims.
In Plaintiffs’ petition, they recite the following as far as the damages they seek:
157. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence as set forth herein, Defendants caused Plaintiffs to lose the physical custody of their son, Chase.
158. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence as set forth herein, Plaintiffs were caused to suffer and continue to suffer great emotional pain and suffering and mental anguish over the loss [of] the *737custody of their son, and have, since December 1995 to the present, been deprived of, and will in the future be deprived of, Chase’s sole and undivided love, affection, and companionship.
159. Further, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence as set forth herein, Plaintiffs have been caused to expend substantial amounts of money in attempting to obtain the return of their son, including attorneys’ fees and costs.
160. Further, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence, Plaintiffs will incur expenses for numerous other related expenses including, but not limited to, professional counseling.
Plaintiffs’ prayer for damages seeks, inter alia, recovery for the loss, since December 1995, of the child’s “sole and undivided love, affection and companionship.”
This is, as far as I have been able to discern, a case of first impression in Missouri as to whether law and policy will permit the recovery of monetary damages for negligent interference with relationship rights as to a living child.1 This is not a case of abduction or other deliberate interference with relationship rights. Also, it is not a wrongful death case in which the legislature has specified that a jury may evaluate the loss of companionship and services of a child who is now deceased. To the extent plaintiffs seek damages for interference with the “sole and undivided love, affection and companionship” of the living nine-year-old child, the case will tend to place that child’s interests squarely in the crucible of litigation over monetary compensation for the child’s affections. If I understand pertinent law and policy considerations correctly, there is substantial doubt about whether plaintiffs should be permitted to seek recovery for these injuries.
It is difficult to find any cases in which a jury has been allowed to adjudicate the value of the loss, through negligence, of a parent’s physical custody and relationship rights with regard to a living child. But see Person v. Behnke, 242 Ill.App.3d 933, 183 Ill.Dec. 702, 611 N.E.2d 1350 (1993) (dismissal of legal malpractice action reversed where court held that a claim exists for non-economic damages resulting from a plaintiffs loss of custody and visitation of his children in a divorce proceeding; holding limited to the most egregious cases of legal malpractice).2
This is not a case about the kind of deliberate interference with custody rights that might justify criminal as well as civil penalties.3 This case is more complicated *738for the child in question in that it asks the fact finder to place an economic value on parental rights to the exclusive care of the child and the loss of exclusive society with that child (who is legally shared with another set of custodians).
Is it not true, under the plaintiffs’ theory of damages, that the more alienated from plaintiffs that the child is at the time of trial, the more money they should receive in compensation? Does that fact not put in front of the plaintiffs an unhealthy temptation to make sure they maintain a substantial distance in their relationship to the child? "What pressures are placed on the child by that and other factors?
At common law, a parent traditionally had no cause of action for non-economic damages, such as emotional distress and loss of society as to his or her child, due to legal negligence. A parent also had no common law action for alienation of the affections of a child, whether a minor or an adult. See 59 Am.JuR.2d Parent and Child § 92 (1987). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 699. While parental rights are sacred rights, there always have been, and there always will be, sound reasons to avoid the intrusive judicial intervention in the life of the child and of the family that would be necessitated in such an action as this. Does not life itself have some adjustment mechanisms that can be utilized to allow nature to take its course when litigation does not distort attitudes and motives?
Is there a way for a jury to determine the value of the loss of parental rights and responsibilities in this scenario without making the child himself the primary focus of the proceeding? Is there a way that does not involve causing the child and the child’s affections to be evaluated like a chattel to be owned? A legal negligence action against a family law practitioner for negligence in handling a custody dispute in a marital dissolution presents a number of problems, including damages. See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., J.D., Annotation, Attorney’s Liability for Negligence in Cases Involving Domestic Relations, 78 A.L.R.3D 255, [*3] (1977); Behnke, 611 N.E.2d 1350; Ignotov v. Reiter, 425 Mich. 391, 390 N.W.2d 614 (1986). As already mentioned, there is also the pressure such a suit would place on the child by affecting the way the divorced parents relate to the child.
Section 453.110, RSMo 2000, which prohibits the permanent transfer of custody of a child without court order, has an “obvious purpose” of opposing the “concept that a parent could pass children on like chattel to a new owner.” In re Baby Girl —, 850 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. banc 1993). Section 453.075 requires a full accounting of any amounts spent in relation to the adoption of a child. The statute provides that only certain types of expenses may be reimbursed by the adoptive parents; and, of course, no other money or other consideration may be paid by or on behalf of the adoptive parents. See § 453.075.2, RSMo 2000. Section 568.175 also creates the crime of “trafficking in children.” It prohibits giving, offering, receiving, or soliciting any money or other consideration for the delivery of a child for the purpose of adoption. See § 568.175, RSMo 2000. Missouri is thus very solicitous of the notion that children are not chattels to be bartered or sold.
Parental rights are not for sale. Had the Standens purchased a negotiated peace in the earlier litigation by agreeing to pay the plaintiffs money to settle and abandon their claim to set aside their termination consents, such agreement would be void *739and unenforceable. See § 453.075.2. Because of the same underlying concerns, there is risk involved in allowing compensation to be adjudicated for a professional’s negligent interference -with such rights. Perhaps such an assertion sounds harsh and unfeeling toward the biological parents. However, it seems obvious that any attempt to provide monetary compensation in such a case requires extensive and intrusive court intervention into family life and into the life of the nine-year-old child, including his feelings, his likes and dislikes, and the actions of both sets of parents. While the court may have appointed a guardian ad litem for the child’s benefit, it is extremely unlikely, in my view, that such a guardian ad litem can provide significant protection for the child in the midst of such powerful factors.
The courts have recognized the “sanctity of the parent-child relationship” in termination of rights cases. In re K.L.S., 119 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Mo.App.2003). The State’s power to terminate rights is an “awesome power.” Id. Assuming, as we do for purposes of our review, that here things happened as Plaintiffs say they did, the loss could be considered huge. At the same time, the case is not about the child being a piece of property to be owned. To make the child a chattel at this point in our search for accountability has too great a potential to distort the child’s relationships and damage his welfare.
.In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court is to affirm on any ground consistent with law, whether the trial court relied upon that ground or other grounds. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Mo. banc 1984). Therefore, if this issue related to damages were not an issue of first impression, or if the parties had addressed it in briefs, this court might choose to address the issue of partial summary judgment as to damages. Not having the benefit of such briefing or clear legal guidelines, however, this writer chooses merely to raise the concerns so that the parties may address the issues in the trial court if they wish to do so.
. The court in Behnlce relied on the fact that the Illinois wrongful death statute allows recovery for the loss of society of a child. 611 N.E.2d at 1353-55. While the Behnke court acknowledged that damages for the parent’s mental distress would not be recoverable, it did allow non-economic damages, holding that the claim for loss of custody and visitation did not constitute a claim for mental distress. Id. at 1353.
. It has been suggested that a parent should be entitled to tort compensation for emotional distress in the case of an abduction of the child, or in the case of a conspiracy to alienate the child’s affections, or in the case of defaming the parent by stating to the child *738that the parent was insane. See 59 Am.Jur2d Parent and Child § 92 (1987).