dissenting:
I join in Judge SPAETH’s cogent dissenting opinion. I also believe that appellant has another meritorious claim: the lower court erred in refusing to suppress line-up and preliminary hearing identifications obtained as a result of appellant’s illegal arrest. Accordingly, I dissent.
I agree with the Majority that the Philadelphia police did not have probable cause to arrest appellant. However, I do not agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the identification evidence was not a fruit of the illegal arrest. The Majority believes that Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972) allows the introduction of identification evidence obtained after an illegal arrest in all cases in which a victim had an ample opportunity to observe the assailant at the time of the commission of the crime and was able to make a positive, unwavering identification. I submit that the Majority reads Garvin too broadly, that subsequent cases have rejected such a broad interpretation of Garvin, and that the Majority’s analysis would license the police to utilize intolerable dragnet arrests.
My analysis commences with a close examination of Common wealth v. Garvin. In Garvin, appellant and an accomplice robbed the owner of a beauty salon and her friend. The victims had ample opportunity to observe the two assailants. Shortly after the commission of the crime, the police apprehended the accomplice; the accomplice subsequently pleaded guilty. Three weeks after the robbery, an informant telephoned the police and asserted that an eyewitness had linked Garvin to the robbery. The police arrested Garvin and transported him to the beauty salon where the owner identified him as her accoster. At trial, both the owner and her friend positively identified Garvin and the court admitted the pre-trial identification; a conviction ensued. On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Garvin. Nevertheless, the Court held that the pre-trial and in-court identifications were not fruits of the illegal arrest and were, therefore, properly admitted. In particular, the Court stat*105ed: “No law abiding society could tolerate a presumption that but for the illegal arrest the suspect would never have been required to face his accusors. Thus, we conclude that the only effect of the illegal arrest was to hasten the inevitable confrontation and not to influence its outcome.” supra 448 Pa. at 264, 293 A.2d at 37. Further, the Court reasoned that “[t]he illegal arrest . . . merely provided the means for the confrontation with [the owner] more promptly than would otherwise have been the case. The arrest played no part in the identification of [the owner’s friend] who after the incident did not meet Garvin again until the day of the trial. We cannot assume that but for the illegal arrest the appellant would have remained at large indefinitely.1 In either case, it is clear that the illegality contributed neither to the knowledge of the witnesses nor to the accuracy of their identifications.” supra 448 Pa. at 266, 293 A.2d at 37.
According to the Majority, Garvin creates a conclusive presumption that an illegal arrest cannot taint a subsequent pretrial identification based on personal observation during a crime because sooner or later the police would have legally apprehended the defendant. I submit that this reading of Garvin is too broad; instead, I believe Garvin turns on the Commonwealth’s ability to prove that it had a source of information independent of the illegal arrest that could have led to the legal arrest of the defendant.
First, a close reading of the facts involved in Garvin reveals that the police in fact would have eventually apprehended the defendant through the use of legal means. The police had already arrested his accomplice who pleaded guilty. Moreover, the police had a full description of Garvin and the aid of an informant who implicated him. Garvin was a suspect. The police could have arranged to have the *106beauty salon owner observe Garvin, by photo or in person, before they made a formal arrest. Thus, it can fairly be said that the police had leads independent of the illegal arrest which could ultimately have led to Garvin’s prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Favors, 227 Pa.Super. 120, 125, 133, 323 A.2d 85, 88, 92 (1974) (Dissenting Opinion by SPAETH, J.).2
Second, Garvin, premises its doctrine of hastened confrontation, in part, upon United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967). Commonwealth v. Garvin, supra 448 Pa. at 266 fn. 4, 293 A.2d at 38 fn. 4. In Hoffman, the Court held that despite the illegal arrest of Hoffman and her co-defendant, the trial court properly admitted the co-defendant’s testimony implicating Hoffman. The Court based its holding upon a finding that the government had information independent of the illegal arrest which would in fact have led to Hoffman’s capture. Thus, the Court stated: “While the unlawful arrests did serve to result in a disclosure of the true identities of Fears, Johnson and Hoffman, all of whom had registered at the motel under other names, the existence of these persons, their association together, and the fact that some stolen money orders had been left behind in the motel room occupied by one of them, were facts which became known apart from any disclosure resulting from the arrests and unlawful search and seizure. These facts supplied an adequate basis for the investigation which followed and culminated in the filing of the informations. In our opinion it would be naive to assume that but for the unlawful arrests the trio would ‘have blended back into the mass of the population, and would have remained at large’ as appellants contend.3 Certainly, the unlawful arrests did not serve to immunize the appellants from prosecution.” Supra at *107503-04.4 In sum, the facts in Garvin and the Supreme Court’s reliance on United States v. Hoffman demonstrate that Garvin is predicated upon the factual, rather than the assumed, inevitability of the defendant’s arrest.
Subsequent cases have rejected the sweeping interpretation of Garvin which the Majority endorses today. For example, in Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 327 A.2d 63 (1974), our Supreme Court awarded a new trial because an illegal arrest tainted a confession. The Court in dictum discussed appellant’s contention that the illegal arrest also tainted a pre-trial identification. In a footnote, the Court noted that such a contention was. contrary to Commonwealth v. Garvin. Nevertheless, in the text of its opinion, the Court stated that it would not decide whether the admission of pre-trial identification evidence was “harmless error” and also cautioned the lower court to exclude reference to this testimony during the retrial.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 626 (1976) also evidences our Supreme Court’s reluctance to interpret Garvin broadly.5 In Brown, the Court held that' an illegally obtained confession had not poisoned the subsequent discovery of a murder weapon and a witness who inculpated the defendant. The Court articulated the following guidelines for determining when the exclusionary rule mandates suppression of evidence allegedly tainted by a constitutional violation: “Where the initial taint did not effect the reliability of the evidence, the only basis for excluding relevant testimony is to discourage unlawful police practices by preventing the exploitation by police of their improper acts. However, where the prosecution can establish that the challenged evidence would have come to its attention from an independent source free of the taint, there is not the type of exploitation of the illegality that requires the imposition of *108the rule of exclusion. Restated, where the evidence obtained as the result of illegal police activity would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule. Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 166, 170, 89 Cal.Rptr. 731, 474 P.2d 683 (1970).” supra 470 Pa. at 284, 368 A.2d at 631. The Court then concluded that the Commonwealth had met its burden of demonstrating an independent source which in fact would have led to the discovery of the allegedly tainted evidence. The Court discussed Garvin : “ . [There,] we concluded that the evidence secured through the illegality should nevertheless have been admitted where it was obvious that■ without the illegality the Commonwealth would have obtained the information.” supra 470 Pa. at 283, 368 A.2d at 631. (Emphasis supplied). Thus Brown restricts Garvin to situations in which the Commonwealth factually establishes the existence of an independent source which would have inevitably led to the defendant’s arrest.
Our Court has also subscribed to a narrow reading of Garvin. In Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 239 Pa.Super. 175, 361 A.2d 724 (1976), we held that the lower court properly suppressed a co-defendant’s testimony which had been obtained as the result of the defendant’s illegal arrest. In particular, we rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that an eyewitness to the crime would have eventually seen, recognized, and reported the co-defendant who implicated Nicholson. Our Court stated: “Finally, the contention that eyewitness-Parrish would have eventually seen and recognized Honesty when Honesty visited his family is too uncertain. We must remember that the description given by Mr. Parrish did not fit Honesty. Although Mr. Parrish did select Honesty’s picture from a group of five, we have no proof that Honesty would have been identified if a confrontation had occurred on the street absent the picture identification. We cannot even be reasonably certain that the confrontation would have occurred.” supra 239 Pa.Super. at 179, 361 A.2d at 726 (Emphasis supplied). Because the Commonwealth did not establish the factual certainty of the co-defendant’s *109ultimate apprehension through a source independent of the constitutional violation, we rejected the Commonwealth’s reliance on Garvin.6 If we required the Commonwealth in Nicholson to demonstrate an independent source leading to the co-defendant’s eventual arrest, then we must require the Commonwealth in the instant case to demonstrate an independent source which could have resulted in appellant’s ultimate apprehension.
Finally, and most importantly, I believe that the Majority’s overly broad interpretation of Garvin would immunize from judicial protection impermissible and wholesale intrusions on the constitutional rights of our citizenry. See U.S.Const., amend. IV; Pa.Const. Art. I, § 8. Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, instructs us to assess the alleged taint emanating from an illegal arrest in light of the policies which underlie the exclusionary rule: “Restated, where the evidence obtained as a result of illegal police activity would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule.” supra 470 Pa. at 284, 368 A.2d at 631. The Majority's analysis subverts the privacy interests protected by the exclusionary rule and encourages unlawful police practices by permitting the police to reap the benefit of illegal acts. Extended to its logical conclusion, the Majority’s reading of Garvin would authorize dragnet arrests without probable cause and the subsequent parading of innocent individuals before the victim. The Majority refuses to impose the only sanction, exclusion of the identification testimony, which could effectively deter such blatantly illegal police procedures.
*110In conclusion, I would interpret Garvin and its progeny as requiring the Commonwealth to establish a source of information independent of the illegal arrest which could have led eventually to a defendant’s legal arrest and subsequent identification. I would hold that the presumption of inevitable apprehension relied upon by the Majority cannot serve as a substitute for this independent source. If the Commonwealth fails to demonstrate such an independent source, the identification has not been purged of its primary illegality. In the instant case, the record does not reveal any evidence supporting the existence of an independent source of information which could have resulted ultimately in appellant’s arrest.1 *****7 Accordingly, the lower court should have suppressed the identification testimony.
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. “Our view on this point was succinctly summarized in United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967), when it was stated that ‘it would be naive to assume that but for the unlawful arrests the trio would “have blended back into the mass of population, and would have remained at large” as appellants contend’ 385 F.2d at 503.” (footnote 4 in the original).
. The Majority in Commonwealth v. Favors did not discuss Garvin because it concluded that the arrest was made on the basis of probable cause.
. “At the time of the arrests an F.B.I. investigation had begun of a series of incidents involving the passing of stolen money orders at LaCrosse, Onalaska, and Superior, Wisconsin.” (footnote 2 in the original).
. In the absence of any facts indicating an independent source of information as in United States v. Hoffman, supra, it would be naive to assume that a criminal would not blend back into the mass of the population. This is especially so when the crime occurs in a city the size of Philadelphia, as in the instant case.
. Justice NIX, the author of Garvin, wrote Brown.
. I filed a Dissenting Opinion in Nicholson in which I argued that the co-defendant’s testimony should not have been suppressed. I noted my belief that the Commonwealth had established as much likelihood of the co-defendant’s eventual arrest as the Commonwealth established in Garvin. For example, the eyewitness testified that he had a good opportunity to observe the co-defendant and that he had seen the co-defendant several times in the neighborhood since the time of the incident. In fact, the co-defendant resided in his mother’s home only two blocks from the scene of the crime.
. While the police did search the stolen getaway car which had been wrecked during the chase, the police found no evidence connecting appellant to the crime which ultimately would have led to his arrest.