dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. While I concur with the majority’s holdings regarding the warrantless search of Mahsman’s home and the search of Mahsman and his vehicle incident to the warrantless arrest, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the untainted information in the affidavit was not sufficient for probable cause to support the search warrant and that the denial of Mahsman’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained under this search warrant was clearly erroneous.
Our review of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. State v. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Mo.App.2000) (quoting State v. McNaughton, 924 S.W.2d 517, 522-23 (Mo.App.1996)). The meaning of probable cause is a legal issue, but the existence of probable cause in an individual case is a question of fact. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 604 (quoting State v. Berry, 801 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Mo. banc 1990)). Our review of whether the issuance of a search warrant lacked the required probable cause to render the subsequent search and seizure illegal so as to exclude the evidence at trial is not de novo. Id. Instead this Court is to give great deference on review to the initial judicial determination regarding probable cause made at the time that the warrant issued, and we reverse only if that determination is clearly erroneous. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 604 (quoting State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 457 (Mo. banc 1999)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1054, 120 *254S.Ct. 598, 145 L.Ed.2d 497 (1999). A determination of probable cause is clearly erroneous only if this Court is left with the firm and definite impression from the record that an error has been made. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 604 (quoting State v. Hill, 854 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Mo.App.1993). This Court will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, even if we might have weighed the evidence differently if we had been the trier of fact. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 604 (quoting Hill, 854 S.W.2d at 819)).
Probable cause is to be determined from the four corners of the application for the search warrant and of any supporting affidavits. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 604. See section 542.276 RSMo (2000). To determine whether probable cause has been established for the issuance of a search warrant, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 604-05 (quoting Hill) 854 S.W.2d at 817). The determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant depends on the specific facts and circumstance of each case, looking at the probabilities and the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable, prudent men act, rather than the considerations of legal technicians. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 544 (1983); Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 605. Accordingly the affidavits supporting search warrants should be interpreted in a common sense manner rather than a hypertechnical one. See Dotvell, 25 S.W.3d at 605.
Tainted evidence cannot be used to establish the required probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, but the fact that it is included in the affidavit does not invalidate the warrant. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 606. The proper inquiry is not whether an affidavit contained allegations based upon illegally obtained evidence but whether, after excising all tainted allegations, the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. (quoting State v. Macke, 594 S.W.2d 300, 309 (Mo.App.1980). “It is not required that the affidavit provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, the rule being that ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’” Hill, 854 S.W.2d at 819 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 546)).
Law enforcement agents are not, generally speaking, lawyers, and do not have to be such. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-2329, 76 L.Ed.2d at 544, probable cause
[D]oes not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.
The U.S. Supreme Court also stated in that case that affidavits are typically drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation, and that a negative or grudging attitude towards warrants by reviewing courts is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s preference for searches by warrant, and that courts should not invalidate warrants by examining and interpreting affidavits in a hyper-technical manner instead of a commonsense manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-35, 103 S.Ct. at 2330-2331, 76 *255L.Ed.2d at 545-47. See also Hill, 854 S.W.2d at 818.
I believe that there was sufficient information in the affidavit, even after excising the tainted allegations, to support the issuance of the search warrant. After excising the tainted allegations, the affidavit stated the following: that the affiant was a special agent of the Northeast Missouri Narcotics Task Force with specialized training in narcotics enforcement; that the affiant was familiar with methamphetamine and the items used in its manufacture; that on January 11, 2003 at approximately 10:00 p.m., Mahsman burst into his neighbor’s house armed with a gun, yelling at the neighbor to turn off the lights and that the world was coming to an end; that at approximately 10:43 p.m. that same night, the door to Mahsman’s house was open; that a jar of ether was on the walkway outside of Mahsman’s house when the police arrived; that weapons were found in plain view inside Mahsman’s home; and that at 11:03 p.m. that night, a Palmyra police officer conducted a vehicle stop of Mahsman in Palmyra.
The evidence showed Mahsman burst into his neighbor’s house late in the evening in the middle of winter, armed with a gun, and yelled at his neighbor to turn the fights off and that the world was coming to an end. This constituted bizarre and irrational behavior at the very least, and supports an inference that Mahsman was intoxicated by some substance. Moreover, Mahsman allegedly left his residence later that same night, leaving the door to his house open, with weapons in plain view in the house, and a jar of ether, which is commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, on the walkway outside his house. When considered in a commonsense manner, the combination of these allegations in the affidavit supported a conclusion by the trial court that there was a reasonable probability of criminal activity. Under our standard of review, looking at the totality of the circumstances, this was sufficient to support the trial court’s issuance of the search warrant and to overrule the motion to suppress.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.