dissenting.
The majority holds that a defendant, “whatever the nature of the evidence presented or of his defense, has an unconditional right, on request, to an instruction on the complete statutory definition of the offense of voluntary manslaughter.” It is asserted that this conclusion is mandated by this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 316, 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974). The majority fails to consider that in Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, we were addressing a killing under the 1939 Penal Code,1 whereas *501today’s decision is governed by the 1972 Crimes Code.2 I believe this distinction is critical and that Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, is not controlling in the present case.
The 1939 Penal Statute and those statutes preceding it3 did not attempt to define the crimes of murder and voluntary manslaughter, but rather incorporated the concepts of the common law as explicated in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 492, 137 A.2d 472, 474 (1950). Part of our common law heritage in this regard was the principle that the jury always has the power under a murder indictment to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter although the classical requirements of voluntary manslaughter were absent. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 323, 281 A.2d 859 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 266 A.2d 726 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harry, 437 Pa. 532, 264 A.2d 402 (1970); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 433 Pa. 525, 252 A.2d 671 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cooney, 431 Pa. 153, 244 A.2d 651 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 220 A.2d 807 (1966); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d 337 (1966); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959); Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 66 A.2d 825 (1949); Commonwealth v. Arcuroso, 283 Pa. 84, 128 A. 668 (1925); Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 122 A. 166 (1923). This principle was a corollary to the rule that upon an indictment for a particular crime, the defendant may be convicted of a lesser offense included within it. Commonwealth v. Soudani, 398 Pa. 546, 159 A.2d 687 (1960). The rationale of this principle as it has been applied in homicide cases has been set forth as being two-fold:
“First, it was intended to prevent the prosecution from failing where some element of the crime of murder was not made [out]. Second, it was designed to redound to the *502benefit of the defendant, since its effect is actually to empower the jury to extend mercy to an accused by finding a lesser degree of crime than is established by the evidence.” (Footnote omitted).
Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, 457 Pa. at 569, 319 A.2d at 146.
In view of this firmly embedded common law, in Jones I was persuaded that it was jurisprudentially sound to remove the discretion from the trial court and require the giving of an instruction of voluntary manslaughter in any case where such a request was made by the accused. I was particularly influenced in reaching this conclusion by the fact that although our cases had clearly given the trial court the right to deny the request where there was no rational basis for such a verdict,4 we had not unequivocally prohibited the granting of such a request where there was an absence of a rational basis. To the contrary, we had frequently held that under an indictment charging murder, an accused may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter even though it clearly appeared from the evidence that there was an absence of the traditional elements of the crime of manslaughter.5
*503However, it is my view that the enactment of the 1972 Crimes Code provided a significant departure from this precedent and affords us the opportunity to reassess the wisdom and present utility of these principles. The enactment of the 1972 Crimes Code evidenced an unequivocal intent on the part of the Legislature to depart from reliance upon the common law for the definition of criminal offenses within this Commonwealth. While a number of the newly announced statutory crimes are quite similar to their common law counterpart, there are many other instances where there are significant changes. Additionally, new crimes not heretofore recognized have been articulated as well as previously existing crimes rejected. We are now freed from the strictures of the conceptual abstractions of the past. Our present concern should be to fashion those principles that will enhance the sound administration of justice. Therefore, before continuing to embrace these doctrines in this context, we should reexamine their present utility.
In my judgment neither lesser included offense nor the mercy dispensing power provide a compelling reason for the adoption of the rule today by the majority. An analysis of the lesser included offense approach would suggest that it is only compelling in those instances where there exists a factual dispute as to the presence or absence of an element of the greater offense, which element is not a component part of the lesser offense. Commonwealth v. Gartner and Pfaff, 475 Pa. 512, 381 A.2d 114 (1978) (dissenting opinion). Where the controversy centers around elements common to both the greater and the lesser offenses, it is arbitrary and capricious to allow a fact finder the freedom to choose the verdict to be returned.
I am also unimpressed by those arguments offered by those who advocate vesting in the jury some undefined *504quantum of “mercy dispensing power.” As noted in Gartner and Pfaff, “the term ‘mercy dispensing power’ is merely an euphemism to justify a rationally unsupportable verdict.” “Not only does this approach invite arbitrary action by juries, it also leaves a reviewing court powerless to ascertain and to remedy discriminatory verdicts.” Id. 475 Pa. at 533, 381 A.2d at 125 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
In my view our jurisprudence would be best served by abandoning these doctrines of the past and vesting in the prosecutor the charging decision.
“The charging decision is properly a prosecutorial function. See Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Reid, 338 Pa. 351, 12 A.2d 909 (1940); A.B.A. Standards on The Prosecution Function, §§ 3.5, 3.9 and Commentaries (approved draft 1971). See Generally, Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 232 A.2d 729 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Bauer, 437 Pa. 37, 261 A.2d 573 (1970). The prosecutor’s awareness of the strengths and the weaknesses of his case places him in the best possible position to assess whether a jury would be likely to reject a verdict of the higher grade of homicide under a given set of facts. I, therefore, suggest that the appropriate rule would be to give the option to the district attorney of charging all of the grades of criminal homicide or to permit him to select the specific charge or charges he deems appropriate under the evidence he intends to present. In the event that he chooses the latter course and the jury sees fit to acquit the accused, then under this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Campana, [452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808, 94 S.Ct 73, 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974)], supra, subsequent Prosecution for the offenses not initially charged, would be barred. Additionally, this approach would encourage responsible charging by the prosecutor and deter the ‘boiler-plate’ charging of accused.”
*505Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 471, 378 A.2d 1199, 1215 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (dissenting opinion).6 Accordingly, it is my view that the trial court did not err in denying the requested instruction for voluntary manslaughter and I would therefore affirm the judgment of sentence.
. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 701, amended, Act of Dec. 1, 1959, P.L. 1621, § 1, 18 P.S. § 4701 (repealed 1972).
. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1 et seq., as amended, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 et seq. (Supp. 1977-78).
. Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 402, No. 374, § 74; Act of April 22, 1794, ch. 1766, § 2, 1791-1802 Pa.Laws 187.
. Commonwealth v. Dews, 429 Pa. 555, 558, 239 A.2d 382, 384 (1968); Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112 A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 A. 632 (1938); Commonwealth v. Pava, 268 Pa. 520, 112 A. 103 (1920); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 266 Pa. 223, 109 A. 878 (1920):
“[I]t is the duty of the court to submit the question of manslaughter unless it is clearly convinced there is nothing in the evidence to reduce the grade of the crime below murder; while the jury must be free to act in determining the degree of murder, there is no such requirement in distinguishing between murder and manslaughter.”
See Also, Commonwealth v. Sutton, 205 Pa. 605, 55 A. 781 (1903); Clark v. Commonwealth, 123 Pa. 555, 16 A. 795 (1889).
. Commonwealth v. Hill, 444 Pa. 323, 326, 281 A.2d 859, 860 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 356-57, 266 A.2d 726, 730-31 (1970); Commonwealth v. Harry, 437 Pa. 532, 535, 264 A.2d 402, 404 (1970) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 433 Pa. 525, 528-29, 252 A.2d 671, 672-73 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cooney, 431 Pa. 153, 157, 244 A.2d 651, 653 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pavillard, 421 Pa. 571, 576-77, 220 A.2d 807, 810 (1966); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 211-13, 216 A.2d 337, 338 (1966); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 202, 191 A.2d 369, 373 (1963); *503Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 396 Pa. 359, 363, 152 A.2d 913, 915 (1959); Commonwealth v. Steele, 362 Pa. 427, 430, 66 A.2d 825, 827 (1949); Commonwealth v. Kellyon, 278 Pa. 59, 61-62, 122 A. 166, 167 (1923); Commonwealth v. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 60, 47 A. 952, 953 (1901); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 422 (Pa.1821).
. Although Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977) involves a request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction, the principles for which I am citing this case would apply as well to cases involving the request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction as in the instant case.