dissenting:
Unemployment compensation benefits are a statutory right for those genuinely eligible under D.C.Code § 51-110(a) (2006), and the statute is to be construed broadly to accomplish the legislative and statutory intent of minimizing the economic burden of unemployment. See Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Labor, 409 A.2d 164, 170-71 (D.C.1979). Employees presenting sufficient evidence that they left them employment voluntarily, for good cause, and for reasons connected with their work are entitled to benefits. See 7 DCMR § 311.4. In my view, appellee Patricia O. King presented sufficient evidence to meet that requirement.
Chimes was certainly aware that King was having medical problems relating to work due to her pregnancy, evidenced by her prior memorandum on work restrictions and her communication to her employer that she would require an additional leave of absence until her child was born. As in Bublis v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 575 A.2d 301 (D.C.1990), we should hold that the employer possessed enough information to “require it to assume the duty of inquiring further of her” about her health, because “basic fairness dictates that at some point the party assumed to have greater knowledge of the regulatory scheme must bear the responsibility of confirming the nature and cause of the illness and the prospect it holds out for resumption of work” (emphasis in the original). Therefore, I conclude that King presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that she left work for good cause and that she previously supplied her employer with a medical statement regarding her disability, as required by 7 DCMR §§ 311.4 and 311.7(e). Because I would affirm the judgment of the Office of Administrative Hearing’s administrative law judge, I respectfully dissent.