Phillip Chase appeals from a final order terminating his parental rights to his son, N.C. (born February 24, 1993). Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support termination of his parental rights, and he asks that we reverse the trial court’s order. We hold that the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of the appellant was not clearly erroneous. Thus, we affirm.
On January 27, 2000, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed a petition for emergency custody of N.C. because N.C. had bruises and bedsores for which the appellant had not sought medical treatment, because N.C. had not been in school since November 1999, and due to allegations of sexual abuse. On February 1, 2000, the trial court found probable cause to remove N.C. from appellant’s custody1, ordered appellant to attend parenting classes, undergo a psychological evaluation, and attend counseling if recommended as a result of the psychological evaluation. N.C. was found to be dependent-neglected by the trial court on March 7, 2000. DHS failed to prove that there was sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. The parties stipulated that there was medical neglect, educational neglect and physical abuse. During the next review hearing, appellant was found to be in partial compliance with the court’s earlier orders. He was ordered to obtain appropriate housing, to obtain counseling, and to attend and complete domestic violence classes.
A permanency planning hearing was held and an order issued on March 12, 2000. DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental rights on December 15, 2000, but the petition was denied after a February 12, 2001 hearing. Due to appellant’s partial compliance with the trial court’s orders, inconsistency with housing, and failure to comply with counseling, DHS filed another petition for termination of appellant’s parental rights on October 4, 2001. The trial court referenced the fact that appellant had remarried since N.C. went into the State’s custody, and his wife, Priscilla, was an untreated alcoholic. However, the petition was denied again.
. At a-May 16, 2002 review hearing, the trial court approved a trial placement between appellant and N.C., in addition to a visitation arrangement. The conditions of visitation included that appellant pay for daycare services for N.C. while he was at work. In addition, N.C. was not to be left alone with appellant’s wife, Priscilla. The trial placement took place from August 15, 2002, until November 7, 2002. On November 12, 2002, the court ordered that the trial placement with appellant be terminated and that N.C. be returned to foster care. The trial court terminated the trial placement based on evidence that N.C. had not received his medication, appellant failed to take N.C. to counseling, N.C.’s grades deteriorated, he was dismissed from his after-school program because appellant did not pick him up on time, and because appellant’s home was roach infested.
On March 26, 2003, DHS filed a new petition for termination of appellant’s parental rights, and asked the court to grant a consent to adoption petition. Appellant’s rights were terminated on June 23, 2003. The trial court found that N.C. had been out of appellant’s home since January 25, 2000, and, that despite meaningful efforts on the part of DHS to provide services to effect reunification and to rehabilitate the home, appellant had not remedied the conditions that caused the removal.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is as follows:
We have held that when the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship. Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Parental rights, however, will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. The facts warranting termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence, we will not reverse unless the court’s finding of clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the fact finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we must give due regard to the opportunity of the [trial court] to judge the credibility of witnesses. Additionally, we have noted that in matters involving the welfare of young children, we will give great weight to the trial judge’s personal observations.
Bearden v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 328, 42 S.W.3d 397, 403-04 (2001) (citing Ullom v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 12 S.W.3d 208 (2000)) (citations omitted).
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights. The trial court terminated the appellant’s parental rights pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 2002)2, which states that a parent’s rights can be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile has been adjudicated dependent-neglected, has been out of the home for twelve months, and despite an effort by DHS to rehabilitate the home, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. We hold that the trial court’s determination is not clearly erroneous.
Appellant did not have legal custody of his child for three years before the trial court issued its order terminating his parental rights. DHS put forth extensive efforts to rehabilitate the home. DHS provided homemaker services that addressed parenting, budgeting, and cleanliness of the home. DHS also provided transportation assistance and discussed with appellant what was expected from him on the case plan. In addition, DHS provided furniture, HUD referrals, and food stamps.
The trial court ordered a trial placement that began on August 15, 2002, and was terminated on November 7, 2002. During the trial placement, the court found that, among other things, N.C.’s health needs were not being met and his grades were lower than when he was in foster care. Appellant partially complied with the case plan, but he continued to make decisions adverse to the child. Even though the trial court had ordered that no one with head lice was to visit appellant’s home, a DHS worker observed three children with head lice in the home during N.C.’s trial placement. Appellant failed to take N.C. to counseling during the trial placement, and N.C. was discharged from an after school program because appellant failed to pick him up on several occasions. N.C.’s medicine was also not properly administered during the trial placement, and the court found that appellant’s housing was not appropriate.
The court’s initial probable cause order finding the juvenile dependent-neglected found that there was medical neglect, educational neglect, and physical abuse. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 2002), the court can terminate appellant’s parental rights if those areas are not remedied after twelve months, and DHS made a reasonable effort to rehabilitate the home. In this case, after three years appellant failed to demonstrate the ability to properly care for his son. During the trial placement he neglected his son’s medical and educational needs. We hold that the trial court’s decision terminating appellant’s parental rights regarding N.C. is not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Gladwin, Neal, and Vaught, JJ., agree. Hart and Roaf, JJ., dissent.The mother of N.C. is deceased.
Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-341 (b) (3) (B) (i) (a) was amended in 2003, but the changes were only stylistic.