concurring.
Although I support the result obtaining under the majority opinion, I differ with its analysis.
As I understand the majority opinion, it applies a general rule that the filing of alternate and/or inconsistent land devel*415opment applications, simultaneously or serially, does not affect a municipality’s statutory obligation to render decisions on all applications, absent some additional evidence of confusion. Under the majority’s approach, however, the filing of a revised plan extends the 90-day decision period and, presumably, relieves the municipality of the obligation to pass on the original application in its unrevised form.
One difficulty with this analysis, it seems to me, is that the words “alternate,” “inconsistent” and “revised” are not closely defined, and in the context of land development plans, these terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive.1 Moreover, at least some of the Commonwealth Court decisions suggest that the filing of serial, alternate and/or inconsistent applications itself is enough to support a finding of potential for confusion sufficient to avoid a deemed approval. See Morris v. Northampton County Hanover Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 466, 470-72, 395 A.2d 697, 699 (1978) (holding that the filing of serial, inconsistent plans created confusion, and upholding a common pleas court’s decision that Section 508’s 90-day deemed approval period did not apply).2
*416In my view, it would be useful to supplement the focus on whether plans are “alternative,” “inconsistent,” or “revised” with a more detailed factual assessment concerning whether, in the prevailing circumstances, there is legitimate potential for confusion and, if so, where the burden to seek or supply clarification should be allocated.3 The matter of burden allocation is a difficult one. On the one hand, the Legislature’s intent via Section 508 to secure streamlined resolution of land development applications seems reasonably clear, suggesting that the burden should be allocated to the local government. On the other hand, the public maintains a strong interest in merits-based decisions assuring orderly land use decisions in implementing legislatively prescribed controls on land development, see Wistuk v. Lower Mt. Bethel Twp. ZHB, 592 Pa. 419, 431, 925 A.2d 768, 775 (2007), militating in favor of allocation of the burden to the landowner.4 Given these substantial interests in tension, I believe the burden should be allocated to the party initiating a new or substantially revised *417plan.5 It is also important to note that, in assessing both the potential for confusion and the appropriate allocation of the burden to address it, there may be factual issues that would require an evidentiary hearing and findings.
Here, however, it is undisputed that the alternative or revised plan was offered at the suggestion of the Township.6 I realize the parties moved forward on the basis of the cluster development plan only, thus creating the potential for confusion on the part of the Township, and a more detailed factual development of the circumstances underlying the landowners’ serial proposal would be preferable. However, in light of the Township’s concession that the subsequent proposal was at its behest, I believe that the burden to obtain clarification should be allocated to it, and thus, the record is sufficient to support the result directed by the majority.
Finally, I note that the application of deemed approval statutes may raise due process concerns, at least with respect to neighboring landowners who may have a direct interest in the outcome of a land use proceeding, but who have no control over the issuance of the decision necessary to prevent an automatic approval. No such interests, however, are raised in this appeal.
. I realize that the majority opinion does not treat Appellant’s conditional use application as in the nature of a land development plan and, for the same reason, does not consider such application as a revision to the original subdivision plan. See, e.g., Majority Opinion at 412, 966 A.2d at 1112 ("Appellant's conditional use application was not intended to revise the land use application as it dealt with zoning issues as opposed to the original subdivision application, which addressed land use.”). Under the Upper Merion Township Code, however, a conditional use application framed under the cluster development overlay is addressed to the governing body and serves a dual function as a subdivision application. See Upper Merion Township Code § 165-73 (explaining that "such applications shall be simultaneously considered as a subdivision and/or land development application”). Thus, the subsequent proposal shared greater fundamental similarities with the original subdivision plan than the majority opinion implies.
. Morris seems to me to be irreconcilable with the Commonwealth Court's later decision in Appeal of Fiori Realtor, Inc. from Decision of Lower Southampton Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 55 Pa.Cmwlth. 59, 422 A.2d 1207 (1980), which enforced a 90-day automatic approval with regard to a plan to develop a shopping center, despite the filing of an intervening, inconsistent proposal to construct a restaurant. See id. at 62, 422 A.2d at 1208. It is not clear whether the Fiori panel was aware of the Morris decision — its reasoning is contained in a single paragraph with no citation to any previous authority.
. We would not be free to consider such an inquiry, absent a constitutional violation, but for the fact that Section 508 is silent as to the effect of serial applications upon the 90-day approval period. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) ("When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”). Under Section 508, a key event in calculating the ninety-day period is the filing of "the application,” 53 P.S. § 10508, and I believe that the filing of serial applications may render the statute ambiguous in terms of which filing or filings represents “the application” pending for consideration before the governing body. In this regard, I would conclude that the Legislature could not have intended to impose upon municipalities the obligation of having to consider numerous, inconsistent land development applications and render a decision on each individual application within 90 days of filing. See generally 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (setting forth the presumption that the Legislature "does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable”).
. Other state courts have determined that their legislatures did not intend harsh results in providing for deemed approval where there is legitimate confusion or inadvertence. See, e.g., Manalapan Holding Co. v. Planning Bd. of Hamilton Twp., 92 N.J. 466, 457 A.2d 441, 449-50 (1983). Courts, however, also have cautioned against a permissive interpretation or application of the governing statute. See id.; see also Amerada Hess Corp. v. Burlington County Planning Bd., 195 N.J. 616, 951 A.2d 970, 979-982 (2008) (summarizing New Jersey’s judicial treatment of deemed approval provisions).
. In the case of minor revisions, I do not believe that a new ninety-day period should begin. However, again, the party seeking the revisions should make clear its perspective concerning the substantiality of revisions so that at least all parties are aware of a potential difference and can seek legal advice and apply precautionary measures where appropriate.
. The Township’s brief does not provide further detail; according to the landowner's submission, the governing body sought to address open space concerns by requesting the cluster development overlay.