OPINION
Opinion by
Justice HINOJOSA.In this original proceeding, relator, Maria C. Dooley, seeks habeas corpus relief. Relator asserts she is illegally confined under an order of contempt and commitment issued by the 105th District Court of Nueces County, Texas. In two issues, relator contends she is entitled to unconditional release because: (1) the trial court did not admonish her, and she did not waive her right to be represented by counsel during the hearing; and (2) the commitment order was not timely filed and entered with the court. We grant habeas corpus relief.
A. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 29, 1989, relator and real party-in-interest, Moses Del Bosque (“Del Bosque”) were divorced. Pursuant to an Agreed Modification Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship signed by the court on September 5, 1997, Del Bosque was awarded possession of the child at specified times, as well as telephonic visitation. On October 14, 1998, relator filed a Motion to Modify in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and a Motion for Enforcement and Clarification of Prior Order. On December 21, 1998, Del Bosque filed a Counter-Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship and Counter-Motion for Enforcement in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship. He filed a First Amended Motion for Enforcement in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship on August 19, 2003, and a Second Amended Counter-Motion for Enforcement in Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship on December 31, 2003.
On January 2, 2004, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing on the various motions. Relator appeared without counsel and requested a continuance so she could obtain an attorney. The trial court denied relator’s request and proceeded with the hearing. The trial court found that relator had violated the Agreed Modification Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship by not compelling the parties’ sixteen-year-old son to visit with his father during the court-ordered periods of possession. The trial court found that relator had violated the court’s order on ten separate occasions, found her guilty of criminal contempt, and ordered that she be confined in the Nueces County jail for a period of 180 days for each violation, with the periods of confinement to run concurrently.
On January 16, 2004, after a preliminary review of relator’s habeas corpus petition, we ordered relator released upon her posting of a $5,000 bond, pending our final determination of her petition. Relator subsequently posted a bond.
B. Analysis
The United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process incorporates the Sixth Amendment assurance that the accused in a criminal prosecution has the right to counsel. In re Butler, 45 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (citing Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir.1983)). This right extends to every case in which the litigant may be deprived of his personal liberty if he loses. Ridgway, 720 F.2d at 1413. Contempt proceedings in Texas have been characterized as quasi-criminal proceedings which *279should conform as nearly as practicable to those in criminal cases. Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex.1983) (orig.proceeding). Because contempt proceedings are triggered by actions which defy the state’s authority and entail possible penal sanctions, Texas courts have consistently held that alleged constructive contemnors are entitled to procedural due process protections before they may be held in contempt. Id. The Texas Family Code provides:
(a) In a motion for enforcement or motion to revoke community service, the court must first determine whether incarceration of the respondent is a possible result of the proceedings.
(b) If the court determines that incarceration is a possible result of the proceedings, the court shall inform a respondent not represented by an attorney of the right to be represented by an attorney and, if the respondent is indigent, of the right to the appointment of an attorney.
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.163(a), (b) (Vernon 2002).
Here, not only did the motion for enforcement indicate that incarceration was a possible result of the enforcement proceedings, counsel for Del Bosque specifically requested incarceration at the hearing. The record in this case is devoid of any endeavor by the trial court to ascertain relator’s ability to afford an attorney, and relator was not advised of her statutory right to an attorney.
The concurrence asserts that the trial court’s failure to admonish relator of her right to counsel renders only the eommitment order void, not the contempt order, because the contempt order was not beyond the power of the court to enter, citing Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex.1983). However, Johnson is not a family law case. In family law cases, the Texas Supreme Court has held that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver by relator of her right to counsel, the trial court has no authority to hold relator in contempt. Ex parte Keene, 909 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding); Ex parte Gunther, 758 S.W.2d 226, 226 (Tex.1988). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s order finding relator guilty of contempt and assessing her punishment at 180 days in jail, signed on January 9, 2004, is void.
We sustain relator’s first issue. In view of our disposition of this issue, it is not necessary to address relator’s second issue. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1.
We order relator discharged and released from the bond she executed pursuant to our January 16,2004 order.1
. We do not address the guilt or innocence of the relator in this habeas corpus proceeding. Only the legality of her detention is relevant. Ex parte Stringer, 546 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, orig. proceeding). Consequently, our action in discharging relator from custody is without prejudice to the right of the court to retry the issue of contempt after relator is properly admonished.