Respectfully, I dissent. The majority approaches this appeal as a case of statutory interpretation. I would interpret the indictment instead. This case presents only the question of whether the indictment alleges a felony under the animal-cruelty statute so as to invoke district court jurisdiction. I would conclude that it does. I would reverse and remand.
I. THE INDICTMENT
I would begin my analysis with the indictment itself, not with the animal-cruelty statute:
INOCENTE MORALES DOMINGUEZ AND PATRICK SCOTT KINGSBURY, hereinafter called the Defendants, on or about the 29th day of JANUARY, 2002, ... did then and there intentionally or knowingly torture one white and brown haired dog, one white and black haired dog, and two white haired dogs by leaving them without food and water to such an extent as to cause the death of said dogs, and the defendant’s conduct was not a generally accepted and otherwise lawful use of an animal solely for the purpose of fishing, hunting, or trapping; or wildlife control as regulated by state *208and federal law; or animal husbandry or farming practice involving livestock.
In general, an indictment must plead any element that must be proved at trial. Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1989); Harrison v. State, 76 S.W.3d 537, 539 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (citing Green v. State, 951 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). An indictment also must provide adequate notice of the charges the accused must prepare to meet and enable the accused to plead acquittal or conviction in bar to future prosecution for the same offense. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.11 (Vernon 1989); Harrison, 76 S.W.3d at 539 (citing Sanchez v. State, 928 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.)).
When construing an indictment, this Court reads the indictment as a whole, applying practical rather than technical considerations. Harrison, 76 S.W.3d at 539 (citing Oliver v. State, 692 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Soto v. State, 623 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). Keeping this injunction in mind, I then would examine the animal-cruelty statute to determine the sufficiency of the allegations in the indictment.
II. THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
The applicable provisions of the animal-cruelty statute are:
§ 42.09 Cruelty to Animals
(a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly:
(1) tortures an animal;
(2) fails unreasonably to provide necessary food, care, or shelter for an animal in the person’s custody.
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(1),(2) (Vernon 2003). A charging instrument that alleges only “torture” as its description of the criminal act without specifying the manner and means of its commission fails to provide adequate notice of the offense charged because of the diverse number of acts encompassed by the word “torture.” Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978). On the other hand, a charging instrument that alleges the accused “fail[ed] unreasonably to provide necessary food, care, or shelter for an animal in the person’s custody” gives fair notice of the offense charged. See Cross v. State, 646 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex.App.-Dallasl982, writ ref d) (“Torture of an animal may be done by various means, so that the specific means to be proved must be alleged, whereas an allegation of failure to provide necessary food can only mean failure to provide food of sufficient quantity and quality to sustain the animal.”).
On comparison of the indictment in this case with the animal-cruelty statute, I conclude that it does not allege both the felony offense of “torture” of the dogs and the misdemeanor offense of “fail[ure] unreasonably to provide necessary food, care, or shelter for an animal in the person’s custody.” The indictment includes the deprivation of water as an allegation and lacks the words “unreasonably” and “necessary.” It also omits the element that the dogs were in appellants’ custody, a necessary allegation under the failure-to-provide offense defined by section 42.09(a)(2) but not as an element of torture under section 42.09(a)(1). See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(1),(2) (Vernon 2003). The indictment does not adequately allege the misdemeanor and is fundamentally defective in that regard. See Cross, 646 S.W.2d at 516; see also Oliver, 692 S.W.2d at 714; Soto, 623 S.W.2d at 939 (indictment that omits element fails to allege offense).
Rather than charging appellants with the misdemeanor, the indictment alleges “leaving [the described dogs] without food *209and water to such an extent as to cause the death of said dogs” as the manner and means of committing the offense of torturing the animals. Contrary to the majority’s holding, nothing prohibits the State from alleging conduct that could be prosecuted as an offense under one provision of the animal-cruelty statute as the manner and means of commission of a separate provision. Mills v. State, 802 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ refd) (interpreting charging instrument under predecessor animal-cruelty statute).
The majority reaches the conclusion it does by emphasizing some words in the indictment and ignoring the jurisdictional effect of the State’s use of the word “torture,” rather than reading the indictment as a whole. See Harrison, 76 S.W.3d at 539. The Mills court analyzed a charging instrument that alleged the accused intentionally and knowingly confined an animal in a cruel manner “by failing to provide necessary food and care resulting in the animal’s death while the animal was in [her] custody.” Mills, 802 S.W.2d at 404. The offense of “conffn[ing] an animal in a cruel manner” is a distinct provision of the animal-cruelty statute. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(4) (Vernon 2003). Reading the charging instrument as a whole, the Mills court rejected the appellant’s argument that the charging instrument alleged an offense under two different parts of the statute, and she could not determine which one she was accused of violating. Mills, 802 S.W.2d at 404. The court of appeals concluded that the charging instrument alleged an offense under the predecessor to section 42.09(a)(4), not section 42.09(a)(2). Id.
Similarly, I would read the indictment in each case as a whole, without emphasizing any one allegation over another, and apply the practical consideration that the State must allege the manner and means of committing the offense of torture of an animal. See Harrison, 76 S.W.3d at 539. I would hold that the indictment alleged the felony offense of torture with sufficient specificity to confer felony district court jurisdiction. To hold otherwise requires the conclusion that an animal that is starved and dehydrated to death was not tortured for days before it finally succumbed to starvation and thirst. Such an overly technical interpretation of the statute hampers the State’s prosecution of felony animal-cruelty cases, a result the Legislature could not have intended.
III. REMEDY
Respectfully, I further dissent to the precedent the majority sets regarding the remedy for lack of jurisdiction in the district court in a criminal proceeding involving a purely misdemeanor offense. The majority affirms the dismissal of the indictments. If the district court did not have jurisdiction, it was required to transfer each case, not dismiss the indictments. Tex.Code CRiM. Proc. Ann. art. 21.26 (Vernon 2003). On the filing of an indictment in the district court that charges an offense over which the court has no jurisdiction, the judge of the district court shall order transfer of the case to an inferior court that does have jurisdiction. Id. Any case so transferred shall be entered on the docket of the court to which it is transferred. Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 21.29 (Vernon 2003). The case is then tried as if it had originated in the court to which it was transferred. Id. Thus, the proper remedy was to transfer the cases, not dismiss them.