This case involves a fifteen-year-old juvenile who, following his arrest for rape, and after several requests to see his mother were denied, executed a written waiver of Miranda 1 rights and gave the police a statement pertaining to the alleged crime. The question presented is whether, in the circumstances, the juvenile’s purported Miranda waiver was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made and if so, whether the ensuing statement, which was admitted into evidence at the trial, was voluntary in the traditional sense.
I
Patrick McIntyre, a fifteen-year-old tenth-grade student, was arrested and handcuffed by police at 7:00 a.m. on October 1, 1984, as he was on his way to school. As he was being transported to the Howard County Police Station by Detectives Witte and Myers, McIntyre was told that he had been arrested for the crime of rape. After the officers informed McIntyre of the alleged victim’s name, they informed him of his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent, to talk to a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during any police questioning. They also told him that a lawyer would be appointed to represent him, if he could not afford his own counsel, before any questions were asked. McIntyre said that he understood these rights. He then asked the detectives when he could see his mother. Myers explained that he could not see his mother at that time because he had been charged as an adult. No questions were asked of McIntyre during the journey to the police station.
At the station, the police again fully advised McIntyre of his Miranda rights, and again he said that he understood them. He again requested to see his mother, and his request was again denied. McIntyre thereafter executed a *610written form waiving his Miranda rights. At 7:55 a.m., he gave the police a statement concerning the alleged crime.
No pretrial motion to suppress the introduction of the Miranda waiver form or the ensuing statement was made. At the trial, Myers testified with respect to McIntyre’s execution of the Miranda waiver form, volunteering that McIntyre had asked twice to see his mother before waiving his Miranda rights. When the State offered the waiver form into evidence, McIntyre’s counsel objected. He said that he had not previously known of McIntyre’s several requests to see his mother, and he claimed that the requests were “tantamount to a request for counsel, because that’s how he would have gotten counsel.” At McIntyre’s request the court conducted a suppression hearing out of the presence of the jury “on the voluntariness, and whether he (McIntyre) was given the (Miranda) warnings.”
As it was the State’s burden at the suppression hearing to prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence (see State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 1105, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S.Ct. 646, 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)), the prosecutor questioned Myers concerning McIntyre’s waiver of Miranda rights. The detective testified that McIntyre appeared nervous but not frightened; that he was calm when his rights were read to him; that he did not appear “to be excited or flustered”; and that he said he understood his Miranda rights and would talk to the police. Myers testified that, while in the interview room at the police station, McIntyre asked for the second time “when he could see his mother”, that it was “just a matter of fact question”, and was not an “emotional request”. As in his earlier testimony, Myers testified concerning his response to McIntyre’s request to see his mother. He also testified that McIntyre was not under the influence of any intoxicants, did not appear to be ill or have any physical or mental infirmities, that he never asked to have an attorney present, and that no threats, promises or inducements were made to obtain McIntyre’s waiver of Miranda rights.
*611McIntyre did not testify at the suppression hearing and offered no evidence in support of his motion to suppress. In arguing for suppression, his counsel pointed out that McIntyre had been arrested on his way to school, that he was nervous when placed in the police car, that he was only fifteen years old, and that his two requests to see his mother had been denied. Counsel maintained that, in the circumstances, McIntyre “needed the opportunity to speak to his mother to secure counsel,” and that juveniles ordinarily are afforded the right to have a parent present at the police station. McIntyre’s counsel concluded his argument by saying, “That’s what Miranda was designed to guard against, undue influence and overreaching by police in obtaining statements.”
The court (Fischer, J.) denied the motion to suppress. It stated that “from hearing the evidence ... the statement was given voluntarily without any undue inducements, and ... the Miranda warnings were given.” Additionally, the court said that it knew of no “right that a person has to have their mother present during the taking of any statement.”
McIntyre’s statement to the police was subsequently admitted in evidence. It was essentially exculpatory as he denied having committed the rape. The statement contained several admissions, however, that the State urged at trial constituted, along with other evidence, proof of McIntyre’s guilt.
The jury convicted McIntyre of first degree rape, and he appealed. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected McIntyre’s argument that the waiver of Miranda rights was invalid because he had been denied “counsel of a parent.” It also found no merit in McIntyre’s argument that his ensuing statement to the police was involuntary. Specifically, the intermediate appellate court held that, if a statement was otherwise voluntary, “the fact that the parent of the juvenile is not permitted to attend the interrogation has no bearing on the admissibility of the *612voluntary statement.” We granted McIntyre’s petition for certiorari which presented the single question:
“Where a fifteen year old is arrested and charged with a serious crime, is denial of access to a parent by the police prior to extracting a statement [from him] violative of both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as applied to Maryland under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
In support of his position, McIntyre argues that juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation are in need of greater protection from constitutional violations than adults. He claims that such protection may be provided through the presence of a parent or adult friend whose guidance is needed to protect a juvenile’s constitutional rights. He contends that his request to see his mother was tantamount to invoking his right to consult an attorney. Because these requests occurred immediately after receiving Miranda warnings, he maintains that the police should not have continued to question him, and consequently, the resulting statement was inadmissible. McIntyre relies upon cases from other states requiring the presence of an “interested” adult prior to a juvenile’s waiver of constitutional rights.
Alternatively, McIntyre contends that the totality of the circumstances surrounding his arrest, waiver, and interrogation indicates that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights to silence and assistance of counsel. Because he was only fifteen years old, was denied access to his mother, and had no previous experience with the criminal justice system, McIntyre argues that the trial court should have found his waiver of Miranda rights to be invalid and suppressed his statement.
II
Under Miranda, in order “to use statements obtained during custodial interrogation of the accused, the State *613must warn the accused prior to such questioning of his right to remain silent and of his right to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during interrogation.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2568, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 186, 62 L.Ed.2d 121 (1979). Once Miranda warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear:
“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise____ If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to the police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.”
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28.
Miranda was based, the Supreme Court has said, on its perception “that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation.” Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 719, 99 S.Ct. at 2568-69. The Court explained that
“[t]he per se aspect of Miranda was thus based on the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary system of criminal justice in this country. Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the courts. For this reason, the Court fashioned in Miranda the rigid rule that an accused’s request for an *614attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.”
Id.
That “the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice under our Constitution” was emphasized in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481, 86 S.Ct. at 1631. “It is this pivotal role of legal counsel,” the Court said in Fare, “that justifies the per se rule established in Miranda, and that distinguishes the request for counsel from the request for a probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend.” 442 U.S. at 722, 99 S.Ct. at 2570.
In Fare, the Supreme Court held that a request of a sixteen-year-old juvenile charged with murder, made while undergoing custodial interrogation, to see his probation officer, with whom he had a special relationship, did not constitute a per se invocation of the juvenile’s rights to remain silent and to counsel. Among other reasons, the Court said that probation officers are not usually trained in the law and, therefore, are not in a position to advise persons as to their legal rights. And merely because a relationship of trust and cooperation might have existed between the accused and the probation officer did not, the Court held, indicate that the probation officer was capable of rendering effective legal advice to protect the juvenile’s rights during interrogation. To otherwise conclude, said the Court, quoting from Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), would amount to “an extension of the Miranda requirements [that] would cut this Court’s holding in that case completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale.” Such an extension, it said, would apply the rigid rule of Miranda to “a juvenile’s request for almost anyone he considered trustworthy enough to give him reliable advice.” Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 722-23, 99 S.Ct. at 2571.
In undertaking to prove a waiver of Miranda rights, “a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently *615waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. The “heavy burden” shouldered by the State is only proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 n. 5, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 38, 375 A.2d 1105 (1977). The question whether an accused waived Miranda rights is not “one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Thus, “the determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forego his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel.” Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 724-25, 99 S.Ct. at 2571-72, citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-77, 86 S.Ct. at 1628-29. “This totality-of-the-circumstances approach”, according to Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572, “is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is involved” (emphasis added). The Court there said:
“We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach permits—indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth *616Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”
Id.
The Court concluded in Fare that the “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis [may] take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved.” Id. Thus it said, “[w]here the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver determination.” Id. (emphasis added).
In reversing the holding of the Supreme Court of California that there was no waiver of Miranda rights, the Court in Fare concluded that the juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights. It said that the record demonstrated that the interrogating police officers “took care to ensure that respondent understood his rights”; that they “fully explained” to him that he was being questioned in connection with a murder; that they informed him of his Miranda rights and ascertained that he understood them; that there was “no indication in the record that respondent failed to understand what the officers told him”; that “no special factors indicatefd] that respondent was unable to understand the nature of his actions”; that he was a sixteen year old juvenile “with several arrests, ... had served time in a youth camp, ... had been on probation for several years [and] was under the full-time supervision of probation authorities.” 442 U.S. at 726, 99 S.Ct. at 2572. The Court also noted that there was “no indication that [respondent] was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be ... [and] he was not worn down hy improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” Id. at 726-27, 99 S.Ct. at 2572-73.
*617As the Court so recently stated in Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 523, the “sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion,” and the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver “has always depended on the absence of police overreaching.” Id. In the final analysis, the relinquishment of Miranda rights must be voluntary in the sense of constituting a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Id. “Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.” Id. at 524.
Ill
The Supreme Court has stated that great care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1458, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 303, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). In Haley, a preMiranda case, a fifteen-year-old youth gave police a written confession after being held incommunicado for five days. During that time, the juvenile was subjected to protracted interrogation, coupled with some physical coercion. In addition, the police refused to permit the youth to see his mother or a lawyer. In finding the confession involuntary, the Court noted that “[a]ge 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy [and] he cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity.” 332 U.S. at 599, 68 S.Ct. at 304. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), another pre-Miranda case, involved a fourteen-year-old juvenile who gave the police a written confession after being held incommunicado and questioned for six days. During that time, he was not permitted to see a lawyer, his parents, or any other adult. In finding the confession involuntary, the Court explained that the youth was “not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers *618being recorded and [was] unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.” 370 U.S. at 54, 82 S.Ct. at 1212. In both Gallegos and Haley, the Supreme Court found the confessions involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. In each case, the Court found that the youth of the juvenile was a crucial factor in determining, in the totality of the circumstances, whether the confession was voluntary under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We applied these principles in Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 247 A.2d 530 (1968), a case involving a confession given by a sixteen-year-old ninth grade student in a capital murder case. Taken into custody by the police and advised of his Miranda rights, the defendant made a statement. While he did not ask to see his parents before making the statement, he refused to sign it in their absence. At trial, there was an objection to the introduction of the unsigned statement on the ground that the juvenile did not knowingly and intelligently waive his privilege against self-incrimination and to counsel under Miranda. Noting that waiver of a fundamental constitutional right is usually an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, we said that the waiver determination “ ‘must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ ” Id. at 378, 247 A.2d 530 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). We observed that the Supreme Court “has emphasized that admissions of juveniles require special caution.” Id. 251 Md. at 378-79, 247 A.2d 530. We said, however, that “age ... , in itself, does not render a confession involuntary”, id. at 379, 247 A.2d 530, and that “a young accused may waive his constitutional rights and make a voluntary statement admissible in evidence”, id. at 380, 247 A.2d 530. After considering the totality of the circumstances, we concluded that, after careful and deliberate consideration, the defendant waived his *619Miranda rights and that his ensuing confession was voluntary. Id. at 381, 247 A.2d 530.
A clear majority of jurisdictions have utilized the totality of the circumstances test, including the presence of parents as one factor, in determining the validity of a juvenile’s waiver of constitutional rights.2 The weight that courts have given to a denial of parental access, however, has varied considerably. Some mention it as only one factor with no indication of its importance. E.g., State v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 270, 576 P.2d 129 (1978); State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 297 (Utah 1980); Theriault v. State, 66 Wis.2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974). Other courts have emphasized the importance of parental involvement, e.g., Interest of Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 2 (Iowa 1976); State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973); State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 490 A.2d 295 (1985); State in Interest of S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972), or stated that it would be preferable to have parents present during a juvenile’s interrogation, e.g., Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1979); State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 1637, 29 L.Ed.2d 115 (1971); Interest of Stiff, 32 Ill.App.3d 971, 336 N.E.2d 619 (1975). Another court has treated a juvenile’s request to consult with parents as a circumstance requiring case-by-case examination to evaluate its significance. United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir.1981). The court there considered the denial of access to parents as more important than the refusal to call a probation officer in Fare v. Michael C., supra. According to the court, “the proper characterization of such a [parental] request depends upon an examination of the abilities of the parent or guardian requested on the one hand, and of the accused juvenile on the other.” 653 F.2d at 1161. See also *620Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir.1977), reh’g en banc denied, 570 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 904, 99 S.Ct. 3095, 61 L.Ed.2d 871 (1979) (discussing Chaney’s independence from his mother as well as his awareness of his rights in refusing to equate request to call his mother with request for counsel).
As in Miller v. State, supra, Maryland has consistently examined the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived constitutional rights before giving a statement to police. Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254, 513 A.2d 299 (1986) (Lodowski II). In Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 199 A.2d 773 (1964) and Green v. State, 236 Md. 334, 203 A.2d 870 (1964), both pre-Miranda cases, we applied this approach to statements made by juveniles. The Court of Special Appeals has also consistently applied the totality of the circumstances approach in determining the validity of a juvenile’s waiver of rights. E.g., In re Lucas F., 68 Md. App. 97, 510 A.2d 270, cert. denied, 307 Md. 433, 514 A.2d 1211 (1986); In re Anthony F., 49 Md.App. 294, 431 A.2d 1361 (1981); aff'd on other grounds, 293 Md. 146, 442 A.2d 975 (1982); King v. State, 36 Md.App. 124, 373 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 281 Md. 740 (1977); In re Appeal No. 245, Term 1975, 29 Md.App. 131, 349 A.2d 434 (1975); Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 280 A.2d 260 (1971); State v. Hance, 2 Md.App. 162, 233 A.2d 326 (1967).
These cases recognize the importance of parental involvement in a juvenile’s decision to waive Miranda rights, and they consider this factor in evaluating the validity of the juvenile’s waiver. Certainly the lack of access to parents prior to interrogation does not automatically make a juvenile’s statement inadmissible. Bean, supra, 234 Md. at 440, 199 A.2d 773; Green, supra, 236 Md. at 342, 203 A.2d 870. In Bean, however, 234 Md. at 440, 199 A.2d 773, we observed that neither the defendant nor his father requested an opportunity to speak with the other. And in Green, the record contained no evidence that the police had pre*621vented contact between the defendant and his family. Green, supra, 236 Md. at 342, 203 A.2d 870.
The Court of Special Appeals has consistently listed access to parents as a relevant factor in assessing the validity of a juvenile’s waiver. E.g., Walker, supra, 12 Md.App. at 708, 230 A.2d 260; Hance, supra, 2 Md.App. at 168, 233 A.2d 326. The court has also carefully noted whether parents were present and whether either the juvenile or the parents requested an opportunity to consult with each other prior to the interrogation. E.g., King, supra, 36 Md.App. at 131, 373 A.2d 292; Anthony F., supra, 49 Md.App. at 298, 431 A.2d 1361. Furthermore, in two decisions finding juveniles’ statements to be involuntary, the court considered denial of access to parents as an important factor in the decision. Appeal No. 245, supra, 29 Md.App. at 139, 349 A.2d 434; Walker, supra, 12 Md.App. at 708, 280 A.2d 260.3 Thus, including access to parents as a factor in the waiver evaluation is consistent with Maryland law.4
Notwithstanding McIntyre’s urging, we are not persuaded to depart from the totality of the circumstances test in determining the validity of a Miranda waiver and in assessing the traditional voluntariness of a juvenile’s statement to the police. In so concluding, we recognize that some states have developed the so-called interested adult rule pursuant to which an adult interested in the juvenile’s welfare, generally a parent, must be informed of the child’s rights, have an opportunity to consult privately with the child, and be present during any interrogation. E.g., Lewis *622v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972); State in Interest of Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 594 (La.1978); Com. v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 389 Mass. 128, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1983) (applies absolutely for children under fourteen; for those fourteen or over State has very heavy burden if no consultation permitted); In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937, 940 (1982). In adopting this approach, the courts relied on the traditional legal protections afforded minors, Lewis, supra, 288 N.E.2d at 141-42, studies indicating that a significant percentage of juveniles do not understand their constitutional rights, Dino, supra, 359 So.2d at 593; A Juvenile, supra, 449 N.E.2d at 656; E.T.C., supra, 449 A.2d at 939, and a belief that a per se rule would assist the police by providing a definite standard. Lewis, supra, 288 N.E.2d at 141; Dino, supra, 359 So.2d at 592. California equates juveniles’ requests to see their parents with requests to consult an attorney. People v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1971). According to the California Supreme Court, minors desiring assistance naturally turn to their parents. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts should treat minors’ requests to see their parents as requests for assistance of counsel. Id. 491 P.2d at 797-98. Similarly, Florida considers juveniles’ requests to call their parents as assertions of the juveniles’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Sublette v. State, 365 So.2d 775 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978), appeal dismissed, 378 So.2d 349 (Fla.1979); Dowst v. State, 336 So.2d 375 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 339 So.2d 1172 (Fla.1976). Thus, when juveniles in custody request an opportunity to talk with their parents, the police must stop questioning them.
In rejecting the per se approach of these cases in favor of the totality of the circumstances test, we note the observation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
“protection of juveniles against the innate disadvantages associated with the immaturity of most youth may ... be *623achieved in a manner that affords more adequate weight to the interests of society, and of justice____”
Com. v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989, 992 (1983).5
IV
In reviewing the trial court’s determination of the Miranda waiver question and of the statement’s admissibility, we consider the entire record and make our own independent determination of the issue. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 711, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), vacated, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1452, 89 L.Ed.2d 711, on remand, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986) {Lodowski I). We accept the trial court’s factual findings about the circumstances surrounding the interrogation unless clearly erroneous, but determine for ourselves whether these facts demonstrate a voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. Id.; Watson v. State, 282 Md. 73, 84, 382 A.2d 574, cert. denied, 437 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3100, 57 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1978). In this regard, the record must demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that the trial court made the necessary factual findings to support its conclusion that the waiver was valid and the statement properly admissible in evidence. See Lodowski II, supra, 307 Md. at 251, 513 A.2d 299.
In the present case, the only evidence before the trial court on the question of whether the Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and the subsequent statement to police voluntarily given, was adduced by the State at the suppression hearing. As already indicated, it showed that McIntyre was fifteen years old and a tenth grade student; that he had been arrested early in the *624morning while on his way to school; that he had been handcuffed, put in a police car and told that he had been accused of raping a named victim; that he was transported to police headquarters and twice read Miranda rights; that before waiving these rights he twice asked to see his mother; and that his request was twice denied. The evidence further showed that while McIntyre was nervous, he was not flustered and said he understood his rights and would talk to the police. The questioning was of brief duration, less than an hour, culminating in McIntyre giving an essentially exculpatory statement. Evidence was also adduced by the State that McIntyre was not under the influence of any intoxicants, did not appear to be mentally or physically impaired, that he never asked to see a lawyer, and that no promises or threats were made to obtain the Miranda waiver and the ensuing statement.
The trial judge concluded “from hearing the evidence” that Miranda warnings were given, that the statement was voluntarily made, and that McIntyre had no right to have his mother present at the police station. The court did not specifically focus on whether McIntyre knowingly and voluntarily decided to forego his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel within the contemplation of Miranda. While there was evidence of McIntyre’s age and educational level in high school, there was no other evidence respecting his background, including prior experience with the justice system. The court did not specifically address the fact of McIntyre’s youthful age, and his several requests to see his mother before waiving his Miranda rights, in evaluating the validity of the waiver or the voluntariness of the statement.
On the other hand, as in Fare v. Michael C., supra, the record contains evidence that the interrogating officers took care to ensure that McIntyre understood his rights. And, as in Fare, there is no indication on the record that McIntyre failed to understand what the officers told him or that any special factors existed to indicate that he was unable to understand the nature of his actions. Nor, as in Fare, was *625there any indication that McIntyre “was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be ... [and] he was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at 726-27, 99 S.Ct. at 2572-73.
We think it implicit from the record in this case that the trial court’s finding of voluntariness encompassed both the Miranda waiver and the subsequent statement to the police; indeed, as the case was tried, the two determinations were blended together and treated essentially as one, both by counsel and the court. That a denial of parental access to a juvenile charged as an adult with a crime is a factor, and a very important one, in applying the totality of the circumstances test is entirely clear. But proof in this totality formulation that a juvenile’s request to see a parent was “in fact, an invocation of [the juvenile’s] right to remain silent”, Fare, 443 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572, is essentially a subjective determination, dependent on the juvenile’s state of mind at the time the request for parental access is made and denied. As McIntyre did not testify and adduced no evidence at the suppression hearing, and as the record is otherwise unrevealing, we cannot conclude that his mere requests to see his mother, in the circumstances, factually constituted an invocation of his right to remain silent.
Applying the relevant totality test to the particular facts of this case, we conclude from our independent review of the record that the trial judge could properly conclude, and did determine with sufficient clarity that the State’s proof that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights satisfied the preponderance of the evidence test. That no evidence was adduced by the State concerning McIntyre’s prior experience with the justice system does not alone compel a holding that the requisite evidence did not in its totality satisfy the preponderance standard.
*626Also to be factored into the totality test is that McIntyre’s statement was exculpatory and was given shortly after his arrival at the police station under circumstances that disclosed no police coercion. Nor was there any evidence to show that McIntyre’s mother would have been able to advise him of his legal rights, and the consequences of waiving them, had she been present at the police station. Thus, in the totality of the circumstances of this case, we shall affirm the determination of the trial judge at the suppression hearing that McIntyre voluntarily waived his constitutional rights in making his statement to the police.6
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Some courts apply the totality standard, but apparently do not include access to parents as a factor. E.g., State v. Guttings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966); In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975); O’Neil v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 518, 455 S.W.2d 597 (1970), cert. denied, Tenn., June 1, 1970.
. In In re Lucas F., supra, the Court of Special Appeals held a ten-year-old boy’s waiver invalid. Although the court discussed the lack of parental guidance prior to Lucas F.’s waiver, the court emphasized the suspect’s age rather than the absence of his parents in reaching its decision. 68 Md.App. at 103-04, 510 A.2d 270
. In Lodowski II, supra, 307 Md. at 254-55, 513 A.2d 299, we listed the factors previously identified as relevant to the voluntariness of a suspect’s statement: the suspect's age, intelligence, education, experience, suggestibility, and mental and physical health; the police officers’ treatment of the suspect; and the methods and length of interrogation.
. Pennsylvania recently abandoned the interested adult rule. First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court replaced the rule with a rebuttable presumption that a juvenile’s waiver was invalid without the opportunity to consult with an interested adult. Com. v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989, 992 (1983). One year later, the court adopted the totality of the circumstances approach and listed the presence of an interested adult as one factor in the analysis. Com. v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283, 1288 (1984).
. The Juvenile Causes Act, Maryland Code (1984 Repl. Vol.), § 3-814(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article requires a law enforcement officer who "takes a child into custody" to immediately notify the child’s parents, guardian or custodian. Whether the statute applies to juveniles charged as adults with criminal offenses was not raised below and, consequently, we do not determine whether this statute has any application in this case.