dissenting.
This is an appeal from an Order of the Commonwealth Court denying Appellants’ petitions for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Appellants in these consolidated cases are members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. They instituted these actions to challenge the authority of the *592Appellee, Department of Transportation (PennDOT), to establish and implement an automobile emission inspection and maintenance (I/M) program.
PennDOT had taken steps toward developing such a program to control air pollution in the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia areas as a result of two suits brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Those actions, brought by the Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air and by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against the Commonwealth, PennDOT, and the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), sought enforcement of the I/M provision of the state’s implementation plan (SIP), required by the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(G). The suits were settled in August of 1978 when the parties entered into a consent decree.
According to the terms of this consent decree, PennDOT was to seek legislative approval for a franchise system of emission inspections or, in the event of failure to obtain such approval, to implement a private garage inspection system under its own authority. When the General Assembly failed to pass the franchise system legislation proposed by Penn-DOT, the Department promulgated regulations and standards for the private garage system, to take effect under the modified consent decree by May 1, 1982. In October of 1981, the General Assembly passed, and overrode the governor’s veto of, House Bill No. 456, which prohibited PennDOT or any other executive agency from spending “any public funds for the establishment and administration of any system for the periodic inspection of emissions or emission system of motor vehicles.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 4706 (1981) (amended 1983). Having thus been disabled from proceeding with the I/M program, PennDOT sought a stay of the consent decree in the federal actions. The stay was denied, and upon motion of the plaintiffs the Commonwealth was found in contempt for failure to proceed with implementation of the program. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 533 F.Supp. 869 *593(E.D.Pa.1982); aff’d, 678 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir.1982); cert. denied, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 298, 74 L.Ed.2d 280 (1982).
In these actions, the Appellants sought to establish that PennDOT at all times lacked the authority to implement an I/M program or to consent to such a program on behalf of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Court concluded to the contrary, finding that under § 4531 of the Motor Vehicle Code, Title 75, Pa.C.S., PennDOT “had the statutory authority to implement an auto emission inspection maintenance program at the time it entered into the consent decree in the Federal District Court.” Because of the effects of House Bill No. 456, the court found no threat of irreparable harm and therefore denied the injunctive relief as well.
Subsequent to the Commonwealth Court’s decision, and the filing of this appeal, the General Assembly enacted Act 3 of 1983. While maintaining the prohibition on expenditure of funds for emissions inspection programs as the general rule of 75 Pa.C.S. § 4706, Act 3 added as an exception that such prohibition “shall not apply when the secretary [of transportation] shall certify that such system is required to comply with Federal law and is necessary for the Commonwealth to receive or avoid the loss of Federal funds,” and affirmatively provided that in such a case “the department may establish and administer such a system for motor vehicles registered in areas where periodic inspection of emissions systems of motor vehicles is required by the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States or decrees of the court of the United States.”
A Majority of this Court today holds that the Department did not have the authority to enter into the consent decree, that the decree is invalid, and that the Department does not presently, under Act 3, have authority to implement the I/M program. I most vigorously dissent.
The first and perhaps most fundamental error of the Majority Opinion occurs in the introductory sentence. There it is stated that the record reveals the “fact” that a suit was filed in federal court “against appellees, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penndot), and Pennsylvania *594Department of Environmental Resources, et. [sic] al.” Slip opinion at 1. What is stated is true as far as it goes. The Majority errs by what it does not state. Even a cursory glance at the record of the federal court actions makes it clear that those cases involved, as separate defendants, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the Department of Transportation and the Secretary of the Department; and the Department of Environmental Resources and the Secretary of that Department. The captions and innumerable references in the Opinions and Orders entered in the course of that litigation indicate that the Commonwealth was the primary defendant in those cases. In affirming the District Court’s order holding the Commonwealth in contempt, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that a motion to intervene filed by two groups of state legislators had been denied, which denial had been affirmed with the holding that the interests of the legislators were adequately represented by the Commonwealth defendants. Delaware Valley Citizens Committee for Clean Air, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 678 F.2d 470, 474 (3rd Cir.1982); cert. denied,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 298, 74 L.Ed.2d 280 (1982). The Court also noted that the “Pennsylvania Department of Justice, members of which were signatories of this decree, has the exclusive power to compromise and settle lawsuits against the Commonwealth,” [see 71 P.S. § 293 (Repealed 1980, Oct. 15, P.L. 950, No. 164, § 503 imd. effective)] and that “the Attorney General, who heads the Department of Justice, has represented the Commonwealth in this litigation from the time the complaint was filed, through the negotiation and signing of the consent decree, and up to the present.” 678 F.2d at 475. The Court further stated in unmistakable language “that the Commonwealth itself was and remains bound by the consent decree.” Id. The Majority conveniently ignores the fact that the federal courts had before them as defendants not only the two1 agencies involved in the case at bar, but also the Commonwealth itself.
*595The importance of this misstatement of fact becomes immediately obvious in the next paragraph where the Majority indicates that “the actions were concluded by the entry of a consent decree agreed to by counsel for the parties to the lawsuits.” Majority opinion at 1109 (Emphasis added). If, as the Majority implies, the party defendant was simply PennDOT, then the question addressed by the Majority, whether that agency had authority to establish an I/M system at the time it entered into the consent decree, might indeed be the relevant question. If however, as was found by the federal courts, the Commonwealth itself was the party defendant, then regardless of the intragovernmental processes necessary to comply, the Commonwealth itself, not just the agencies or the executive, but the entire state government, became bound by the consent decree. The Court of Appeals in an early challenge to the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency to enforce the requirements of the Clean Air Act and the State Implementation Plan by proceeding directly against the Commonwealth, held that such enforcement was valid. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Environmental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir.1974). The Court made clear its awareness that in permitting the EPA to enforce the SIP by acting against the Commonwealth itself, the processes of all branches of the Commonwealth government were implicated.
It is also true that compliance with the plan will require the Commonwealth to exercise its legislative and administrative powers, for that is the means by which a state regulates its transportation system. However, it must not be forgotten that when dealing with the commerce power, ‘we are guided by practical considerations’ (citation omitted). In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 Congress created an interlocking governmental structure in which the Federal Government and the states would *596cooperate to reach the primary goal of the Act ... Under its provisions, state and local governments retain responsibility for the basic design and implementation of air pollution strategies, subject to approval and, if necessary, enforcement by the Administrator. We believe that this approach represents a valid adaption [sic] of federalist principles to the need for increased federal involvement.
500 F.2d at 262 (emphasis added). See also, Delaware Valley Citizens Council v. Commonwealth, 678 F.2d at 476. As a matter of Federal law then, the Commonwealth itself, through all its branches, must enforce the requirements of the Clean Air Act and Pennsylvania’s SIP. [It must be noted that although the Commonwealth challenged a particular requirement of the SIP in that case, the part of the plan requiring the Commonwealth “to establish an inspection system for certain motor vehicles to ensure that they do not emit carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons above the level prescribed by EPA ... [was] not challenged by the petition for review.” Id. at 249.] It is against this background that the present case must be examined.
The Majority reviews the legislative history of various sections of the Motor Vehicle Code, additions and deletions, and concludes that “the deletion of emissions systems language and ‘Clean Air Act’ references evinces that the legislature intended to deny Penndot the authority to require emission systems inspections.” Majority opinion at 1112. I cannot agree with this conclusion. Section 4521 of Title 75, the initial section of Subchapter B, “Safety and Anti-Pollution Equipment”, assigns to PennDOT the duty to
promulgate regulations governing the number, size, color, type, construction, location and use of other equipment on vehicles consistent with but not limited by the provisions of this subchapter and taking into consideration different requirements for different classes or types of vehicles. (Emphasis added).
Section 4531(b) provides that
No person shall change or alter the emission control system of a vehicle in such a manner that it fails to comply with the prescribed emissions criteria. It is un*597lawful for the vehicle to be operated under its own power until a reinspection at an official inspection station establishes its full compliance. (Emphasis added).
The above-quoted, emphasized language supplies sufficient indication that PennDOT, even after the 1976 changes in the statutory language noted by the Majority, had the authority to set emissions criteria, require emission control equipment, and require inspections to establish compliance. Although the deleted language had made such authority explicit, by retaining the language of Sections 4521 and 4531 after the deletions the legislature acknowledged the continued existence of the Department’s authority in this regard. It would be absurd for the legislature to have granted PennDOT authority to set requirements for emissions equipment, to make unlawful the tampering with such equipment and the operation of a vehicle until re-inspection establishes full compliance, and yet to have denied the authority to inspect such systems for tampering or compliance in the first place. At a minimum such authority must be recognized in Penn-DOT’s power to “promulgate regulations . . . consistent with but not limited by the provisions of this subchapter”. 75 Pa.C.S. § 4521. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1). (Contrary to the assumption of the Majority, the change in language does not necessarily indicate a change in intent. The deletion of language is also consistent with the view that because that authority described by the deleted language was adequately spelled out by other statutory language, the language was no longer necessary. Such a view is particularly worthy of consideration when the deletion and change in language occurs as a result of the consolidation of statutes in a comprehensive Motor Vehicle Code.) We must, therefore, interpret the Motor Vehicle Code as having established in PennDOT the duty to promulgate the challenged regulations.
This interpretation is further supported by reference to 35 P.S. § 4001 et seq., the Air Pollution Control Act, 1960, Jan. 8, P.L. (1959) 2119, as amended 1972, Oct. 26, P.L. 989, No. 245, § 1. In that Act the Department of Environmental *598Resources, a party defendant in the federal litigation, is given the power to “[r]equire the owner or operator of any air contamination source to sample the emissions thereof in accordance with such methods and procedures and at such locations and intervals of time as the department may reasonably prescribe and to provide the department with the results thereof.” 35 P.S. § 4004(2.3). Air contamination source is previously defined in the Act as “[a]ny place, facility or equipment, stationary or mobile, from ... which there is emitted ... any air contaminant.” 35 P.S. § 4003(7). (Emphasis added). DER is further given authority to “[ejvaluate motor vehicle emission control programs with respect to their effect on air pollution and determine the need for modifications of such programs.” 35 P.S. § 4004(10.1). Finally, the Environmental Quality Board of DER has the power to “[rjecommend to the Secretary of Transportation performance or specification standards, or both, for emission control systems and devices on motor vehicles.” 35 P.S. § 4005(4). It would be anomolous indeed if the legislature granted DER authority to require the owners of cars to submit them for emissions inspections, to evaluate emissions control programs, and to recommend emission control systems standards to the Secretary of Transportation, and yet, along with all the previously enumerated powers of the Department of Transportation, withheld from that department the authority to implement an emission control inspection/maintenance program.
At the very least, these powers of DER refute the argument advanced in Part II of the Majority Opinion that, in the federal litigation, the proper parties were not before the court and could not lawfully bind the Commonwealth to the terms of the consent decree. The deputy attorneys general who signed that decree clearly had authority to act on behalf of the Commonwealth itself, and as agents of the Department of Justice adequately represented the interests of the Commonwealth in those proceedings.
The Majority’s discussion of the effect of Act 3 of 1983, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4706(b), as amended, compounds the error previously noted. That Act provides that PennDOT may estab*599lish and administer an I/M program where required by EPA or the federal courts “when the secretary shall certify that such system is required to comply with Federal law and is necessary for the Commonwealth to receive or avoid the loss of Federal funds.” The Majority, relying on its analysis that PennDOT did not have authority to enter into the consent decree, declares that the decree was not a valid decree based upon proper authority. Because Act 3 contemplates such a decree as a pre-requisite for the establishment of an I/M program, says the majority, the conditions of Act 3 have not been met and the program is enjoined.
It is incomprehensible that a Majority of this Court could hold that a decree entered by another court, which court has authority to determine its own jurisdiction, is invalid, thereby abandoning accepted principles of judicial comity. The Majority further errs in concluding that because the decree is invalid the program must be enjoined. This conclusion ignores the alternate basis for implementation of an I/M program set out in Act 3, “when it is required by the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States.” The record makes it abundantly clear that the I/M program which was the subject of the federal litigation is required by federal law, by Pennsylvania’s SIP, and by EPA regulations, and that the federal court action was only a means of enforcing those requirements. PennDOT clearly has the authority to implement the challenged program following the enactment of Act 3 of 1983. Indeed, this intervening change in the applicable law has made moot this entire appeal, for by “granting” PennDOT the authority to implement an I/M program of the type challenged under conditions which undeniably exist, the legislature has resolved the only issue raised by the Appellants. See generally, In Re Gross, 476 Pa. 203, 382 A.2d 116 (1978).
Despite the self-serving protestations to the contrary (“The desirability and merits of the system is [sic] not the question here; it is the extent of the authority possessed by PennDOT which is at issue.” Majority opinion at 1113), the Majority Opinion belies a clear intent to rewrite both federal and state environmental law according to the conceptions of *600the Majority. In its zeal to fend off the “coercion” of the federal court and redeem the “ransom” paid by the citizens of the Commonwealth for the release of their captive tax dollars, the Majority adopts only those facts of record which support its position and discards those which implicate a different result. The federal government through its several branches, and the state government through its several branches, over the years have established the applicable policies in regard to air pollution, the means by which those policies are to be implemented, and the authorities responsible for their implementation and enforcement. The Commonwealth, through enactments of several sessions of the General Assembly, has delegated the authority to bring the Commonwealth into compliance with the requirements of federal law to two agencies. To allow a select group of disenchanted legislators and former legislators to overturn duly enacted legislation and regulations by resort to an action such as the present one is to abandon constitutional government and the stability it promises in the face of continuous changes in personnel, and to substitute anarchy, government changing with the whims and caprices of those who happen to gain control for the moment. I cannot. subscribe to this total abandonment of our traditions of governmental order.
I would dismiss the appeals as moot.
. The actions which are the subject of this appeal were brought against both PennDOT and DER, but were discontinued as to DER on August 28, 1981. The removal of DER as a defendant in these *595actions does not, however, permit decision of the actions by reference only to statutory enactments concerning PennDOT. The legislative program for enforcement of air pollution policy must be read as a whole, and all statutes in that regard must be read in pari materia. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932.