dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s unwarranted conclusion that the P.U.C.’s provisional approval of Duquesne Power Company’s requested rate increase “amounts, in the real world, to the setting of a temporary rate.” Maj. op. at 481. Duquesne’s Supplement 52 was a tariff stating a general rate increase, and the P.U.C. has the authority to permit such tariffs to go into effect. The fact that the P.U.C. advised Duquesne of the size of the increase it would approve does not render the resulting rate an illegal temporary rate.
The majority misperceives the Public Utility Code’s rate approval scheme. When a tariff which states a general rate increase is filed with the P.U.C., section 1308(d) empowers the P.U.C., after investigation and analysis and upon a majority vote, to permit the tariff to become effective. 66 Pa.C.S. § 1308(d). If the P.U.C. does not so permit, the tariff is automatically suspended for a period not to exceed seven months during which the P.U.C. must render a final decision. Id. If the tariff is suspended pending such a decision, the utility may seek extraordinary relief under section 1308(e), 66 Pa.C.S. § 1308(e). 66 Pa. C.S. § 1308(d). Such relief will not constitute a temporary rate under section 1310, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1310, which does not permit the P.U.C. to set temporary rates in general rate increase cases. 66 Pa.C.S. § 1308(e).
The majority treats the factual situation as if the P.U.C. suspended Supplement 49, which requested a $100 million rate increase, and then set a temporary rate of $64,237,000 pending its decision whether to approve Supplement 49. In reality, Duquesne Light Company filed a new Supplement *490providing for the rate increase the P.U.C. considered reasonable, and superseding Supplement 49. Duquesne’s initial request for a higher increase was abandoned and was no longer before the P.U.C. The P.U.C. then permitted Supplement 52 to become effective pursuant to section 1308(d). The rate thus established did not represent “that portion of the total rate relief requested within a general rate filing, needed at once because of the extraordinary circumstances,” maj. op. at 1110, but rather was a provisional general rate increase subject only to final P.U.C. approval. After a formal investigation that general rate was ultimately approved. Since Supplement 52 was not suspended, there was no reason for Duquesne to seek extraordinary relief under section 1308(e) pending a final decision.
The majority’s reading of the Code renders ineffectual the P.U.C.’s statutorily conferred power to provisionally approve general rate increases and requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances before even a clearly reasonable rate increase could go into effect. The majority views that result as intended by the legislature in amending the statute. The clear language of the Code refutes that conclusion.
Appellant’s alternative argument that the procedure followed by the P.U.C. violates due process is also without merit. Appellant contends that it was denied notice and a “meaningful” opportunity to present objections prior to the approval of Supplement 52. It appears from the record, however, that appellant had notice of a proposed rate increase and presented objections thereto prior to approval, since it filed a complaint challenging Supplement 49. Thus the only basis for appellant’s due process claim is that it was entitled to a hearing before the increase went into effect.
A similar argument was recently rejected by this Court in Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public *491Utility Commission, 501 Pa. 71, 459 A.2d 1218 (1983). In that case the ratepayer challenged the rate-setting procedure employed by the P.U.C. in reviewing and approving an increase pursuant to section 1307 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1307, which provides for automatic adjustment of rates to reflect fuel cost increases. The ratepayer filed an objection to the proposed increase in question but was denied an opportunity to be heard during the public meeting at 'which the increase was approved. In rejecting thq ratepayer’s constitutional challenge, we identified as significant factors the procedural safeguards of an automatic year-end meeting for final determination and adjustment of rate increases allowing full participation by all interested parties and the requirement that overpayments be refunded with interest in the event increases are found to be excessive. We also emphasized that the increases required express P.U.C. approval and thus the P.U.C.’s procedure could not be characterized as a private rate-setting scheme necessitating notice and an opportunity to present objections prior to approval. In the instant case the P.U.C. held extensive hearings, in which the utility bore the burden of proving the reasonableness of the increase, prior to final approval. Appellant had the opportunity to voice its objections during those proceedings. Provisional approval had been given subject to potential refunds should the increase ultimately be found excessive. Moreover, initial approval was granted only after investigation and analysis of Duquesne’s filings. Thus,, as in Allegheny Ludlum, supra, the due process challenge to the rate-setting procedure should be rejected.
Since the rate increase was effectuated in compliance with the Code and appellant’s alternative due process argument is without merit, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.