concurring and dissenting.
The action seeking the removal of two supervisors of Franklin Township, Mr. Charles Wood and Ms. Norma Shultz, was commenced under Section 503 of the Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, § 503, as amended, 53 P.S. § 65503 (1957). Section 503 provides:
*83§ 65503. Penalty for failure to perform duties
If any township officer refuses or neglects to perform his duties, the court of quarter sessions, upon complaint in writing by five percentum of the registered electors of the township, may issue a rule upon such officer to show cause why his office should not be declared vacant and another appointed in his stead. Such rule shall be made returnable not less than two weeks from its date of issue. Upon hearing, and proof that the facts alleged in the complaint are true, the court may declare the office vacant and appoint another in his stead, to hold office during the term of the officer deposed, or to make such other order as to the court may seem just and proper. 1933, May 1, P.L. 103, art. V, § 503; 1947, July 10, P.L. 1481, § 5.
It is clear that jurisdiction is vested in the court under this Section only after a complaint in writing “by five percentum of the registered electors of the township” has been filed with that court. Minimum due process would necessarily require that the person or persons towards whom the complaint is directed must be provided with some opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of the purported signatures. Such challenge would extend not only as to whether or not the persons signing the document were in fact qualified electors but also would include objections that the signatures were forgeries or that the persons signing were not aware or were misinformed as to the content of the complaint. My reading of the record convinces me that the appellants, Wood and Shultz, were denied this fundamental right. For that reason I believe the proceedings below were a nullity and the order of the court below should be reversed. I concur in the result reached by the majority with regard to the appeal of Allen B. McNeely.
As recited by the majority upon being notified of the filing of the said petition, Wood and Shultz proceeded to contact the alleged signatories of the complaint. By the time of the date set for hearing, they had successfully contacted 109 of the 271 purported signers and of the 109 individuals who had been reached, 100 of those persons *84indicated a defect in their endorsement to the petition and requested their signatures be withdrawn. The information obtained by Wood and Shultz, as a result of their contact with the various alleged signatories, indicated that misinformation had been given in an effort to induce voters to sign the petition; that others were not given a sufficient opportunity by the circulators to fully read the contents of the complaint; and still others were never presented the complaint to be read.
Rather than make some effort to inquire further into the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the hearing court saw fit to restrain appellants, Wood and Shultz, from further contact with the purported signatories. The justification for this action was the assertion by the proponent of the complaint that Wood and Shultz were “harassing” the electors. No opportunity was given to Wood or Shultz to answer that allegation. Nor did the court seek an alternative method to ascertain the legitimacy of the complaint in view of the questions that should have been raised as a result of the findings submitted by Wood and Shultz.
The majority chose not to address the issue of the validity of the restraining order classifying it as a special injunction which should have been pursued in a separate appeal. A separate appeal would be the proper procedural tack in the case of a special injunction pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531. Act of February 14, 1866, P.L. 28, § 1, 12 P.S. § 1101. See, Rosenzweig v. Factor, 457 Pa. 492, 327 A.2d 36 (1974). However, the challenged order was clearly not a special injunction pursuant to Rule 1531 but merely an ancillary ruling during the course of the underlying action in this case.1 As a ruling during the course of the proceedings *85appellants did properly assign it as a ground of error for review in this direct appeal.
With regard to the merits, in my judgment, the actions of the hearing court were clearly violative of the most fundamental due process concepts. While it is quite understandable that a court would not condone harassment of the signatories, there was here an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that any harassment had in fact occurred. Further, it remained uncontradicted that at least 100 of the 109 individuals contacted had reported circumstances which, if believed, would invalidate their signatures. It is clear that it was incumbent upon the court to make some further inquiry as to the legitimacy of the other purported signatures which were necessary to provide the court with jurisdiction to proceed further in this action. The court’s failure in this regard, in my judgment, was fatal.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this opinion.. Pa.R.C.Pro. 1531 provides this special relief in actions in equity. The instant case was an action at law. Further, the rule requires written notice and hearing absent a showing of immediate and irreparable injury. Even where there is an averment of immediate and irreparable injury, such a claim must be raised and supported by a petition or other affidavits. The rule also provides that an appropriate bond must be required. Clearly there was no intent either by the party seeking relief or the court in granting it to have been acting pursuant to Rule 1531.