Plaintiff Catherine A. Mobley worked for Allstate Insurance (“Allstate”) for sixteen years before being laid off with 31 other employees in October 2003 as part of a reduction in force (“RIF”). In July 2001, Mobley had begun having problems concentrating and staying awake at work, due to what was ultimately diagnosed as essential tremor and nocturnal myoclonus. From fall 2002 until April 2003, Mobley wrangled with her supervisors over workplace accommodations for her conditions. In May 2003, Allstate permitted Mobley to regularly work in a private room rather than a cubicle. Although Mobley’s earlier, temporary placement in this private room had improved her work performance, Mob-ley’s performance level never reached the “meets” level after May 2003, causing her name to be included on the RIF in October of that year. Mobley subsequently brought suit against Allstate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), bringing claims for failure to accommodate *542her disability, discriminatory termination, and unlawful retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate on all claims, which Mobley now appeals. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I. Background
Mobley began working for Allstate Insurance in 1987 and during the period of time relevant to this suit, July 2001 through October 2003, Mobley held the position of Staff Claims Service Adjuster. In this role, Mobley’s immediate supervisor was Nancy Brechbuhl. Brechbuhl, in turn, was directly supervised by Alexandra Balatsoukas, the manager of the Indianapolis Allstate facility where Mobley worked.
Prior to her annual review in 2002, all of Mobley’s performance evaluations had been positive. Allstate’s review system for Claims Adjusters centered upon numeric goals regarding the quality and quantity of their work. If a Claims Adjuster is meeting these goals, they are rated as “Meets” or “Exceeds.” If they fall below a “meets” level, they are then placed on a performance improvement plan and given “Requires Improvement” (“RI”) status. Once on RI status, an employee is then reviewed at the 30, 60, and 90 day marks to determine if they have improved to a “meets” level. If, after this time, a Claims Adjuster has not reached a “meets” level, they are then placed on “Job in Jeopardy” (“JIJ”) status. Typically, if a Claims Adjuster cannot improve to a “meets” level after another 90 days, she is terminated. For those Claims Adjusters taken off RI or JIJ status for reaching a “meets” level, any fall under a “meets” level over the next twelve months generally results in immediate JIJ status.
From March 2001 to July 2001, Mob-ley was away from work on an approved disability leave for depression. During this leave, Mobley sought treatment after she began to experience tremors and involuntary muscle movements, and was diagnosed with essential tremor. Upon returning to work in July 2001, Mobley experienced difficulty with her concentration and focus, as well as staying awake while at the office. At the same time, Mobley was also assigned to work on approximately 100 uninsured and underin-sured motorist (“UI/UIM”) claims that, up to that time, had not been worked on properly and were more complicated than those involving insured motorists.
At her next annual performance evaluation, in March 2002, Mobley was informed that she was “not meeting the accountabilities of your position,” which Mobley disputed. In July 2002, Mobley was then formally placed on RI status. In response, Mobley explained that her health condition was affecting her concentration and memory, and that she was undergoing tests in order to diagnose the problem. That same month, Mobley underwent a sleep study, the results of which she passed along to Brechbuhl.
In early fall 2002, Mobley asked Brechbuhl if she could use the “huddle room,” which was a small conference room, on an as needed basis to help with her concentration and focus. Brechbuhl permitted Mobley to do so, so long as she asked Brechbuhl for permission on each occasion. That fall, Mobley also requested that Brechbuhl let her work from home one or two days a week to help her productivity, and allow her to work solely on bodily injury (“BI”) evaluations in order to limit her focus and increase her performance. Brechbuhl denied both of these requests. Mobley points out, however, that Allstate permitted one of her non-disabled co-workers to work from home several afternoons a week so she could watch her son’s baseball games, and later assigned another, *543lower rated employee to work exclusively on the BI files.
On October 30, 2002, Mobley responded to her RI status review, which reported that she had not returned to a “meets” performance rating. In her response, Mobley noted that she had been diagnosed with essential tremor, myoclonus, and narcolepsy, and was attaching medical documentation to that effect. She then noted that she was on medication and wrote, “I have felt much better the last two weeks. I believe that once I am able to work through the backlog that has accumulated, I will return to the Meets/Exceeds employee I have been for the last 15 years.” The attached medical records were then faxed to Allstate’s human resources department on November 11, 2002.
Mobley then had a follow-up meeting with Balatsoukas on November 18, 2002 regarding her RI status. In this meeting, Mobley told Balatsoukas that using the huddle room had been beneficial and that she thought it would also be helpful if she could work at home one day a week and focus on BI evaluations. Balatsoukas denied these requests, allegedly telling Mob-ley that she would do the same work as everyone else at the company, or she would be terminated. A week or two later, however, Brechbuhl informed Mobley that Balatsoukas had decided to permit Mobley to use the huddle room again. According to Mobley, Brechbuhl conveyed that Balatsoukas was letting Mobley use the huddle room to prove that she was not disabled and that this accommodation would have no impact on her performance. Using the huddle room, however, Mobley was able to bring her performance level up to a “meets” status by the end of January 2003. As a result, in early March, Balat-soukas and Brechbuhl had a meeting with Mobley to confirm her improved status. At this meeting, Mobley was told that because of her improvement, she was being moved out of the huddle room. Mob-ley was also informed that although she would keep the UI/UIM files she already had, in the future she would only be assigned BI claims.
Around the same time, Mobley also received further medical information. In February 2003, Mobley received a note from her physician requesting that Mobley be provided with an alternate schedule, where she would take Wednesdays off, but work ten hour days the other four days of the work week, in order to provide her with extra time to sleep. She passed this information along to Allstate sometime in late February or early March as part of FMLA paperwork for her being gone from work from February 10 to 14.
On March 21, 2003, Mobley met with Balatsoukas and Brechbuhl to discuss her requested change to her schedule. Balatsoukas informed Mobley that this request had been denied because her being out of the office on Wednesdays would cause difficulties in covering her phone calls. Balatsoukas did, however, suggest that Mobley’s schedule be pushed back to 9:00-5:30, in order to give her more time to sleep in the morning, although Mobley expressed that this would not help given the fact that she would probably have to come in early and stay late anyway to complete her work.
Following this meeting, Mobley contacted Allstate’s Resolution Tracking System sometime around March 25, and was put in contact with Human Resources Division Manager Sybil Brenner. Through this contact, Mobley provided Allstate with additional information it requested from her physician. Mobley’s physician indicated on a form that Mobley suffered from lifelong medical conditions, and in response to being asked “[w]hat specific accommodations are needed,” her physician wrote:
*544—being in room by herself—helps her concentrate.
—working Monday & Tuesday for 10 hrs, have Wed. off, work Thursday & Friday for 10 hrs.
Mobley, at least earlier in March, had viewed these proposals as alternative accommodations.
Around this same time, despite Mobley’s being assigned the easier BI files, without the use of the huddle room, her performance rating again dipped below “meets” status, and she was told she would be reviewed again in June. In late April and early May, additional accommodations were made for Mobley. On April 28, Brenner from human resources conveyed to Balatsoukas in an email that it was important to accommodate Mobley, and that accordingly, she was to be permitted to use the huddle room again, seeing as it had previously been successful in improving her performance. Mobley began using the huddle room again in the first week of May, and around the same time, at least eighteen of Mobley’s files were transferred to another employee in order to alleviate her workload. Although Mobley’s schedule also continued to be pushed back a half hour to give her time to sleep in, she complained that Balatsoukas would not permit her to work past 5:30 p.m., which prevented her from getting all her needed work done.
By the summer, Mobley was still not performing at a “meets” level, and in July, in the hopes of improving her performance, she began taking work home with her. By August, however, Mobley’s performance still had not improved to a “meets” level, and on August 26, 2003 she was provided with notification that she had been placed back on RI status, even though Allstate could have placed her directly in JIJ status. The next month, in September, Brechbuhl informed Mobley that she was coming close to meeting Allstate’s expectations and would likely be moved off RI status.
Mobley never reached “meets” status, however, and instead, on October 23, 2003, was one of thirty-two employees terminated as part of Allstate’s RIF. As of early 2003, Balatsoukas knew that the RIF was a possibility, and employees throughout the department, including Mobley, were aware by mid-summer that such a reduction was likely. Brenner, in human resources, was initially responsible for putting together the RIF package. The criteria used for putting together the package were stated as including those on RI status, business need, and length of service, although service date was not ultimately used. In September or October, Brenner pulled a list of employees on RI status as of the end of August. Although Mobley argues that there are discrepancies between this list and those who were terminated and on RI status, Mobley was included on this list and let go by Allstate.
Mobley brought suit against Allstate on August 31, 2004, asserting claims under the ADA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2006. Mobley, in her response to Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, conceded her ADEA claim. The district court then issued its order and judgment on September 22, 2006, granting summary judgment for Allstate with respect to Mob-ley’s remaining claims of failure to accommodate, discriminatory termination, and unlawful retaliation under the ADA. Mob-ley now appeals these claims.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of a motion for summary *545judgment de novo. Jackson v. County of Racine, 474 F.3d 493, 498 (7th Cir.2007). In doing so, all facts and reasonable inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party, Mobley. Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir.2001). A district court’s grant of summary judgment is to be affirmed if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. p. 56(c).
B. Failure to Accommodate
Mobley’s first claim is that Allstate failed to accommodate her disability. Under the ADA, a failure to make reasonable accommodations for a known disability constitutes unlawful discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12112(a). In order to prevail on this claim, Mobley must show: “(1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir.2001)). In conjunction with this third element, the “ADA requires that employer and employee engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation.” Id. (quoting Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir.1998)).
Turning to the first element of a failure to accommodate claim, we find that Mobley is a “qualified individual with a disability.” In order to satisfy this element, Mobley must show that she is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Darnell v. Thermafiber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657, 659-60 (7th Cir.2005). This first element thus contains two parts-showing that Mobley’s medical conditions rendered her disabled, and that she was able to still perform at a “meets” level. Allstate does not contest that Mobley had a disability as of April 2003, when Allstate’s human resources department received further documentation from Mobley’s physician. Allstate argues though, that once Mobley was provided with an array of accommodations in late April or early May 2003, she was still unable to reach “meets” status, and thus failed to show that she could perform one of the essential requirements of her position. Allstate, however, in looking only at Mobley’s performance after April 2003, fails to recognize that for approximately two to three months, from January to early March 2003, Mobley was able to perform at a “meets” level when she was allowed to work in the huddle room. Although arguably, at that time period, it was not known that Mobley’s condition was permanent or long-term, as is required to constitute a “disability,” Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (“The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long-term.”), there is no indication that Mobley’s underlying condition worsened between January and April 2003, only that the “chronic,” “indefinite” and “lifelong” nature of her condition was not documented to Allstate when she achieved “meets” status with this accommodation. Because the underlying condition itself did not change, we find that Mobley’s achievement of a “meets” status while using the huddle room in early 2003 satisfies this first element.
The discussion above regarding Mob-ley’s documentation of her condition to Allstate is relevant in considering the sec*546ond factor, Allstate’s awareness of Mob-ley’s disability. According to Allstate, Mobley’s failure to accommodate claim should only pertain to Mobley’s work environment after April 2003, since Allstate alleges that as late as March 2003, when Mobley was reassigned to her workstation from the huddle room, all parties were under the understanding that Mobley’s medical condition and its impact on her work performance were temporary. Determining when Allstate became aware of Mobley’s disability ties into the third factor, since the interactive process is triggered upon the employee’s notification to the employer of their condition. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 803-04. It is not necessary for this Court in this case, however, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the interactive process was triggered prior to April 2003, since, as we will discuss, we find that Allstate did eventually reasonably accommodate Mobley’s disability. Although it was an admittedly laborious process for Mobley to obtain the accommodation she finally received in late April or early May 2003, the fact that Allstate may have failed to engage in an interactive process prior to that time is by itself insufficient to establish a failure to accommodate claim when, in the end, Mobley was provided with a reasonable accommodation. Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir.2000) (“we hold that a plaintiff must allege that the employer’s failure to engage in an interactive process resulted in a failure to identify an appropriate accommodation for the qualified individual”); Siebems v. Wal-Mart Stores, 125 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir.1997) (“The interactive process the ADA foresees is not an end in itself; rather it is a means for determining what reasonable accommodations are available to allow a disabled individual to perform the essential job functions of the position sought.”).
We find that in this case, Allstate did reasonably accommodate Mobley’s disability. The ADA includes a long, nonexclusive list of what “reasonable accommodations” may include, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)1, although an employer is not required to make accommodations that “would impose an undue hardship” upon the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Mobley’s argument focuses on what accommodations were not made by Allstate despite her requests, contending that other individuals were provided with these alternative arrangements and that providing such accommodations to Mobley would not constitute an “undue hardship.” However, even if the accommodations Mobley requested—working from home; exclusively working on BI files; and switching to four, ten hour days with Wednesdays off—did not impose an “undue hardship” on Allstate, that did not obligate Allstate to grant these accommodations. Rather, “[a]n employer is not obligated to provide an employee the accommodation [s]he requests or prefers, the employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation.” Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir.1996); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 802. Therefore, Allstate was not required to provide Mobley with all her requested accommodations, but did, at a *547minimum, have “to provide an accommodation that effectively aceommodate[d] [Mobley’s] limitations.” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 802.
Allstate met its obligation in this case to effectively accommodate Mobley’s limitations in the workplace. From July 2001, when Mobley’s condition began, to October 2003, when she was terminated, the one accommodation that had successfully allowed Mobley to bring her performance level to a “meets” status was her use of the huddle room from late November or early December 2002 until early March 2003. The use of the huddle room was also one of two alternative accommodations specifically recommended by Mobley’s physician. Although prior to April 2003, Mobley’s use of the huddle room had been sporadic, from early May up until the time she was terminated, Mobley was permitted to use the huddle room on a regular basis. Therefore, despite the other accommodation requests Mobley had made, Allstate provided Mobley with the only accommodation proven to “effectively accommodate[ ][her] limitations.” In addition to using the huddle room, Mobley also, from May 2003 on, was provided with other accommodations, including permission to shift her schedule back a half hour; reassignment of at least 18 files to another worker; and being assigned only BI files.
Although Mobley was ultimately permitted to use the huddle room, she claims that when this occurred, her accommodations were still not reasonable, since Balatsou-kas’s efforts to prevent her from working at the office past 5:30 p.m. prevented her from getting her work done and meeting Allstate’s performance expectations. This argument, however, is unavailing. Even accepting that Mobley’s forty hours at the office were insufficient for her to complete all her work, Balatsoukas’s reluctance to allow her to work longer hours at the office does not make Allstate’s accommodations unreasonable. There is no evidence in the record that Mobley was in any way prevented from taking her work home with her if necessary; indeed, the fact that she began doing so in July 2003 shows that this was not the case. Furthermore, there is no evidence that it was more difficult for Mobley to complete her work when at home. To the contrary, Mobley specifically requested that she be permitted to work from home and testified to the fact that she was able to work productively in that environment.
As an additional matter, we note that Mobley’s claim that Allstate failed to reasonably accommodate her disability also fails because she has failed to meet her burden of showing that her other requests did in fact constitute reasonable accommodations. Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir.2002) (“the burden of showing that a reasonable accommodation existed remains on the employee”). Again, the only accommodation that has been proven to effectively remedy Mobley’s limitations is the use of the huddle room. With respect to Mobley’s request to work four, ten hour days and take Wednesdays off, Mobley offered no evidence that this would effectively accommodate her disability, and she in fact testified that this proposal was viewed as an alternative to her being allowed to use the huddle room. Additionally, with respect to Mobley’s request in fall 2002 to be assigned BI files, by March 2003 this accommodation had been provided, but Mobley was still unable to achieve “meets” status. The final request made by Mobley that was not granted by Místate was that she be permitted to work from home one or two days each week. Here too, Mobley has failed to show that this in fact would have effectively accommodated her disability, and additionally, we note that as a general matter, *548working at home is not a reasonable accommodation. Rauen v. United States Tobacco Mfg., 319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir.2003) (“a home office is rarely a reasonable accommodation”) (citing Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir.1995)). Accordingly, despite wrangling between Mobley and Balatsou-kas regarding use of the huddle room prior to Mobley’s conversation with human resources and filing of additional medical documentation in March and April 2003, Allstate ultimately reasonably accommodated Mobley’s disability by permitting her to use the huddle room, the one accommodation that had proven to be effective in allowing Mobley to achieve “meets” status. The fact that after April 2003, Mobley was unable to replicate her earlier rise to “meets” status does not render Allstate liable when the accommodation provided had proven effective in the past and Mobley failed to raise any concern after April 2003 that additional accommodations were needed.
C. Discriminatory Termination
Mobley’s next claim is that Allstate acted discriminatorily when it terminated her in October 2003 as part of its RIF. Mobley attempts to prove this claim under the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), arguing that discrepancies in the RIF package put together by Brenner show that discriminatory intent motivated Allstate’s decision to terminate Mobley. This claim fails, however, because Mobley is unable to meet one of the elements of the prima facie case.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method of proof, Mobley must show: “(1) [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2)[s]he was meeting h[er] employer’s legitimate employment expectations; (3)[s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment.” Rooney v. Koch Air, 410 F.3d 376, 380-81 (7th Cir.2005). Mobley argues at length regarding discrepancies in the RIF package that allegedly reveal that other employees received favorable treatment, but has failed to offer any evidence with respect to the second element—that she was meeting Allstate’s employment expectations when she was terminated. See Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. Of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir.2006) (in race discrimination case involving the plaintiffs termination, finding that, “[although [the plaintiff] may have been performing adequately at the time of her positive evaluation, the critical inquiry is her ‘performance at the time of [her termination]’ ”) (quoting Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir.2005)) (emphasis in original); see also Squibb v. Mem. Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d 775, 788 (7th Cir.2007) (in ADA retaliation claim under the indirect method, stating “we must examine [the plaintiffs] performance at the time of the challenged adverse actions”); see also Timmons v. General Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (7th Cir.2006) (same, in ADA disparate treatment claim under the indirect method). It is undisputed that performing at a “meets” level is a requirement for Mobley’s position, and although Mobley was told in September that she was close to achieving “meets” status, from April 2003 until her termination, Mobley never in fact raised her performance to a “meets” level. As a result, particularly given that Mobley acknowledges that her performance had slipped during that time and does not challenge Allstate’s methodology for finding that she was performing below a “meets” level, Mobley cannot establish her prima facie case, and thus her claim fails.
*549D. Retaliation
Mobley’s final claim is that Allstate unlawfully retaliated against her by removing her from the huddle room in early March 2003 in response to her requests for accommodations in fall 2002, and also by placing her on RI status in August 2003 in reaction to her call to Allstate’s complaint resolution line in March 2003. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Mobley must show evidence of: “(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse action; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Squibb, 497 F.3d at 786 (quoting Burks, 464 F.3d at 758). Even if for each of these allegedly retaliatory acts the first two elements of the prima facie case have been met, Mobley fails in both circumstances to establish any causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse action. In both instances, the only evidence Mobley offers regarding causation is temporal proximity, noting that only a matter of months existed between her initial request for accommodations and removal from the huddle room, as is similarly the case for her complaint to Allstate’s help line and subsequent placement on RI status. Evidence of temporal proximity, however, standing on its own, is insufficient to establish a causal connection for a claim of retaliation. Burks, 464 F.3d at 759 (“[Plaintiff] presents no evidence of a retaliatory motive other than the timing of her termination. Therefore, she has not met her burden under the direct method of proof.”); Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir.2000) (“Speculation based on suspicious timing alone ... does not support a reasonable inference of retaliation.”). Although there may be an exception to this general rule when the adverse action occurs “on the heels of protected activity,” see McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir.1997) (two to three day period separating protected activity and adverse action) (quoting Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1458 (7th Cir.1994) (four weeks separating the protected activity and adverse action)), such a circumstance would be limited to matters occurring within days, or at most, weeks of each other. This can hardly be said to be the case here, where in both circumstances, months separated the alleged protected activity and adverse action. As a result, in the absence of any other evidence pointing towards causation, Mobley’s retaliation claim also fails.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendant’s favor.
. This includes:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).