concurring.
I believe the Legislature said what it meant and meant what it said when it enacted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-10 to require an insurer to “make available to the named insured covered under section 4, suitable additional first-party coverage for income continuation benefits, essential services benefits, survivor benefits and funeral expense benefits.”
Section 4 (N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4) had four groups of beneficiaries: (1) named insured; (2) members of his family residing in his household; (3) occupants or authorized drivers of the named insured’s automobile; and (4) pedestrians injured by the named insured’s automobile. As written, section 10 granted an option only to the named insured under section 4. Although one can argue, as the majority does, that this interpretation would make the phrase “covered under section 4” surplusage, the legislative intent is abundantly clear.
The option granted to the named insured (which is defined in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2g to include the spouse) was to purchase additional insurance for the insured identified in the policy by name and for the insured’s spouse. This accords with the interpretation of the Commissioner of Insurance. N.J.A.C. 11:3-7.7, Appendix A, August 17, 1979, superseded by 14 N.J.R. 543(b), eff. August 16, 1982.
The Legislature acknowledged the difference between sections 4 and 10 and amended section 10 to permit the insured to have the option of additional coverage not only for himself, but also for the second category in section 4 — resident relatives in the household. L.1981, c. 533 reads: “Insurers shall make available to the named insured covered under section 4, and, at his option to resident relatives in the household of the named insured, suitable additional first-party coverage * * (Emphasis added). As the Senate Labor, Industry and Professions Committee wrote, the 1981 amendment was intended “to eliminate an inconsistency between sections 4 and 10 of the law.”
*372Of course, the defendant insurance carrier could voluntarily offer additional coverage under its policy beyond the statutory requirement. Whether it did, whether that offer was accepted, and whether any acceptance was transmitted to the defendant were issues unresolved on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, a remand is in order to resolve those questions.
SCHREIBER, J., concurring in the result.
For affirmance in part; reversal in part and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI—6.
Opposed—None.