Snisky v. Pennsylvania State Police

KELLEY, Judge,

Concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the Majority. All of the cases cited by Snisky, to support the proposition that the determination of the Background Investigation Appeal Panel is an appealable “adjudication”, recognize that any right to appeal from such a determination is a personal right conferred under the consent decree entered into in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. Civ. A. 73-2604 (E.D. Pa., June 20, 1974), modified, 73 F.R.D. 370 (1976). As the consent decree has been dissolved, see Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. Civ. A. 73-2604 (E.D.Pa., February 1, 1999), the Appeal Panel’s determination in this case is not an appealable “adjudication”.

I write separately, however, to express the view that if this determination were reviewable, I would not hesitate to argue *965for its reversal. Pursuant to Section 710(f) of the Administrative Code of 1929, 1 the Pennsylvania State Police is invested with the power and duty “[t]o collect and classify, and keep at all times available, complete information useful for the detection of crime, and the identification and apprehension of criminals ...” And yet, in conducting a background investigation into one of its own potential cadets, neither the Background Investigation Screening Panel nor the Background Investigation Appeal Panel spoke with the principals involved in the purportedly disqualifying incidents. One can only hope that this is not indicative of the majority of the investigations conducted by the Pennsylvania State Police.

. Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. § 250(f).