concurring in part, dissenting in part.
This appeal raises the familiar question of when, in the context of a property damage claim, does an insured become legally obligated for damages to another, entitling the insured to coverage from an insurer. The question is critical to the issue here concerning which insurers should be responsible for a landfill’s liability for groundwater damage. Respectfully, the majority errs when it reverses the Appellate Division. The Court’s holding misapplies the notion of “continuous injury” recognized in Owens-Illinois, Incorporated v. United Insurance Company, 138 N.J. 437, 650 A.2d 974 (1994).
Owens-Illinois involved claims of asbestos liability. Id. at 441-42, 650 A.2d 974. In that declaratory judgment action brought by an asbestos manufacturer against its insurance carriers, the Court *438held that there was no question but that injury from asbestos, and damage therefrom, was instantaneous and continuous from the moment that asbestos was installed in the buildings in issue. Id. at 456, 650 A.2d 974. The Court explained that scientific research had established that damages accrued continuously from the building inhabitants’ inhalation of airborne asbestos particles, causing an injurious occurrence. Id. at 453-54, 650 A.2d 974. Accordingly, the insurer’s liability for coverage started with the moment of injury (and damages), and continued through discovery of the injury and its remediation. Id. at 456, 650 A.2d 974.
In Owens-Illinois, and in previous decisions, this Court has reaffirmed the principle that the time of accrual of an insured’s liability must be the determining factor to compel coverage when the basis of the claim is negligence. Id. at 452-53, 650 A.2d 974 (citations omitted). That liability occurs when damage actually is suffered.
The Court applied that principle in Owens-Illinois, relying on its prior decision in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Company, 98 N.J. 18, 483 A.2d 402 (1984), which in turn cited extensively from Muller Fuel Oil Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 95 N.J.Super. 564, 578, 232 A.2d 168 (App.Div.1967) (stating that generally in context of indemnity policy, time of “ ‘occurrence’ ... is not the time the wrongful act was committed but the time when the complaining party was actually damaged. ‘The time of the accrual of the insured’s liability is the determining factor, not the time of an event which ultimately results in liability.’”). The scientific evidence in Owens-Illinois persuasively established that bodily injury occurs immediately when asbestos is inhaled and retained in the lungs. 138 N.J. at 454, 650 A.2d 974. Although the record was found to be less persuasive on the issue of property damage, the Court similarly concluded that claims of asbestos-related property damage begin at installation and continue throughout the period that friable particles detach and release into *439the air in normal degradation of the material, and then through the remediation process. Id. at 454-56, 650 A.2d 974.
No such evidence of injury and damage to third parties exists in this record during the period of coverage by Quincy. Quincy merely was on the risk at the time of lawful dumping of material that later seeped from the landfill after Quincy’s policy period had concluded. That is not enough under our normal principles of accrual of liability to cause an insurer to be liable on a risk.
In my view, the majority decision of the Appellate Division concluded properly in this matter and that decision should not be disturbed. Writing for the majority, Judge Lesemann made the compelling point that liability for the dumping in issue here attached not as of the time that the material was deposited in the landfill, which was perfectly legal and authorized by all regulatory bodies at the time, but at the time that components of the dumped materials leached out of the landfill and caused injury to the groundwater. Quincy Mut Fire Ins. Co. v. Borough of Bellmawr, 338 N.J.Super. 395, 402-04, 769 A.2d 1053 (2001). The Appellate Division’s determination, that there was no injury until the landfill failed and the materials it contained caused damage to groundwater, is consistent with Muller Fuel’s principles, and with the consistent application of those principles in Hartford and Owens-Illinois. Quincy, supra, 338 N.J.Super. at 402-04, 769 A.2d 1053. See also Astro Pak Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 284 N.J.Super. 491, 499-501, 665 A.2d 1113 (App.Div.1995) (holding that depositing of solid waste into landfill took place within policy period, and finding that triggering event was “not the placing of pollutants into the landfill,” but rather their escape), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 323, 670 A.2d 1065 (1995).
I view the majority decision of the Appellate Division as consonant with the notion that it is injury causing damage, and accrual of liability, that “triggers” coverage under an indemnity policy of insurance. The Court’s notion of inevitability of injury and damage is based on a misapplication of the doctrine of “continuous injury” and leads one to wonder why coverage should start only at *440the time of the dumping of the material because, one could argue, it was inevitable that the discarded waste would end up at the landfill contracted to receive the waste. The open-ended approach of the majority mistakenly has severed the notion of injury and damage to a third party from the accrual-of-liability analysis.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion that allocates any responsibility to an insurer prior to the date of damage to the groundwater. I would affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful decision of Judge Lesemann. Quincy, supra, 338 N.J.Super. at 397-404, 769 A.2d 1053. Subject to my contrary view of when coverage should be required of an insurer, I concur with the Court’s affirmance of the Appellate Division’s allocation of coverage as among liable carriers.
Justice VERNIERO joins in this concurrence and dissent.
For reversal and remandment — Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and ZAZZALI — 5.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part — Justices VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA — 2.