dissenting:
It is the opinion of the majority that the vote on Question No. D, referred to the voters of Anne Arundel County at the November 1974 general election, must “be declared a ‘nullity and of no effect’ ” because the language of the question as it appears on the ballot failed to satisfy the requirements of the Election Code, specifically § 16-6 (a) of Maryland Code (1957, 1975 Cum. Supp.), Art. 33, pertaining to the form of the ballot title.1 While I concur with the majority in finding Article 33 applicable to local questions petitioned to referendum by county voters, I cannot agree that the ballot title in question failed to satisfy the requirements of § 16-6 (a), and I therefore respectfully dissent.
Section 16-6 (a) provides generally that in the case of a referendum, “[t]he ballots shall contain a condensed statement in understandable language of every constitutional amendment or other question to be submitted to the vote of the people at any election.” It is further stated *309in § 16-6 (a), in prescribing the proper form for questions referred to the voters, that “[i]t shall be sufficient in any case to print the legislative title, a brief summary of the contents or purpose of the proposed amendment or referendum ....” In the instant case the legislative title was not employed in formulating the ballot title, but instead what appeared on the ballot was “a brief summary of the contents or purpose” which the majority finds wanting.
Because § 16-6 (a) permits the use of the legislative title, in assessing the sufficiency of a summary of the purpose or contents of the question constituting the ballot title, the test for sufficiency of legislative titles may be used. Morris v. Governor, 263 Md. 20, 27, 281 A. 2d 216 (1971). Thus, if the summary of the contents or purpose of the question meets the test for sufficiency of a legislative title, the requirements of § 16-6 (a) are satisfied.
Similar purposes are served by a ballot title and by a legislative title. The, purpose of each is to assure that the public is fairly advised of the nature of pending legislation. Neuenschwander v. Wash. San. Com., 187 Md. 67, 79, 48 A. 2d 593 (1946); State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 95-96, 16 A. 445 (1889). To fulfill that purpose it is not necessary that the title give an abstract of the act, but only that it fairly indicate the subject of the legislation. Dutton v. Tawes, 225 Md. 484, 499, 171 A. 2d 688, appeal dismissed, 368 U. S. 345 (1961); Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 92, 102 A. 2d 821 (1954); Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 474, 87 A. 413 (1913).
Referendum Question No. D, as it appeared on the ballot, fairly indicated the subject matter of the question — the rezoning of certain properties along Route 3. The question was stated as follows:
“To rezone certain parcels of land in the median strip, the west side of the southbound lane and the east side of the northbound lane of Route 3; and to rezone one parcel of land on the west side of Brockbridge Road near Ellen Street; all parcels of which are in the Fourth Assessment District and *310which were rezoned by virtue of amendments to Bill No. 59-73.”
The problems the majority finds with the ballot title are basically two: the failure of the ballot title to give the precise location of the properties to be rezoned and the failure to specify the nature of the rezoning as to each.
First, as to the failure of the ballot title to give the precise location of the properties in question, it seems clear that the wording of the question was both accurate and the best statement of location possible under the circumstances. As the majority itself observes at note 2, in criticizing the referendum petition which gave the complete location of each of the properties together with its present and proposed zoning, the text of the petition was necessarily such that it could be read only with “the assistance of a magnifying glass.” Surely the majority cannot then contend that the ballot was deficient in failing to likewise include metes and bounds descriptions and details of zoning.
Secondly, and perhaps most ardently, the majority urges that the ballot title was inadequate in failing to specify whether the “rezoning” was “up-zoning” or “down-zoning.” While it is true that in this respect the ballot title could have been more specific, this level of generality is insufficient grounds for voiding the election. It has been observed that “[s]o long as the attention of the electorate is reasonably drawn to the issue involved, claims of generalities will not be honored.” C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 17.14 at 558 (1974); see Concrete, Inc. v. Rheaume Builders, 101 N. H. 59, 132 A. 2d 133, 135 (1957); McDonald v. Van Winkle, 136 Ore. 706, 299 P. 1015, 1017 (1931); Martin v. Hart, 296 Ill. 149, 129 N. E. 693, 695 (1920). To state that the purpose of the amendments was to rezone the parcels in question was, as the majority apparently concedes, accurate. The comprehensive zoning ordinance gave these parcels residential zoning; the amendments petitioned to referendum had the effect of rezoning the properties by placing them in various commercial and industrial categories. Furthermore, specific reference is made to the ordinance in question, Bill No. 59-73.
*311It is too much to ask, as the majority seems to do, that a ballot title alone present enough information that a voter, confronted for the first time with the question in the voting booth, be able to render a truly informed decision. Yet the majority, citing an Ohio case, Markus v. Trumbull County Board of Elections, 22 Ohio St. 2d 197, 259 N.E.2d 501, 504 (1970), holds that the descriptive title of a question appearing on the ballot must be in such form “ ‘that the voter may have at hand some means for making up his mind whether to approve or disapprove the issue.’ ” It is not possible, nor is it necessarily desirable, that all aspects and nuances of a question be discussed in the ballot title. While the question of sufficiency of the summary of the contents and purpose of referred legislation on the ballot is necessarily a matter of degree, it is nonetheless certain that considerable reliance must be placed on outside sources of publicity to fill in the details.
Here there was evidence on the record of extensive publicity given the issue of the Route 3 rezoning. In fact, the extent of the pre-election publicity surrounding Question No. D was a sufficient supplement to the language of the ballot title to assure that the election would be a full and fair expression of the will of the voters. See Dutton v. Tawes, supra, 225 Md. at 493. Three fully noticed public hearings were held on the measure by the Planning and Zoning Commission and eight by the County Council after submission of the comprehensive plan. It is not necessary to detail the very extensive extra-governmental publicity given to the question, including numerous newspaper articles, some of which contained the full text of the amendments, and the sample ballots distributed by the League of Women Voters. Suffice it to say that an officer of the Planning and Zoning Commission of Anne Arundel County testified that the Route 3 rezoning received by far the greatest publicity of any activity of the County Council.
The majority dismisses the effect of the pre-election publicity given this question by citing the fact that this action was commenced before the election. The principle referred to is that stated in Dutton v. Tawes, supra, 225 Md. *312at 495, to the effect “that when an election has been held and it is not shown that the failure of election officials to hew strictly to the statutory line has prevented a full and fair expression of the will of the voters the Courts will not disturb the result.” In a dictum relied on by the majority here, the Court in Tyler v. Secretary of State, 230 Md. 18, 22, 185 A. 2d 385 (1962), indicated that when an action is filed prior to the election, the court may permit the election to take place, and then later try the issues in the posture of a pre-election challenge.
First, the majority misconstrues the use which appellants make of the pre-election publicity. The principle stated in Dutton, that an election will not be declared invalid where, because of the surrounding circumstances, the result was an intelligent expression of the popular will, is directly applicable only where there has first been found a deviation from statutory election standards. Here the question is not what the effect of a deviation shall be, but rather the question is whether the ballot title in fact deviated from the requirements of § 16-6 (a). The argument proffered by appellants is simply that in assessing the sufficiency of the ballot title under § 16-6 (a), the wording of the question must be viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. As discussed above, reliance must necessarily be placed in an election on the surrounding publicity to fully apprise the voters of the nature and purpose of a question.
Moreover, I have serious reservations about the efficacy of the procedure indicated in Tyler. While it may well be that the distinction drawn in Dutton between the effect of election irregularities challenged before and those challenged after an election is a legitimate one, to stay a challenge until after the election is held and then treat the action as a pre-election challenge is inconsistent with that distinction. The rationale for the rule of Dutton is that “it would be unjustifiable to defeat the expressed will of the electorate if the irregularity did not frustrate or tend to prevent a free expression of the electors’ intention . . . .” Lexington Park v. Robidoux, 218 Md. 195, 200, 146 A. 2d 184 (1958); Carr v. Hyattsville, 115 Md. 545, 549, 81 A. 8 (1911). It *313is equally unjustifiable, when a challenge is presented before an election, to permit the election to take place, and then invalidate the election because of an irregularity that did not affect the result. In either case the result is the frustration of the expression of the popular will.
There can be little doubt that here the disapproval of the amendments referred to the voters of Anne Arundel County represented the full and fair expression of the will of the electorate. The measure was defeated by a vote of 36,656 to 11,314, approximately a three-to-one margin. Furthermore, the public record of the results of the November 1974 election shows that more people voted on Question No. D in Anne Arundel County than voted for the candidates for Governor of the State. This Court should be most reluctant to assume that the voters of Anne Arundel County, especially in view of the publicity surrounding the vote on Question No. D, did not know what they were voting for or against. Morris v. Governor, supra, 263 Md. at 27. I would hold, therefore, that the election is not void for failure of the ballot title to comply with § 16-6 (a) of Article 33.
Chief Judge Murphy authorizes me to state that he concurs in the views expressed herein.
. The majority, somewhat obliquely, indicates a failure to comply with § 23-1 (a), which pertains to the noticing of local questions, as well. It appears, however, to be the position of the majority that had the ballot title satisfied the requirements of § 16-6 (a), notice of the election by publication of the proper ballot title would have satisfied the requirements of § 23-1 (a). Since I find the ballot title to be in compliance with § 16-6 (a), I therefore conclude that publication of that ballot title satisfied the notice requirements of § 23-1 (a).