dissenting. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in declining to give the precise instruction proposed by the defendant. However, because I believe that the trial court’s instruction was misleading, I respectfully dissent.
RSA 265:88-a (2004) (repealed and replaced by RSA 265-A:10 (Supp. 2007)) dictates the effect a refusal to take an alcohol concentration test has upon a civil or criminal action or proceeding. It provides that if a person refuses to submit to a test as provided in RSA 265:84 (2004) (repealed and replaced by RSA 265-A:4 (Supp. 2007)), our “implied consent statute,” see *413State v. Schneider, 124 N.H. 242, 245 (1983), “such refusal may be admissible as evidence in a civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of an act alleged to have been committed by that person while driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any controlled drug,” RSA 265:88-a. A refusal is admissible as evidence because it “supports an inference that the defendant sought to suppress evidence of his guilt.” State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732, 735 (2003) (citations omitted); see Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of Evidence that Accused Refused to Take Test of Intoxication, 26 A.L.R. 4TH 1112 (1983).
Where a defendant recants an initial refusal, however, the probative value of the inference may diminish, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The question presented here is whether the trial court accurately instructed the jury as to the circumstances in which it could find that a recantation negated the inference of guilt created by a refusal to take a chemical test under our implied consent statute.
In Harlan v. State, 113 N.H. 194, 195 (1973), we construed a prior version of our implied consent statute, see RSA 262-A:69-a (1972), which is essentially the same as the version relevant here, RSA 265:84. Although we interpreted the implied consent statute in the context of a license revocation proceeding, and in relation to the effect a refusal to consent to a chemical test would have in such a proceeding, Harlan, 113 N.H. at 194-95, I believe that the manner in which we construed the statute provides guidance on the issue presented here.
In Harlan, we held that our implied consent statute “contemplate[d] that the [chemical] test be administered without unreasonable delay.” Id. at 196 (citations omitted; emphasis added). We found that “[c]learly implied in the statute is the requirement that one of its described tests be submitted to and completed expeditiously.” Id. at 197 (quotation omitted; emphasis added). Therefore, we held that the initial refusal by the driver in that case “to submit to a breathalyzer test was not cured by her offer to take the test one hour later,” id. at 197-98, and, as a result, the defendant was “forbid[den] . . . from being allowed to take [the] alcohol-level test after [s]he had initially refused to take it,” Schneider, 124 N.H. at 245 (citing Harlan, 113 N.H. at 194). We noted, however, that “[w]e [we]re not faced with a situation where a defendant had almost immediately retracted his refusal and had been denied the test and had been told that his belated consent was unacceptable.” Harlan, 113 N.H. at 198 (quotation omitted; emphasis added).
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that a person may recant, “but only if he does so promptly, almost immediately, without [unreasonable delay so that the test may be completed expeditiously.” (Emphasis *414added.) It repeated this instruction by stating: “Again, the burden of proof is on the State to prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that such a recantation did not occur here; that is, a recantation that was prompt— promptly given almost immediately and presented without unreasonable delay so that the tests may be completed expeditiously.” (Emphasis added.)
In the evidentiary context, the jury must determine whether a recantation occurred, whether it was valid, and what effect it has upon the inference of guilt that may be drawn from the initial refusal. “Harlan ... indicates that any significant delay in taking a breathalyzer test may serve to deprive the State of an accurate indication of the driver’s condition----” Schneider, 124 N.H. at 245 (second emphasis added). Thus, Harlan requires that, under the implied consent statute, a chemical test be administered “without unreasonable delay,” and “submitted to and completed expeditiously.” Harlan, 113 N.H. at 196-97.
Consequently, because all that is required is that the test be administered “without unreasonable delay,” where a defendant initially refuses but recants “without unreasonable delay,” and the test may be “submitted to and completed expeditiously,” a valid recantation could rebut the inference of guilt created by the defendant’s initial refusal. Certainly, the inference of guilt created by a refusal would be substantially diminished in situations where a defendant recants “promptly” and “almost immediately.” However, there may also be instances where a defendant does not recant “almost immediately” and “promptly,” but does recant “without unreasonable delay.” In such circumstances, the recantation could still serve to negate the inference of guilt created by the initial refusal. Thus, by instructing the jury that a person who has refused a test may recant “but only” in those instances where he does so “promptly [and] almost immediately,” the trial court improperly narrowed the circumstances in which the jury could find that a recantation negated the inference of guilt created by the initial refusal. See State v. Parker, 142 N.H. 319, 324 (1997) (“Jury instructions are designed to give jurors neutral guidance on the law by which to evaluate testimony. Instructions are appropriate if they properly state the law and allow the jurors to exercise their own judgment in evaluating conflicting testimony.” (citation omitted)).
Even if the defendant was not entitled to a recantation instruction under RSA 265:88-a, because the trial court chose to give such an instruction, the defendant was at the very least entitled to an instruction that accurately and clearly informed the jury as to the circumstances in which a recantation could negate the inference of guilt created by a valid refusal. See State v. Drake, 155 N.H. 169, 171 (2007) (“The purpose of the trial court’s charge is to state and explain to the jury, in clear and intelligible language, the rules of law applicable to the case.” (citation omitted)); Jackson v. Morse, *415152 N.H. 48, 51 (2005) (“the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury completely and correctly on the law applicable to the case”). The trial court, however, misled the jury by instructing it that a person could recant “only if” he does so “promptly [and] almost immediately.” Because the trial court failed to “fairly cover the issues of law of th[is] case,” Drake, 155 N.H. at 171 (quotation omitted), I would find the trial court’s instruction in error and reverse.