OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.The offense is possession of marijuana; the punishment, sixteen years imprisonment.
We are met at the outset with appellant’s serious contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. These are the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Officers, armed with a search warrant, approached the home of one Claude Bell. After knocking, but without announcing their identity or purpose, the officers entered the home and discovered four men and a woman seated in the “den.” There was no testimony from any of the officers that any person in the house attempted to flee, was seen or heard moving about, or observed making any suspicious movements. Each was searched and nothing incriminating was found. They then proceeded into the bedroom where they found a quantity of marijuana and pipe in which some “used” marijuana was found. The only probative fact which implicated appellant was that the officers detected the odor of marijuana in both the “den” and in the bedroom. None of the officers testified that in their opinion any of the five appeared to be under the influence of marijuana at that time or later. The State lays much stress on the fact that they found a packet of cigarette papers in appellant’s pocket which were returned to the appellant after the search. This can have no probative effect in the case at bar as no marijuana cigarette “butts” were found in the “den” or anywhere in the house. However, there were regular tobacco butts found in the ash tray in the den. All of the marijuana and other items introduced into evidence were found in the bedroom occupied by Claude Bell in his parents’ home. Said bedroom was across and down the hall from the “den,” the distance between the rooms did not appear in *916the record. There was no showing that appellant had ever been in the bedroom, and it is noted that among the items found there were no cigarette papers. A search of John Rock’s automobile, with his consent, revealed no marijuana or other contraband. If marijuana had been smoked prior to the officer’s entry, it had been smoked in the pipe which was found in the bedroom.
This is the State’s case. Appellant testified that he was seventeen years old at the time charged and had no prior felony convictions. He stated that he had seen Bell, whom he did not know too well, at a shopping center earlier in the day; that Bell had invited him and John Young, who was present, to come by the Bell’s house that evening; that they had no transportation and did not decide to go until John Rock unexpectedly came by in his car; that they had arrived at the Bell’s home in Rock’s car some 30 to 45 minutes before the officers; that they were admitted into the house by the 17 year old girl; that he never left the “den” after his arrival; that they were all watching television when the officers suddenly walked into the room; that he had no knowledge there was marijuana in the house; that he did not detect any odor because of an allergy which affected his olfactory capacity. He stated that he smoked ready made cigarettes and had a package with him at the time.
This being a circumstantial evidence case, attention is called to the following from 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Section 742, p. 422:
“In ascertaining whether the guilt of the accused has been established to a moral certainty, the appellate court will review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent. The court will not presume any acts against the accused that are not shown to have been committed by him. Furthermore, a conviction will not be sustained on appeal if the evidence does not sufficiently establish all material elements of the offense charged.”
Though not relied upon by the State, the nearest case is the majority’s opinion in Hunt v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 618, 258 S.W. 2d 320. The obvious distinction is that in Hunt the accused was seen making motions in the immediate area where the contraband was later found. Here appellant was never shown to have entered the bedroom, across the hall from the “den,” where the marijuana and the pipe were found.
The next case in point is Martinez v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 266, 340 S.W.2d 56, where the marijuana cigarette upon which the prosecution was based was found across the street from Gonzales’ automobile and Martinez was not shown to have had any prior connection with Gonzales. In that case even though there was a plea of nolo contendré this Court found the evidence insufficient to support the plea.
We then move to Arsiaga v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 372 S.W.2d 538, where the court expressed serious doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence in a case where the accused was shown to be in a position to have come in contact with the contraband, but the State was unable to show that he had ever had the same in his control and custody.
In Brown v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W. 2d 828, we had occasion to distinguish Arsiaga v. State, supra, and Martinez v. State, supra, and Brock v. State, infra. The facts in Brown are clearly different and more incriminating than those before us here.
In Brock v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 339, 285 S.W.2d 745, the general rule in cases such as the one at bar is accurately stated as follows:
“A conviction on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances proven do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused; and proof amounting only to a strong suspicion or mere probability is insufficient.”
*917Attention is also directed to Glenn v. United States, 6 Cir., 271 F.2d 880, where the Court said :
“The mere presence of the accused at the scene of a crime does not, of itself, justify drawing an inference that he participated therein.” 1
A conviction on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained on proof amounting only to a strong suspicion or mere probability. Such proof does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused.
It therefore follows from what we have said that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and the judgment must be reversed and the cause be remanded.
. See also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210; Araujo-Lopez v. United States, 9 Cir., 405 F.2d 466; Vasquez v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 376, 167 S.W.2d 1030; Massey v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 263, 226 S.W.2d 856; Williamson v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 520, 244 S.W.2d 202; Moore v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 234, 254 S.W.2d 520.