This is an appeal from the judgment of Count Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County, finding appellant guilty of drunken driving and assessing his punishment at a fine of $150 and thirty days in jail.
The judgment is attacked as being void because of a lack of jurisdiction.
The legislature has created for Harris County several county courts at law, among which are County Court at Law No. 2 and County Court at Law No. 3.
Said courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the misdemeanor offense of drunken driving.
This prosecution was instituted on January 23, 1959, when the complaint and information were filed in County Court No. 2. By such filing that court obtained jurisdiction of the offense charged in the information. When appellant was arrested upon that accusation, said court acquired jurisdiction of the person of appellant.
So far as this record is concerned, appellant was on trial on March 3, 1959, under said complaint and information, in County Court No. 3.
There is an absence of any order from County Court No. 2 transferring the case to County Court No. 3. In fact, there is an absence of any showing suggesting how the case got from Court No. 2 into Court No. 3.
By Art. 64, C. C. P., the legislature made express provision relative to concurrent jurisdiction, as follows:
“When two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction of any criminal offense, the court in which an indictment or a complaint shall be filed shall retain jurisdiction of such offense to the exclusion of all other courts.”
By that language the legislature has said that, as between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the court in which criminal proceedings are first filed retains jurisdiction of the offense charged, to the exclusion of all other courts.
*83Giving effect to that article, here, Court No. 2, being the first court to acquire jurisdiction of the offense charged, retained that jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts until that court transferred its jurisdiction or the prosecution was terminated.
There is no question but that jurisdiction in Court No. 3 to act or to try the appellant is entirely lacking, for that court had neither jurisdiction of the subject matter nor did it have jurisdiction to render the particular judgment that it did.
The judgment of County Court No. 3 was therefore void and unenforcible, for the want of jurisdiction. 12 Tex. Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 111, page 385.
This is not a case where the accusation arose by indictment for a misdemeánor returned into district court. In such cases the district court does not acquire jurisdiction of the offense charged in the indictment. Its only power in such cases is to transfer the indictment to a court having jurisdiction of the offense charged therein.
Nor is this a case where there was an effort made to transfer it from one court to another and in which the order of transfer was defective. Hence, the rule relative to waiver, in failing to attack the transfer of the trial of such a case, has no application. Nor is this a case where proceedings were commenced in two separate courts by separate indictments or information, for the same offense. Cases dealing with such matters therefore have no application here.
In the instant case there is but one proposition—which is that County Court No. 3 convicted this appellant upon an information filed in County Court No. 2, without the latter court having transferred or relinquished its jurisdiction over the offense charged and its jurisdiction of the appellant.
The judgment of County Court No. 3 is void for the want of jurisdiction. A void judgment can be attacked at any time.
Accordingly, the conviction is set aside and the cause is remanded.