dissenting. When the present case reached this Court, my first thought was that in all fairness I should disqualify myself from hearing the matter. This thought was based upon the fact that the small farm on which I live is located in a rural area within five miles of two municipalities which could possess City Planning Commissions. I was personally concerned with the denial of the right to vote for or against the officials authorized to dictate to me the conditions under which I could use and develop my property under the terms of Act 202 of 1957, and Act 186 of 1957.
It has been argued that in this modern day, planning commissions are necessary for progress. Certainly there is a great deal of merit to this argument. However, the validity of the argument depends upon what is considered to be progress. It has been my observation that most rural people in this state live in the country by choice and a great number of them such as myself live in the country principally to escape the mass regimentation that the Acts here in question are calculated to contribute' to. Yes, it can be said that in the absence of regulation some people might build a pig pen. The truth of the matter is that some of us country people might have every intention of building a pig pen. If so, we feel that we have every right to choose to do so. Freedom of choice is the greatest freedom we in this nation enjoy, or did enjoy until the United States Supreme Court by judicial fiat set out to destroy that right.
The present laws of Arkansas, whether they are fair or unfair, are ample to allow a municipality the right to annex property contiguous with their boundaries. I don’t think it would be an unreasonable burden to require that such property which the city seeks to control be incorporated into the city before control is assumed. With the strong feelings I have on this matter, I probably should have disqualified but in the absence of an offer to disqualify by the other members of the Court who, with the exception of one, all reside within the corporate limits of the appellee, I chose to remain.
Article 7, Section 28 of the Constitution reads, in all parts material herein, as follows:
“The County Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to County taxes, roads, bridges . . ., and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties.”
It is fundamental in the law that municipal corporations have no extra-territorial powers but their jurisdiction ends at the municipal boundaries. 37 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations, § 122, p. 736; 62 C. J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 141, p. 283; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 10.07. The legislature may, and in many instances has, authorized the exercise of municipal authority outside the legal limits of the municipality, but such must be within and subject to the state’s constitutional limitations.
With these fundamental principles in mind, it must be determined what constitutional limitations, if any, are imposed on the state legislature.
It must be admitted by all concerned that Art. 7, § 28 of the Arkansas Constitution, grants to the county courts exclusive original jurisdiction over county roads. Sanderson v. Texarkana, 103 Ark. 529, 146 S. W. 105; Parkview Land Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 1, 92 Ark. 93, 122 S. W. 241; Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 89 Ark. 513, 117 S. W. 544. This does not mean city streets nor state highways, but merely county roads. As a result, then, the county court must have the power, and, therefore, has the duty to plan, construct, maintain, alter, relocate, and abandon county roads.
How could the county courts execute this constitutional power if Act 186 is law? Under the act, municipalities could pass ordinances adopting a street plan for streets outside the city in the five-mile area. § 4 (c). The planning commission would be empowered to make regulations to enforce this plan. § 5 (c) and 5 (d) and (e). The development and use of the land in the five-mile area could be controlled by the city. § 4 (a). No plat for the dedication of land in the five-mile area could be accepted for recording unless passed on by the city. § 5 (c). Under these sections it would be possible for the city to locate, plan, and abandon streets, roads and highways; it could determine the Avidth, points of entry, types of construction and types of use of streets, roads and highways. It is Avell settled that the legislature may impose upon political subdivisions other than counties the responsibility of maintaining streets and roads. Parkview Land Co. v. Road Improvement District No. 1, supra; Sanderson v. Texarkana, supra. But here, although the city is purportedly empowered to determine the location, type of construction and all other details of roads in what has always been thought to be the county’s jurisdictional area, the city is not made responsible for their upkeep and maintenance after construction.
The proponents of the act may say this is an extreme interpretation of its provisions, but it is an inescapable conclusion. What better ways'is there to impose the city’s will on the development of county roads in the five-mile area than by refusing to approve plats for recordation or by “denial of building permits and use permits.” The county would also be hamstrung by the provisions of § 3 (f): “no public way, . , . building or structure . . . shall be • acquired, constructed or authorized unless ... submitted to the planning commission for . . . approval ...” Can the majority say the things here set out do not constitute the internal improvements specifically reserved to the county court under the Constitution?
The question here is not one of good intentions, or what responsible commissions and city councils or boards might do, but whether this act infringes upon the powers of county courts under the Arkansas Constitution. Exclusive original jurisdiction can only mean Avhat the words say. Any encroachment on this jurisdiction by a municipality is unconstitutional.
I reach this conclusion based not on my personal feelings in this matter but upon the clear and unmistakable language of the Constitution as it is written.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.