with whom SCHWELB, Associate Judge joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I entirely concur with the court’s conclusion that liability here must rest, if at all, on proof of “gross negligence” under D.C.Code § 2-412. However, I cannot agree with my colleagues that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the submission to the jury of the question whether the officer in this case committed gross negligence under that Code section.
I do not understand my colleagues to take issue with the concept of gross negligence as we defined it in the high-speed chase case of District of Columbia v. Walker, 689 A.2d 40 (D.C.1997). I will not rehearse that full discussion again, but we noted there that the concept requires “an extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care,” “conduct so extreme as to imply some sort of bad faith,” and “such negligence as would shock fair-minded men [and women].” 689 A.2d at 44.
I do not see how any reasonable jury could come to such a conclusion on the record here. Officer Partman sought to stop the vehicle because he observed (correctly) that the driver appeared too young to be operating a vehicle and that he was doing so somewhat erratically. The pursuit lasted some twelve seconds, spanning some four blocks. At the time of the pursuit, the road was wet but it was daylight. Like much of the District, the neighborhood of the pursuit was both commercial and residential in character. Officer Partman drove through a red light and utilized his emergency siren and lights. Witnesses testified that both vehicles eventually exceeded the speed limit by up to thirty miles an hour; however, Officer Partman was traveling at a speed and a distance from Butler that apparently enabled him to stop his vehicle without becoming entangled in Butler’s collision and without leaving skid marks on the road.
I do not deny that Officer Partman’s judgment in commencing and continuing the pursuit for four blocks at high speed might be deemed faulty. But “[a] finding of gross negligence, if such standard is to be meaningfully distinguished from simple negligence, must demand serious aggravating factors in the conduct of the police officer beyond those necessary to establish simple negligence in the first place.” District of Columbia v. Henderson, 710 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C.1998) (emphasis added).
At the heart of the statutory exemption is a recognition that the operation of motor vehicles in an emergency situation may require rapid decisions — here, whether to pursue and whether to cut off the pursuit — that in retrospect may be deemed flawed. But duration and distance surely are vital factors in determining liability under the statutory standard. In my judgment, to permit an officer to be found grossly negligent for engaging in a twelve second, four block pursuit of a vehicle that has responded to a siren by fleeing is simply inconsistent with the principle, identified by the court, that “limitations on waivers of immunity, such as the gross negligence provision in § 1-1212 [now *666§ 2-412], are to be read broadly.” Walker, 689 A.2d at 42. If this limited pursuit can be deemed grossly negligent, then virtually any pursuit would seem open to such a finding. I doubt that the enactors of § 2-412 intended such a result. I respectfully dissent.