DISSENTING OPINION BY
FORD ELLIOTT, J.:¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. I do so for two reasons. First, while I disagree with the majority’s revisiting the principles expressed in In Re Insurance Stacking Litigation (“Stacking Litigation”), 754 A.2d 702 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied sub nom. In re Leed, 565 Pa. 673, 775 A.2d 807 (2001), I find no need to apply those principles in this case because stacking, as our legislature has defined that term by statute, has no application here. Additionally, within the context of § 1733, the language in the Donegal policy that restricts the receipt of UIM benefits to the maximum recovery of UIM benefits available on any vehicle, including the vehicle in which the insured was a passenger at the time of the accident, unequivocally violates our legislature’s definition of an underin-sured motor vehicle, set forth in § 1702 of the MVFRL.
¶ 2 Before reaching my analysis of this case, I express my dismay at the majority’s disavowal of the principles enunciated in Stacking Litigation, supra, because not only do I find those principles to be correct but I also find them compelled by law. Additionally, while the inter/intra-policy stacking waiver analysis may or may not have been necessary to the resolution of *279the Stacking Litigation case, that analysis was adopted and applied in reaching the decisions in both State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Rizzo, 835 A.2d 359 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 578 Pa. 710, 853 A.2d 363 (2004); and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 826 A.2d 880 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 723, 847 A.2d 1287 (2004). Assuming, ar-guendo, that the stacking waiver analysis was dicta in Stacking Litigation, a point with which I do not agree, that analysis is now, nonetheless, valid precedent. As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra. I would therefore suggest that the majority’s concern about relying on what it perceives to be dicta in Stacking Litigation is now a moot point.
¶ 3 Turning to the majority’s resolution of this case, I am constrained to disagree because I do not find that the facts of this case implicate “stacking” as our legislature has defined that concept in § 1738 of the MVFRL: rather, a proper analysis of the issue in this case falls squarely within the parameters of § 1733, Priority of recovery. This is not to say that the generic term “stacking” may not describe the priority of recovery under § 1733, as the Insurance Commissioner suggests. (Brief on Rear-gument of Amicus Curiae M. Diane Koken, Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner (“Insurance Commissioner’s Brief’) at 6) (defining “Stacking” of coverages as “nothing more than a cumulation of coverages for a single injury. Stacked coverage combines the limits of available insurance coverages from more than one source.”).
¶4 Our legislature has, however, delineated a more limited concept of stacking for purposes of Pennsylvania’s MVFRL as follows:
(a) Limit for each vehicle. — When more than one vehicle is insured under one or more policies providing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for uninsured or underinsured coverage shall apply separately to each vehicle so insured. The limits of coverages available under this subchapter for an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 5 The MVFRL provides the following definition of an insured:
‘Insured.’ Any of the following:
(1) An individual identified by name as an insured in a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance.
(2) If residing in the household of the named insured:
(i) a spouse or other relative of the named insured; or
(ii) a minor in the custody of either the named insured or relative of the named insured.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. Definitions.
¶ 6 Thus, in Pennsylvania, the concept of stacking applies only to motor vehicles as to which the injured person is an insured, where the definition of “insured” does not include passengers in non-owned vehicles. See 3 Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance (“Widiss”), § 40.1, at 344 (revised 2d ed.2000) (observing, “When there is a question about the “stacking” of underin-sured motorist insurance coverages, it is essential to consider several factors, including: (1) whether applicable legislation has been enacted in the relevant state addressing questions about “stacking”; (2) whether there are provisions specifying circumstances in which more than one underinsured motorist insurance policy *280provides coverage; (3) whether there are ambiguities created by the coverage provisions about an insured right to “stack” coverages or whether individual coverage terms that preclude “stacking” are free of ambiguities; and (4) the applicable judicial precedents about “stacking”.”) (footnote omitted).
¶ 7 Addressing an argument very much like the one Donegal advances in this case regarding our deference to the Insurance Commissioner, an en banc panel of this court opined in Allwein v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 448 Pa.Super. 364, 671 A.2d 744 (1996) (en banc), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 660, 685 A.2d 541 (1996):
Furthermore, while it is true, as [Done-gal] argues, that the ... language in its policy was approved by the Insurance Commissioner, we note that ‘[w]hen there is a question about the effect — if any — such a filing [of an insurance policy form with the Commissioner] has on an adjudication of questions involving the enforceability of coverage terms in an uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, courts almost invariably conclude that the filings do not constitute the type of administrative regulation which justifies judicial deference to the decision of an administrative agency.’
Id. at 753, quoting Widiss, § 32.3, at 21.
¶ 8 Thus, despite the Insurance Commissioner’s position, I must nonetheless turn to the rules of statutory construction, which guide any review of the sections of a statute. L.S. v. Eschbach, 583 Pa. 47, 53-54, 874 A.2d 1150, 1154 (2005), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. As the Eschbach court observed, “ ‘Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to them common and approved usage[.]’ ” Eschbach, supra at 55, 874 A.2d at 1155, quoting 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). Continuing, our supreme court opined, “Moreover, ‘unlike statutes specifically required to be construed strictly, the MVFRL is to be accorded a liberal construction, in favor of the insured.’ ” Id., quoting Hoffman v. Troncelliti, 576 Pa. 504, 514-15, 839 A.2d 1013, 1019 (2003), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
¶ 9 In this case, the majority would expand the definition of an “insured” to include individuals who fall within the rubric of § 1733(a)(1), which provides:
§ 1733. Priority of recovery.
(a) General rule. — Where multiple policies apply, payment shall be made in the following order of priority:
(1) A policy covering a motor vehicle occupied by the injured person at the time of the accident.
Id. As suggested by the majority, because the injured passenger is entitled to UIM benefits under the policy covering the motor vehicle he or she occupied at the time of the accident, the injured person is an insured under that policy. By logical extension, therefore, the majority would find § 1738, which applies only to “the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured,” relevant in a case such as this, where the insured has purportedly waived stacking within her own policy.
¶ 10 The legislature has, however, clearly defined who is an “insured,” as set forth supra. That definition does not include those individuals who fall under the first priority for recovery of UIM benefits in § 1733(a), individuals who are injured while they are passengers in vehicles as to which they have neither the obligation nor the ability to purchase UIM coverage or, of more significance herein, to pay for or waive stacked UIM coverage.
¶ 11 Both our supreme court and this court, sitting en banc, have struck down an insurer’s attempt to limit the definition of an insured in two recent decisions; Pru*281dential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747 (2002); and Richmond v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 856 A.2d 1260 (Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 664, 875 A.2d 1076 (2005). In Colbert, our supreme court opined, “ ‘As a general rule, “stipulations in a contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to, statutory provisions which are applicable to, and consequently form a part of, the contract, must yield to the statute, and are invalid, since contracts cannot change existing statutory laws.” ’ ” Colbert, supra at 88, 813 A.2d at 750, quoting Allwein, 671 A.2d at 752, quoting George J. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev.ed) § 13.7, at 827 (1984); accord Richmond, 856 A.2d at 1267. Based on the foregoing, both the Colbert and Richmond courts invalidated a provision in Prudential’s policy limiting the definition of an insured to individuals who were driving cars, not vehicles, and further limited coverage to cars specifically insured under the Prudential policy. Colbert, supra at 88-89, 813 A.2d at 751; Richmond, 856 A.2d at 1268.
¶ 12 Less recently, an en banc panel of this court, following supreme court precedent, held that a passenger in a vehicle, who is not specifically designated as an insured in a policy of insurance covering that vehicle and who has no contractual relationship with the insurer, but whose “claim to be an insured is solely predicated on his occupancy of the motor vehicle[,]” is not a class one insured. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 423 Pa.Super. 519, 621 A.2d 654, 656 (1993) (en banc), appeal granted, 535 Pa. 638, 631 A.2d 1009 (1993), citing Selected Risks Ins. v. Thompson, 520 Pa. 130, 552 A.2d 1382 (1989).19
¶ 13 The Broughton court grounded its analysis in our supreme court’s delineation of class one, class two, and class three insureds in Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005 (1984). Broughton, 621 A.2d at 656. The Utica policy at issue in Contrisciane provided:
PERSONS COVERED
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set forth below:
(a) the named insured and any designated insured and, while residents of the same household, the spouse and relatives of either,
(b) any other person while occupying an insured highway vehicle; and
(c) any person with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this insurance applies sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) above.
Contrisciane, supra at 338, 473 A.2d at 1010, quoting Reproduced Record at 101a. As the supreme court continued, “These classifications are contained in most uninsured motorist policies, and have come to be described as ‘class one’; ‘class two;’ [sic] and ‘class three’ coverage.” Id. See also James R. Ronca, et al., Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance, An Analysis of the Financial Responsibility Law § 9.1, at 147 (2nd ed.2002) (setting forth the three classes of coverage the Contrisciane court adopted).
¶ 14 In this case as in Contrisciane, “entitlement to coverage was predicated *282on [Contrisciane’s] occupation of the vehicle at the time of the accident: a ‘class two’ type of coverage.” Contrisciane, supra at 338, 473 A.2d at 1010. According to our supreme court, “A claimant whose coverage is solely a result of membership in this class has not paid premiums, nor is he a specifically intended beneficiary of the policy. Thus, he has no recognizable contractual relationship with the insurer, and there is no basis upon which he can reasonably expect multiple coverage.” Id. at 338-339, 473 A.2d at 1010-1011. As a result, because Contrisciane’s entitlement to coverage under the Utica policy “arose from his temporary status as an occupant, rather than from his being a specifically intended beneficiary of the insurance policy[,]” Contrisciane’s estate could not stack coverages applicable to a fleet of vehicles, one of which was the vehicle Contrisciane occupied when he was killed by an uninsured driver. Id. at 339, 473 A.2d at 1011.
¶ 15 Contrisiciane was however, an intended beneficiary of another policy, carried by his father and designating Contris-ciane as a driver. Because Contrisciane was a class one insured as to that policy, the supreme court held his estate could stack coverage under that policy and extended “the right to stack coverages to all persons within the ‘class one’ category of ‘insureds’.” Id. at 340, 473 A.2d at 1011.
¶ 16 Applying the foregoing analysis to the facts herein, insured, falling within class two as a passenger, was not entitled to stack coverage under the policy covering the vehicle she occupied, but had a right to stack coverage under her policy with Donegal, subject to any waiver. The right to stack, with its accompanying right to waive stacking, comes in to play under § 1733(a), therefore, only when 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1733(a)(2) triggers insured’s contractual right to UIM coverage. Under the priority of recovery § 1733 establishes, that right is triggered only when, having exhausted the benefits available under both the tortfeasor’s bodily injury liability policy (“BI policy”) and the vehicle owner’s UIM coverage, if any, and still not having been fully compensated for her injuries, insured seeks benefits under her Donegal policy, “(2) A policy covering a motor vehicle not involved in the accident with respect to which the injured person is an insured.” Id.
¶ 17 I recognize that both the supreme court and this court decided Contrisciane and its progeny under prior law, not under the MVFRL. The class one, class two, and class three analysis remains, however, the law of Pennsylvania. See Bowdren v. Aetna, 404 Pa.Super. 595, 591 A.2d 751, 754-755 (1991) (citing Contrisciane for the proposition that a claimant’s right to stack uninsured coverage under the MVFRL differs according to his status as a claimant, setting forth the three classes of claimants), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 644, 602 A.2d 855 (1992).
¶ 18 I also recognize that in this case, Donegal is not arguing that insured may not stack coverage under the policy covering the vehicle she was occupying, as Donegal did not insure that vehicle. The Contrisciane court’s analysis is, however, directly on point in limiting to class one insureds the right to stack coverage on policies as to which they are class one insureds, and, by logical extension, the right to waive stacking only with regard to those policies. That analysis is also directly at odds with Donegal’s claim that insured is an “insured” for purposes of § 1738 pursuant to her status as the occupant of another’s vehicle; the definition of “insured” in the MVFRL is identical to the Contrisciane court’s definition of a class one insured and clearly does not include an individual such as insured whose only claim to insurance benefits pursuant to *283§ 1733(a)(1) is based on her status as the occupant of a motor vehicle.
¶ 19 Furthermore, I realize that in this case, unlike Colbert, supra, and Richmond, supra, Donegal seeks to limit its insureds’ coverage by expanding, rather than restricting, the definition of who is an insured. The result is, however, the same as in Colbert and Richmond; Donegal would preclude an individual such as insured in this case, who paid a premium for UIM coverage, from the benefit of her bargain by telling her she cannot “stack” her own UIM coverage pursuant to § 1733(a)(2) with the UIM benefits she received pursuant to § 1733(a)(1) pursuant to the policy on a vehicle in which she happened to be riding at the time of the accident.
¶ 20 By permitting Donegal to redefine “who is an insured,” the majority thereby allows Donegal to expand the scope of § 1738 beyond the parameters our legislature established. As our supreme court held in Colbert, supra, insurance contract provisions that are in conflict with or repugnant to applicable statutory provisions must yield to the statutory provisions, which form a part of the contract. Colbert, supra at 88, 813 A.2d at 750 (citation omitted). By defining an “insured” in terms of class one insureds only, and by defining stacking as “the sum of the [UM or UIM] limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured,” the legislature clearly intended that stacking, and, by logical extension, waiver of stacking, apply only to claimants seeking UM/ UIM benefits based on their status as class one insureds.
¶21 As Ronca, et al., observe in the context of gap versus excess coverage, an insured may only waive coverage after being fully informed of the coverage available and knowingly, intelligently, and affirmatively choosing to waive that coverage. Ronca, et al., supra, § 10.4, at 162. In this case, insured chose, and paid for, UIM coverage. She ostensibly waived, and did not pay for, stacking. Nothing in her policy or in the waiver of stacking form she or her husband signed informed her that by waiving stacking, she was waiving the UIM coverage for which she was, at the same time, paying a higher premium.20 She is not, however, seeking to stack UIM coverage. Rather, she is claiming the UIM benefits to which she is entitled as a class one insured pursuant to § 1733(a)(2).
¶ 22 Thus, this is not “another instance of an auto insurance consumer who makes a coverage decision that results in monetary savings, and then sues the carrier after ... realizing that more or better coverage would have been available absent that cost-saving decision.” (Majority opinion at 267.) Rather, this is another instance of an auto insurance consumer who pays a higher premium for coverage she is not required by law to purchase, only to have her carrier deny that coverage when it is time to give the consumer the benefit of her bargain.
¶23 In this case, the insured was a passenger in a vehicle she neither owned nor, a fortiori, could insure. Neither the *284tortfeasor’s liability insurance nor the UIM insurance on the vehicle in which she was riding fully compensated her for her injuries. As a result, she sought compensation from her insurance carrier pursuant to her contract for UIM benefits. Insured was, therefore, entitled to UIM coverage pursuant to § 1731(c) of the MVFRL which requires: “(c) Underinsured motorist coverage. — Underinsured motorist coverage shall provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from owners or operators of underin-sured motor vehicles.” Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 24 Because I reach the result that insured’s waiver of stacking has no application in this case, I find it necessary to reach the issue whether the en banc panel’s decision in Allwein, supra, invalidates the clause on which Donegal relied to deny insured coverage.
¶ 25 The majority is correct that this court decided Allwein in the context of a UIM claim where the tortfeasor’s BI coverage did not fully compensate Allwein for the injuries that resulted in his death. Allwein, who resided with his parents at the time of his death, was a class one insured pursuant to his parents’ policy with Donegal, which provided UIM benefits of $35,000 per vehicle on each of the three vehicles the policy covered, and which allowed stacking of those benefits, for a total of $105,000. Allwein was riding his bicycle to work when the tortfeasors struck him; therefore, the priority established in § 1733(a) did not apply and All-wein’s estate could only pursue UIM benefits pursuant to AUwein’s parents’ policy. The tortfeasors’ policy paid its BI liability limits of $15,000, after which the estate sought $105,000 in UIM benefits. Relying on a “gap” clause in its policy, Donegal agreed to pay only $90,000, claiming the policy allowed it to offset its payment of UIM benefits by the amount the estate recovered in BI benefits.21 Allwein, 671 A.2d at 745-746.
¶ 26 Following arbitration, Donegal appealed the arbitrators’ award to the trial court, raising a single issue: “ ‘whether the cited language in Donegal’s policy is valid or whether Donegal owes Allwein an additional $15,000 in underinsurance benefits.’ ” Allwein, 671 A.2d at 746, quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 3. “The trial court found the so-called ‘gap’ provision in Donegal’s policy, ... which allowed Done-gal to offset the underinsurance benefits payable to Allwein against liability payments received pursuant to the tortfeasors’ separate policy, to be violative of the public policy of Pennsylvania.” Id.
¶ 27 Donegal raised four issues on appeal to the en banc panel of this court, all framing questions of contract and statutory interpretation pursuant to public policy.22 Beginning with Donegal’s fourth issue, the Allwein court opined:
*285‘Excess’ underinsurance benefits are limited only by the victim’s damages or the policy limits, whichever is smaller. As the trial court stated:
Under excess coverage, the party at fault is underinsured when his liability limits are less than the insured victim’s total damages. The tortfeasor’s policy acts as primary coverage, and the insured victim’s policy acts as secondary coverage. The victim recovers under the tortfeasor’s policy up to the policy limits and then recovers under his own policy up to coverage limits or up to the total amount of damages, whichever is less.
Id. at 747, quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 4. As the Allwein court continued, “ ‘Under excess coverage, therefore, [Allwein] would be entitled to recover the full $105,000 of underinsurance benefits available under his policy, because the parties agree that the total amount of his damages exceeds the combined benefits available under both the tortfeasors’ policy limits and [Allwein’s] underinsurance benefits.’ ” Id., quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 4.
¶28 Explaining the concept of gap insurance, the Allwein court observed:
Under ‘gap’ insurance, on the other hand:
[T]he party at fault is underinsured when [his or her] liability limits are less than a specified policy limit of the insured victim. To determine the amount of the insured’s underinsurance recovery, the recovery from the tortfeasor’s policy is deducted from the amount recoverable under the insured’s [underinsurance] policy. The insured’s recovery fills the gap between the two policies up to the total amount of damages suffered or [up to the] policy limits, whichever is less.
Id., quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 4. Therefore, as the Allwein court explained, “ ‘As a result, [Allwein] would only be entitled to benefits in the amount of the ‘gap’ between the $15,000 of coverage under the tortfeasors’ policy and the $105,000 limits of liability of underinsurance under his own policy; namely, $90,000.’ ” Id., quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 4. Continuing, the en banc court observed, “ ‘Furthermore, under gap insurance, if a tortfeasor’s liability coverage is greater than the underinsurance coverage carried by the victim, the victim would be entitled to zero underinsurance recovery, even where his or her damages are far in excess of the tortfeasor’s liability limits.’” Id., quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 4. The Allwein court offered the trial court’s illustration of such a scenario:
For example, in the instant ease, if the tortfeasors had carried $150,000 of liability insurance instead of $15,000, and [Allwein’s] damages were determined to be $500,000, [Allwein] would recover nothing from Donegal because Allwein’s ‘gap’ underinsurance benefits of $105,000 would be less than the tortfea-sors’ liability coverage, so that there would be no gap to fill.
*286Allwein, 671 A.2d at 747, quoting trial court opinion, 7/25/94 at 4.
¶ 29 In this case, Donegal does not question whether the tortfeasor was driving an underinsured motor vehicle, which the MVFRL defines as “A motor vehicle for which the limits of available liability insurance and self-insurance are insufficient to pay losses and damages.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. Instead, Donegal argues, and the majority agrees, that Allwein does not govern the gap provision in Donegal’s UIM endorsement because coverage was not triggered by exhaustion of the tortfea-sor’s BI coverage, but was instead triggered only after both the tortfeasor’s BI coverage and the UIM coverage on the vehicle insured occupied were exhausted, without having fully compensated the insured for her injuries.
¶ 30 Thus, Donegal claims its gap clause does not violate the clear mandate of § 1702 requiring excess, rather than gap, underinsured motorist insurance. In fact, Donegal claims in this case it is obligated to provide no UIM coverage based on the very scenario set forth supra, with one variation; it is the vehicle owner’s UIM coverage, not the tortfeasor’s BI coverage, that is greater than the insured’s UIM coverage.
¶ 31 I find it instructive to set forth paragraph B of the “Limit of Liability” section relevant to insured’s UIM coverage under the Donegal policy:
B. The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the ‘bodily injury’ by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes all sums paid for an ‘insured’s’ attorney either directly or as part of the amount paid to the ‘insured.’ It also includes all sums paid under Part A of this policy.
Stipulation, “Limit of Liability,” R.R. at 338a-339a. This is the identical clause the Allwein court invalidated and belies the majority’s suggestion that insured would have received the full $35,000 of UIM coverage she paid for upon receiving $25,000 in BI coverage from the tortfeasor. See Majority opinion at 11 (opining, “In accordance with Donegal’s policy, if [insured] had been injured in her own vehicle, she would have simply presented a claim to Donegal for the $35,000 in UIM benefits available under her policy.”). In fairness to Donegal, I recognize that the UIM endorsement in effect at the time of insured’s injury on April 29, 1997 appears to bear a 1996 date and may, therefore, have predated Allwein, supra, which was filed February 20, 1996 and for which our supreme court denied allocatur November 13, 1996.
¶ 32 The clause at issue herein is part of the “Other Insurance” section, which follows the “Limit of Liability” section. That clause provides: “b. The maximum recovery under all policies in the Second priority shall not exceed the amount by which the highest limit for any one vehicle under any one policy in the Second priority exceeds the limit applicable under the policy in the First priority.” (Stipulation of Facts with Exhibits at Exhibit R, Underin-sured Motorists Coverage — Pennsylvania (Non-Stacked) (“Stipulation”), “Other Insurance,” R.R. at 339a) (emphasis added).
¶ 33 To the extent this clause is comprehensible, it contemplates the very limitations on coverage the Allwein court invalidated, holding, “For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that § 1702 clearly expresses the policy of this Commonwealth on the issue of ‘excess’ versus ‘gap’ coverage. Neither the insurer nor this court has the power to render this statutory enactment nugatory.” Allwein, 671 A.2d at 758. Section 1702, defining an underin-sured motor vehicle, is as applicable to this *287case as it was to Allwein, as insured purchased UIM coverage specifically to protect her in the event she was involved in an accident with a vehicle “for which the limits of available liability insurance and self-insurance are insufficient to pay losses and damages.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702.
¶ 34 Interestingly, Donegal would have us allow it to eliminate its obligation to insured altogether under the facts herein or to offset its obligation to other insureds, because the priority of recovery set forth in § 1733(a) reduces Donegal’s obligation to its insureds when they are occupying another vehicle carrying UIM coverage. As this court observed in Allwein, however:
[Underinsurance coverage is always secondary, or excess, coverage by its very nature; the insurer pays nothing unless and until the tortfeasor’s coverage is exhausted, and then only if damages exceed the tortfeasor’s insurance limits. To put it another way, underin-surance coverage always carries with it a ‘deductible’ of at least the amount of coverage required by a state’s financial responsibility law. In Pennsylvania, the MVFRL defines ‘financial responsibility’ as ‘[t]he ability to respond in damages for liability on account of accidents arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of $15,000 because of injury to one person in any one accident .... ’ 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702. As a result, the underinsured insurer pays nothing unless and until the tort-feasor’s insurer or the tortfeasor has paid, minimally, $15,000.
Allwein, 671 A.2d at 757.
¶35 Here, the tortfeasor’s insurer paid $25,000; Nationwide, insuring the vehicle insured occupied at the time of the accident, paid $50,000; and insured was still not fully compensated for her injuries. To allow Donegal, which has already had the advantage of a $75,000 “deductible,” to deny insured any benefits under her $35,000 UIM endorsement, for which she paid an extra premium, is to exalt form over both substance and statute.
¶ 36 As our supreme court very recently opined, the legislative intent behind allowing insureds the option of purchasing, or waiving, benefits such as full tort, UM/ UIM coverage, and stacking was to allow individuals to reduce their insurance premiums, thereby rendering insurance more affordable so that more Pennsylvania drivers would maintain financial responsibility. Eschbach, supra at 56-57, 874 A.2d at 1156. The majority’s holding would appear to encourage the very mischief these options were intended to correct.
¶ 37 First, it expands a purported stacking waiver pursuant to § 1738 beyond anything either Donegal or insured contemplated, as the plain language of the waiver indicates, and holds that § 1738 applies to the priority of coverage under § 1733(a). By so holding, the majority eviscerates insured’s contract for UIM benefits.
¶ 38 Second, the majority dismisses insured’s argument that the clause in her UIM endorsement providing gap underin-surance violates the MVFRL by noting that the holding in Allwein is inapplicable to endorsements pursuant to § 1733. As a result, and despite Allwein’s explicit holding with regard to § 1702, the majority allows Donegal to continue to underwrite gap coverage in Pennsylvania in a case such as this.
¶ 39 I agree with Justice Newman, writing for the majority in Eschbach, that to expand a waiver of coverage in a manner the legislature neither contemplated nor condoned is to encourage the very mischief the MVFRL was intended to correct. Such an expansion places Pennsylvania’s drivers in an untenable position. If they *288elect to purchase some optional coverage but waive other options in order to be able to afford insurance, they may discover they have lost the benefit of their bargained-for purchases when the insurer claims, and the courts agree, the waiver swallows the purchase. Drivers may, as the Eschbach court opined, therefore not purchase insurance because they cannot afford it without waiving some options, thereby resulting in more uninsured drivers. Eschbach, supra at 56-57, 874 A.2d at 1156. As Ronca, et al., observed, our legislature enacted the MVFRL because spiraling insurance costs in Pennsylvania resulted in a “staggering” number of uninsured drivers on Pennsylvania’s highways. Ronca, et al., supra at § 1.2 at 11.
¶ 40 Allowing insurers to deny insureds the benefit of their bargain, for which they have opted to pay an increased premium, renders hollow the purchase of UIM coverage, leaving victims of underinsured drivers uncompensated to the full extent of their injuries despite their option, unless they can afford and are willing to litigate their claims for years.23
¶ 41 For all of the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
. The majority in Broughton relied on its reasoning in Jeffrey v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 423 Pa.Super. 483, 621 A.2d 635 (1993) (en banc), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 651, 644 A.2d 736 (1994), decided four days earlier by the same en banc panel. Broughton, 621 A.2d at 655. While our supreme court denied allocatur in Jeffrey and apparently granted allocatur in Broughton, Shepard's does not reflect any further activity in Broughton but refers to Jeffrey as a connected case.
. The rejection of stacked underinsured coverage limits applicable herein reads:
By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for myself and members of my household under which the limits of coverage available would be the sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy. Instead the limits of coverage that I am purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the policy. I knowingly and voluntarily reject the stacked limits of coverage. I understand that my premium will be reduced if I reject this coverage.
Stipulation of Facts with Exhibits at Exhibit J, R.R. at 199a (emphasis added).
. The clause provided:
C. The limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the ‘bodily injury' by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible. This includes all sums paid for an 'insured's' attorney either directly or as part of the amount paid to the 'insured.' It also includes all sums paid for the same damages under Part A. of this policy.
Allwein, 671 A.2d at 746 (citation omitted).
.
A. Whether the 1990 amendment to Section 1731(a) of the MVFRL [Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law], making underinsured motorist coverage optional, eliminates any argument that gap underinsured coverage violates public policy.
*285B. Whether vague notions of public policy can be used to invalidate unambiguous insurance policy provisions.
C. Whether an automobile insurance policy's 'gap' UIM [underinsured motorist] coverage is consistent with the express insurance cost reduction and coverage balancing public policy goals of MVFRL.
D.Whether the required ‘offer’ of under-insured motorist coverage under Section 1731(a) and the definition of 'un-derinsured motor vehicle’ in Section 1702 prohibit gap underinsured motorist coverage under the MVFRL.
Allwein, 671 A.2d at 746-747.
. Insured was injured in 1997. According to a chart Donegal’s Personal Lines Auto Rate File Specialist prepared, insured saved $1 per year over an eight-year period by electing to waive stacking, thereby reducing her UIM premiums for that eight-year period from$32 to $24. (Stipulations, Exhibit Q, R.R. at 335a.)