dissenting. Although I agree with the majority’s recitation of the applicable standard of review, I disagree with the majority’s application of that standard to the facts in the instant case. I cannot say that the commission’s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. section 23-48-601 (a)(1) was “clearly wrong.” Further, the majority’s reversal of the commission’s finding leads us to a result that defies the basic rule of statutory construction, namely, to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 769, 894 S.W.2d 888 (1995).
When we are presented with a matter of first impression, as here, this court is vested with a pivotal responsibility to determine the meaning of a statute. See In re Adoption of Martindale, 327 Ark. 685, 688-89, 940 S.W.2d 491 (1997) (citing Arkansas Dep’t of Health v. Westark Christian Action Council, 322 Ark. 440, 910 S.W.2d 199 (1995); Peters v. State, 321 Ark. 276, 902 S.W.2d 757 (1995): Furman v. Holloway, 312 Ark. 378, 849 S.W.2d 520 (1993)). The majority’s interpretation that section 23-48-601(a)(1) contained no ambiguity, no drafting error, or omission, fails to adequately meet that responsibility because we must construe statutes by looking to all laws on the subject, viewing them as a single system, and giving effect to the general purpose of the system. See Citizens to Establish a Reform Party in Arkansas v. Priest, 325 Ark. 257, 265-66, 926 S.W.2d 432 (1996) (citing Hercules, Inc. v. Pleader, 319 Ark. 702, 894 S.W.2d 576 (1995); Pace v. State Use Saline County, 189 Ark. 1104, 76 S.W.2d 294 (1934)).
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation and adopt the position advanced by the Arkansas Bankers Association and Arkansas Community Bankers Association, who filed an amicus curiae brief in this matter. When read as a whole, the purpose of these statutory provisions is to allow a reorganization through a plan of exchange that will result in a bank holding company becoming the sole stockholder of a bank. The commission’s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. sections 23-48-601—605 recognized that purpose by permitting the instant transaction.
As further evidence of the legislature’s intent, we may also consider subsequent amendments to the statute. Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 769, 894 S.W.2d 888 1995). Via Act 117 of 1999, the legislature enacted an amendment to sections 23-48-601, -604, and -605, entitled a “clarification of the procedures to reorganize using a plan of exchange.” (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the legislature intended to clarify an ambiguity in section 23-48-601(a)(1) to allow for a plan of exchange in which a minority shareholder may be forced to accept a fair cash value for his shares, although other shareholders may receive differing types of equitable consideration in exchange for their shares. Given that the legislature has approved “cash-out” transactions in a corporate-merger context, we should not conclude that the commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously by interpreting section 23-48-601 to permit a cash-out transaction in the context of a bank reorganization utilizing a plan of exchange. Also, like corporate stockholders dissenting from a plan for consolidation, minority bank shareholders, forced to take cash for their shares pursuant to a plan of exchange, are able to obtain a fair valuation for those shares under section 23-48-603.
In conclusion, the interpretation advanced by the majority is counter to the overall purposes and provisions of the Arkansas Banking Code. We should not disregard the legislature’s enactment of its intent in this area. In light of the great deference afforded an agency’s interpretation, Arkansas State Medical Bd. v. Bolding, 324 Ark. 238, 244, 920 S.W.2d 825 (1996), the ambiguity in section 23-48-601 (a)(1), and the legislature’s expressed intent, I respectfully dissent.
Glaze and Thornton, JJ., join.