Retired:
The division decision in this case, which we reaffirm, is reported as Wells v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 449 A.2d 1079 (D.C.1982). It was vacated by order when rehearing en banc was granted. Id. at 1081-82. For reason of judicial economy, we lead off this en banc opinion by iterating, in large part, what we said in division.
On April 24, 1978, petitioner, an officer with the Metropolitan Police Department (hereinafter “the Department”) was shot while on duty. The bullet that lodged in his chest was not removed and after the wound healed, petitioner was left with residual impairment in his nerve and muscle function.
Petitioner began a rehabilitation program in June 1978. The motion and strength in his left arm and hand improved, but he continued to experience pain and parathesi-as (a burning or crawling sensation of the skin) in his left arm. Surgery in March 1979 did not relieve this condition.
Dr. Alfred A. Pavot was Officer Wells’ treating physician during his rehabilitation. On December 12, 1979, petitioner was presented before Dr. Pavot and the other members of the Pain Clinic at Greater Southeast Community Hospital. After the presentation, Dr. Pavot reported that petitioner had “achieved just about maximum recuperation from his injury,” and that he would “be left with some permanent residuals of his left medial neuropathy which are manifesting themself [sic] with some impaired sensation in the left hand and some weakness in the muscles supplied by the left median nerve.” Dr. Pavot also reported that petitioner “could return to limited duty on a full-time basis such as manning a desk in the police station and carrying out other sort of work which would not entail grappling with an assailant and similar types of activity which would necessitate normal grasp and sensory perception in both hands.”
Petitioner was reexamined by specialists at the Pain Clinic in July 1980. The specialists determined that petitioner had “reached essentially a status quo position,” and that he had difficulty flexing his left index finger against resistance which would prevent him from firing a revolver. They also found that although petitioner had a partial permanent disability of approximately 15% of the total body, he could return to light duty “without any significant difficulty.”
In August 1980, petitioner was examined by the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons (hereinafter “Surgeons’ Board”). It made findings similar to those of the Pain Clinic, but found a functional impairment of only 5%.
Petitioner filed a claim for disability retirement. At a hearing before the Board on November 6,1980, Dr. Victor Esch, testifying for the Surgeons’ Board, stated that petitioner could perform some limited duty work on a full-time basis. He recommended that petitioner not be assigned to a busy precinct where he might have to assist with prisoners, but concluded that petitioner could handle a desk job at Police Headquarters where he would have no contact with prisoners.
Petitioner also testified at the hearing, stating that, at times, he feels pain, a burning sensation and/or numbness in his left hand and arm. He also experiences pain in his rib cage where the bullet lodged. Petitioner stated that because of the numbness and pain in his arm and hand, he was no], *138sure that he could safely handle any of the weapons used in the Department.
According to petitioner, on April 14,1980, he was ordered to accept a limited duty status position for an indefinite period of time. He stated that he refused to accept the position for several reasons: (1) he did not believe he would be able to return to full duty, as required by the Department’s limited duty policy;1 (2) he believed his disability would negate his chances for promotion; and (3) he believed the limited duty position would have an adverse effect on his pension rights. Petitioner also testified that he would not return to work unless he received a written offer for a full-time limited duty position.
Petitioner has had an “absent without leave” status since he refused the limited duty position.
I
Petitioner contends that the Board’s conclusions of fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence. Petitioner’s evidence supports his claim that he could no longer perform his old job or any position entailing full police duties. The question before the Board, however, was whether he was "disabled for useful and efficient service in the grade or class of position last occupied” according to D.C.Code § 4-607(2) (1981). Rzepecki v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 429 A.2d 1388 (D.C.1981); Seabolt v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 413 A.2d 908 (D.C.1980). We have interpreted § 4-607(2)2 to mean that an officer is “disabled” if he is unable to perform work in any position at the same salary level as he previously earned. Coakley v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 370 A.2d 1345, 1348-50 (D.C.1977); Seabolt v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, supra, 413 A.2d at 910-12. We conclude from the record, as did the division, that the Board’s finding that petitioner could perform useful and efficient service for the Department was supported by substantial evidence.
The en banc concern in this case is the continuing validity of our Seabolt decision. Contending, once again, that an irreconcilable conflict exists between Seabolt, supra, and Torvik v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 406 A.2d 1264 (D.C.1979), petitioner asks us to overrule Seabolt and hold that an officer who cannot perform full police duties is disabled for useful and efficient service as that phrase is used in D.C.Code § 4-607(2) (1981).
Petitioner cites Torvik v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, supra, and Jones v. Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, 375 A.2d 1 (D.C.1977), in support of his position. In Jones, we referred to the petitioner’s “old job” rather than a job of the same “grade or class of position” in our discussion of whether she was “disabled” under the statutory provision. These references may be explained, however, by the fact that in that case the petitioner was actually capable of performing the very same job she had last occupied.
In Torvik, we reversed the Board’s finding that the petitioner was not eligible for retirement, stating that if a petitioner were able to perform his old job, he would not be eligible for disability. The “old job” dictum in Jones was repeated, but we noted that even if we relied on Coakley, alone, our decision would be the same because there was no evidence of any position in the Department that the petitioner could perform. Torvik v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, supra, 406 A.2d at 1266.
In Seabolt, we limited Torvik to its facts — the Board’s finding of no disability was not supported by substantial evidence given petitioner’s inability to perform any jobs in the Department. We also stressed the soundness of Coakley’s interpretation of § 4-607(2): “A petitioner must ... establish disability from performing any job in the category before qualifying for retirement .... ” Seabolt, supra, 413 A.2d at 912.
We conclude en banc that the Seabolt decision is correct, and to the extent that *139any conflict with Torvik is not reconciled therein, Torvik is overruled.
II
Petitioner claims that the Board erred in refusing to retire him because there was no evidence that a permanent, light-duty position was available for him. He complains that no testimony was presented at his hearing as to a specific duty he could perform and whether, if he were capable of performing, a specific position was available. Under Seabolt, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that there is no job available which he can perform in the grade or class of position he last occupied in the Department. Seabolt, supra, 413 A.2d at 912; Woody v. Police and Firemen’s Retirement and Relief Board, 441 A.2d 987, 989 (D.C.1982). A petitioner will be able to show that no appropriate job is available if the Department fails to place and keep him employed in such a job. Woody, supra, 441 A.2d at 989.3
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish his disability from performing any job in the “grade or class of position” he last occupied. Moreover, for reasons other than his inability to perform it,4 he has refused a job which the Department offered him.
Our interpretation of the retirement statute allows for an appropriate degree of flexibility on the part of the Department and the Board, comports with due process, and extends the maximum benefits to the applicant. Talk of the creation of make-work positions, bolstered by no facts of record, is a disservice to those who attempt faithfully to discharge their responsibilities according to law. If there are perceived inequities in the statute which require correction, the solution lies with the legislature.
Affirmed.
. A Department policy requires an officer on limited duty to return to full duty after a specified period of time.
. This section was previously codified as D.C. Code § 4-521(2) (1973).
. The presumption that a suitable light duty position exists can be rebutted either at the original hearing, or later if no position that the injured officer can perform is available in the grade or class he last occupied. Indeed, we were assured at oral argument that if the unsuccessful applicant for disability retirement cannot perform the duties to which he is assigned, the Department will join him in requesting that the Board retire him from service.
. In a suit in the United States District Court, the trial court was informed that if Officer Wells returned to work he would be placed in a non-conflict office duty position in the Community Relations Division of the Metropolitan Police Department. His police powers would be revoked, e.g., he would not carry a weapon. His eligibility for promotion and other benefits is, of course, beyond the scope of this opinion.