concurring.
In this capital murder case, defendant Rigoberto Mejia was charged with murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and unlawful possession of a weapon. The Prosecutor served notice that it would seek the death penalty. The guilt phase of the trial commenced approximately one year later. Mejia was found guilty of murder and, following a penalty trial, was sentenced to death.
The Court now reverses defendant’s conviction and death sentence. I concur, and write separately to identify and explain additional grounds that, in my opinion, warrant those reversals.
I
Two weeks prior to the beginning of jury selection in this case, another Monmouth County capital-murder prosecution involving *507the notorious multiple killer, Richard Biegenwald, was concluded. As murder cases go, Biegenwald’s was particularly dramatic. He stalked and killed young women for no apparent reason. The press dubbed him a “thrill killer.” The jury, however, declined to impose the death penalty on Biegenwald, and he therefore received a life sentence. The highly publicized news reports and commentary prompted by his “escape” from the death penalty cast doubt on the viability of the death penalty in New Jersey. Press articles abounded, decrying the result and castigating the criminal justice system for its failure to give Biegenwald the sentence that most people felt he deserved.
In light of the intense publicity, defense counsel for Mejia moved for a change of venue. He cited the fact that'the local newspaper, the Asbury Park Press, carried daily reports on the trial from March 5, 1993 to March 16, 1993. One front-page story was accompanied by a photo of Biegenwald “celebrating” his life verdict with his lawyers. In its Sunday edition of March 21, 1993, the Asbury Park Press ran a story entitled, “Prosecutors Regroup on Death Penalty.” Inside the story, the Monmouth County Prosecutor was quoted saying, “Biegenwald is the icing on the cake for the defeat essentially of the death penalty.” In the story, the prosecutor promised that his office would re-evaluate whether or not to pursue the death penalty against Rigoberto Mejia. A companion piece to that story was entitled, “Victims’ Kin Cry for Justice.” The article contained interviews with family and friends of Biegenwald’s victims all expressing outrage at the life verdict he received. Press coverage of the Biegenwald verdict was a major, front-page pre-occupation of the local newspaper for nearly three weeks.
The trial court refused to grant defendant’s request for a change of venue, but allowed defense counsel to question potential jurors about their knowledge of and feelings towards recent Monmouth County capital eases. Of the forty potential jurors then questioned by the trial court, two indicated some familiarity with the Biegenwald case. One of those eventually was excused *508for cause, and the other was peremptorily challenged by defendant.
During the course of voir dire, on April 15, 1993, nearly one month after the Biegenwald verdict, the judge presiding over the trial was replaced. The second judge quickly indicated that he would not allow particularized questioning about a number of issues, including whether a juror had any opinion about recent Monmouth County capital cases. The judge explained that such open-ended questioning was only appropriate if it was directly related to the defendant’s case. Despite the fact that defense counsel was prohibited from asking about the Biegenwald verdict directly, reference to it recurred. Several of the potential jurors questioned under the court’s new regime did volunteer opinions about the Biegenwald case. One juror, K.F., who claimed an opinion on the Biegenwald case did sit on defendant’s jury. (Three other jurors who expressed opinions about Biegenwald were excused for cause, but not for cause arising out of their opinions on Biegenwald.)
Defendant contends that, given the intense publicity surrounding the Biegenwald case, the court deprived him of his right to an impartial jury by refusing to allow the questioning of all potential jurors about their views on that case. The court’s ruling allowed only for revelation of the views of those jurors who volunteered an opinion on the Biegenwald case, depriving defendant of his opportunity to discover bias among possible jurors who' might not otherwise disclose, for whatever reason,' their exposure to the Biegenwald case. Defendant’s argument must be considered in the context of a capital defendant’s right to be tried by a jury that is both fair and impartial and duly qualified, and the central role of the voir dire in ensuring the selection of such a jury.
The importance of a defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, par. 10 of the New Jersey Constitution, cannot be overstated. This right is of exceptional significance “in cases in which the defendant faces death.” State *509v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 61, 459 A.2d 641 (1983) (Williams I). In capital cases, where a human life is at stake, it is particularly important for the trial court “to preserve the integrity of the jury and minimize the danger that prejudice will infiltrate the adjudication process.” Id. at 63, 459 A.2d 641; Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2389-90, 65 L.Ed.2d 392, 403 (1980); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 216, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) (Handler, J. dissenting) (“[I]n a capital-murder prosecution, the jury must be specially qualified in order to assure that high degree of objectivity, sensitivity, fairness, and impartiality essential to determine criminal guilt and appropriate sentence.”) (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 151-54, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) (Bey II); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 248-54, 524 A.2d 188 (1987); Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 61-63, 459 A.2d 641); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 268, 548 A.2d 939 (1988) (citation omitted); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 92, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (Biegenwald I) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 156, 203 A.2d 1 (1964); State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 213, 152 A.2d 343 (1959); State v. Wynn, 21 N.J. 264, 271, 121 A.2d 534 (1956). Thus, this Court has recognized that there is a heightened standard to be applied in ensuring that a capital defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury is respected. State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 30, 594 A.2d 172 (1991) (Biegenwald IV) (citing Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 324 n. 84, 524 A.2d 188).
Likewise, the importance of voir dire in ensuring jury impartiality and competence is obvious; only an adequate pre-trial examination of potential jurors can result in proper qualification. Inadequate voir dire undermines both the parties’ and the Court’s ability to secure a competent and impartial jury. See State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 445, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988) (Williams II) (noting that inadequate voir dire denies parties necessary information relevant to intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges or to challenge for cause; likewise leaves court unable to assess juror fitness). We have in many cases suggested the ways in which to undertake an adequate voir dire. State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, *510449-50, 585 A.2d 864 (1991); Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 68-69, 459 A.2d 641. “An adequate voir dire should incorporate [those suggestions] with an eye toward providing counsel and the court with the tools necessary to perform their respective tasks comprehensively and intelligently.” Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 34, 594 A.2d 172. The harm of an inadequate voir dire is that it makes it difficult for parties and the court to make informed choices in the empaneling of jurors. Peremptory challenges cannot rectify that inadequacy and the fact that a party has failed to exhaust all peremptory challenges is of no consequence. Id. at 30, 594 A.2d 172.
Trial judges are entrusted with considerable discretion and flexibility in conducting voir dire. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 410, 550 A.2d 1172. However, that discretion must ensure that voir dire is an effective tool in protecting a defendant’s right to an impartial jury. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 71 n. 18, 459 A.2d 641. Thus, this Court has reversed convictions where the trial judge failed to allow inquiry into certain areas on voir dire. See Williams II, supra (reversing conviction, in part, because trial judge failed to question jurors about their ability to be fair in light of brutal rape/murder); Biegenwald IV, supra (ordering new sentencing hearing because jury was not questioned about the effect of defendant’s prior murder convictions); Moore, supra (reversing conviction on other grounds, but instructing judge to allow open-ended questioning regarding status of victims); cf. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993) (holding failure to question on effect of kidnapping aggravating factor harmless where no questions were requested and over-all process was thorough and probing).
Fundamentally, a proper voir dire must be sufficiently broad to expose potential bias and to assure that each juror can comply with the governing legal standards. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 65, 594 A.2d 172 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 155, 590 A.2d 624 (1991)); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 354, 558 A.2d 1259 (1989). In a capital case, voir dire *511performs two important functions: (1) its traditional role of assuring juror impartiality; and (2) its special role of serving to “death-qualify” potential jurors. As we stated in Moore, supra, “Under our single-jury capital-trial system, jury selection must ... serve double duty as both a time to ‘death qualify’ jurors and a time to enable counsel to ... select a fail' and impartial jury. The purposes of the inquiry are simply not the same, although they tend to overlap.” 122 N.J. at 449, 585 A.2d 864.
The distinctive nature of voir dire in capital causes has been underscored. See State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 244, 593 A.2d 266 (1991); Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 447, 585 A.2d 864. “The creation of an impartial jury, through the process of voir dire, follows ‘no particular tests’ and is ‘not chained to any ancient and artificial formulas.’ ” Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 66, 594 A.2d 172 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46, 57 S.Ct. 177, 185, 81 L.Ed. 78, 88 (1936)). The adequacy of voir dire is measured by the quality of information it yields to enable the court and counsel to exercise their respective functions, including challenges, both for cause and peremptory. See Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 32, 594 A.2d 172 (noting that by limiting voir dire the court “denied counsel and the trial court the tools with which to insure that the jury panel could fairly undertake its role”); Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 446, 585 A.2d 864 (“voir dire acts as a discovery tool”). This Court has stressed the need for trial judges to take a wider view of the permissible scope of voir dire in a death penalty case. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 451, 585 A.2d 864. Moreover, trial courts have been admonished not to insist blindly that the proposed line of inquiry be assessed solely in terms of the likelihood that it would result in an excusal for cause. Ibid.
Pre-trial publicity poses a special threat to the impanelling of a jury that is both properly qualified and fair and impartial. Information received through the press has the power to significantly alter one’s impressions and to arouse biases, and often its effects are subliminal. The voir dire is the chief mechanism to extirpate *512and combat the prejudicial residue of pretrial publicity. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 68, 459 A.2d 641; Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 429, 550 A.2d 1172. Jurors who have formed an opinion as to guilt or innocence must be excused, and “[ojnly if it is demonstrated that ‘the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court’ will extraneous exposure to the facts of the case not be grounds for automatic disqualification.” Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 61, 459 A.2d 641 (quoting State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 23, 417 A.2d 474 (1980) and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977)).
Courts have considerable flexibility in coping with the prejudicial effects of adverse publicity. However, in cases preceded by extensive publicity, an “exhaustive and searching voir dire" is the linchpin necessary to empaneling impartial jurors, particularly where pre-trial motions to change venue, and sequester the jury have been denied. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 68-69, 459 A.2d 641; see also Biegenwald I, supra, 106 N.J. at 29, 524 A.2d 130, (underscoring indispensability of the “searching voir dire interrogation” to obtaining an impartial jury); Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 220-21, 586 A.2d 85 (Handler, J., dissenting) (“extraordinary importance attaches to the voir dire and death qualification process”).
[An] important, indeed critical, means for dealing with potential-and latent bias is the voir dire. The court should consider the efficacy of more exhaustive and searching von- dire examinations____ The [trial] court could consider whether there should be a greater willingness to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant in excusing jurors for cause. Particularly in capital cases, the trial judge- should exercise extraordinary care in the voir dire of potential jurors and could excuse for cause any juror who has been exposed to sensational prejudicial publicity, especially where such exposure is repeated and involves patently inadmissible evidence.
[Williams I, supra, 93 at 68-69 (footnote omitted).]
We have recognized the need for the independent and scrupulous evaluation of the voir dire by a reviewing court to resolve the claims raised by adverse pretrial publicity. See Biegenwald I, supra, 106 N.J. at 87, 524 A.2d 130 (citing State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 386, 204 A.2d 841 (1964)). This Court encourages an *513intensified review of the adequacy of voir dire that stresses the need for particularized questioning of potential jurors. See Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 414, 550 A.2d 1172; Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 447, 585 A.2d 864 (condemning trial court’s refusal to allow defense counsel to ask questions regarding the victim’s status as a child.)
In Biegnwald I, supra, we recognized that the reviewing court must examine the extent to which potential jurors are biased as a result of any publicity surrounding the case. In determining whether a realistic likelihood of prejudice exists in a particular case, a court must first distinguish “between cases in which the trial atmosphere is so corrupted by publicity that prejudice may be presumed, and cases in which pretrial publicity, while extensive, is less intrusive, making the determinative issue the actual effect of the publicity on the impartiality of the jury panel.” 106 N.J. at 33, 524 A.2d 130 (citations omitted).
In determining whether a presumption of prejudice exists in a given case, we must first examine certain factors that measure the potentially-prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 271, 548 A.2d 939. Those factors include, but are not limited to: (1) evidence of extreme community hostility against defendant; (2) prominence of either the victim or the defendant within the community; (3) the nature and extent of news coverage; (4) the size of the community; (5) the nature and gravity of the offense; and (6) the temporal proximity of the news coverage to the trial. Id. at 271-73, 548 A.2d 939.
In Biegenwald IV, supra, we observed that where prejudice is not presumed, the appropriate inquiry to determine if the record indicates a “realistic likelihood of prejudice” is whether under the totality of the circumstances the voir dire and the handling of the jurors resulted in a fair and impartial jury. 126 N.J. at 22-23, 594 A.2d 172. In State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 548 A.2d 846 (1988) (Bey I), we reversed the defendant’s murder conviction because the trial court failed to ensure that the jury was not exposed to mid-trial publicity respecting defendant’s other-alleged offenses, in-*514eluding another murder. The Court held that the test for such publicity was, “[i]f the court is satisfied that the published information has the capacity to prejudice defendant, it should determine if there is a realistic possibility that such information may have reached one or more of the jurors.” Id. at 86, 548 A.2d 846 (citation omitted). If there is such a realistic possibility, a voir dire must be conducted to ascertain whether any juror has been exposed. Id. at 86-87, 548 A.2d 846. The Court then must determine whether the mid-trial publicity had a “[great] capacity to prejudice a defendant’s case,” id. at 90, 548 A.2d 846, and where the publicity had such a strong potential for prejudice, the usual assumptions about jurors following their oaths and adhering to the judge’s instructions are not warranted. Id. at 81-83, 548 A.2d 846.
The required critical standard in determining whether defendant’s right to an impartial jury has been impaired inheres in our inquiry into “whether under the totality of the circumstances the voir dire and the trial court’s handling of the jurors resulted in a fan- and impartial jury.” Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 23, 594 A.2d 172. The Court’s task in this case is to assess the overall adequacy of the voir dire in light of the trial court’s refusal to allow questions of potential jurors about their exposure to pre-trial publicity concerning “recent Monmouth County capital cases.”
Biegenwald was a particularly notorious defendant. This Court itself observed that the Biegenwald case had received “extensive pre-trial publicity,” noting that the local press had nicknamed him the “thrill killer.” Biegenwald II, 106 N.J. at 21, 524 A.2d 130. Biegenwald’s murders were particularly dramatic and the press coverage exceeded the norm for a murder ease. Biegenwald’s was the first case in Monmouth County in which the Prosecutor sought the death penalty. Moreover, the community in which the murders occurred is somewhat small and isolated, especially during the winter season. The Asbury Park Press covered the trial on a daily basis, culminating in Biegenwald’s life verdict, which was handed down just two weeks before jury selection began in defendant’s case.
*515The pretrial publicity involving the Biegenwalcl case clearly infiltrated the circumstances surrounding defendant’s case. After the verdict, public outrage fueled official speculation regarding the future viability of the death penalty. Thus, some of the press coverage focused on the systemic implications of Biegenwald’s life sentence. The local prosecutor suggested that he would have to reconsider whether it was worthwhile to seek the death penalty in defendant’s case.
A fair argument can be made that this type of coverage would tend to suggest to jurors that they could “send a message” and aid in ensuring that capital punishment remained viable by imposing a death sentence on defendant. That possibility is neither remote nor speculative as is evidenced by this Court’s acknowledgement of the public’s “impatience” with capital-murder jurisprudence in this state. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 465, 575 A.2d 435 (1990). The Biegenwald verdict, coupled with the prosecutor’s publicized skepticism, could easily produce a sense in the community that the death penalty needed some use in order to survive. See, e.g., Jim O’Neil, Sholler Family Enraged as Split Spares Johnson, Star Ledger, March 5, 1995, at 1, 22 (reporting public shock and anger over failure of jury in the Gail Sholler killing to impose death sentence on the defendant); Mathew Reilly, Decision to Spare Murderer’s Life Doesn’t Surprise Public Defender, Star Ledger, March 5, 1995, at 23 (generally the same). Had the trial court allowed relevant specific questions, the parties would have obtained useful information about the attitudes of potential jurors bearing on their fitness to serve as jurors in a death-penalty trial. Although only a few of the jurors mentioned the case, the record leaves the strong impression that there was a general awareness of that case, an awareness that produced strong reactions in the jurors who mentioned it. Although it is impossible to gauge the content of a juror’s memory, it is within our common experience that when asked a direct question we recall information — impressions, memoiúes, and even opinions — which might not be prompted by more open-ended questioning. There can be little doubt that the trial court’s ruling significantly reduced defense counsel’s *516capacity to jog a juror’s memory and elicit whatever reactions that lurked there.
The Court should also consider the broader purpose that would be served by asking questions about the Biegenwald verdict on voir dire. Even if no conscientious juror would allow their outrage over Biegenwald’s “escape” to cloud his or her consideration of defendant’s case, questioning about the Biegenwald verdict would nonetheless provide the court and the parties with significant insight into a juror’s attitude toward capital punishment in general. Recalling that voir dire in a capital case is as much about death qualification as it is about impartiality (and that the two inquiries are not the same), the use of the Biegenwald verdict in voir dire would have been productive. Certainly defense counsel and the original presiding trial judge believed it to be.
The fact that defendant received a death sentence is evidence that this Court should not treat the insufficient voir dire so dismissively. The imposition of a death sentence on defendant is itself both surprising and suspect. An examination of the data relevant to the proportionality of defendant’s death sentence indicates for defendant a very low criminal culpability as compared to other capital defendants. See David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project: Final Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court, 92-100 (Sept. 24, 1991) (hereinafter Final Report ). A consideration of both the statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in defendant’s case puts him in the grouping of defendants least likely to receive the death sentence. See id. at 95; State v. DiFrisco, appeal pending (DiFrisco Report). In fact, the most recent index-of-outcomes figures indicate that' out of a universe of all penalty-trial cases up to date, defendant has the lowest probability of receiving a death sentence out of the 38 individuals sentenced to death since the reinstitution of the death penalty. See, e.g., DiFrisco Report. Clearly defendant’s death sentence is disproportionate to his crime. Final Report, supra, at 92-100.
*517Although the Court, as a practical matter, is not called on to engage in a proportionality review of defendant’s death sentence, it should not resist the critical examination required of information that is indicative of obvious disproportionality and therefore highly relevant to the issue of whether prejudicial factors influenced the result reached in defendant’s case. Frankly, I see no other way to rationalize this clearly disproportionate sentence than to reason that the jury was significantly influenced by the taint of the pretrial publicity surrounding defendant’s trial.
II
At the penalty trial, defendant’s principle mitigation strategy was to highlight the extreme abuse he suffered as- a child. Of the eight specific mitigating factors submitted by the defense, six related to the alleged physical and psychological trauma defendant suffered. To establish those factors, defendant relied on the testimony of a forensic social worker and a clinical psychologist with expertise in family violence and its effects on a child’s development, Dr. Marsha Kleinman.
Defendant offered Dr. Kleinman’s testimony to establish that he had in fact suffered severe abuse. The testimony did not, in his view, propose to diagnose any particular mental illness that was, inferentially, a medical or legal cause of the murder. However, on cross-examination, to the surprise of the defense, Dr. Kleinman testified that she thought that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Defense counsel objected to that line of questioning as exceeding the scope of the direct examination.
In rebuttal, Drs. Michals and Coram testified that defendant did not suffer from that disorder, and that whatever antisocial traits defendant possessed would not prevent him from “operating within a structured society....” Dr. Coram went so far as to label defendant “sociopathic,” and to declare that it was impossible to isolate the effect of one factor, such as child abuse, in identifying a cause of subsequent behavior.
*518Defendant argues that the State’s rebuttal evidence had the effect of distorting the meaning of the proffered mitigating evidence, and as a result of that distortion, allowed the State to introduce additional non-statutory aggravating factors, namely, “a lack of mental illness” and “further dangerousness.” Additionally, defendant argues that the State shifted the focus by offering its evidence to rebut defendant’s childhood abuse as an excuse for his behavior, which misled the jury because defendant did not proffer the evidence of his abusive childhood to excuse his conduct, but rather to suggest that he did not deserve to be put to death.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to heed the defense objections to the State’s line of rebuttal evidence, and that even if the State’s evidence was admissible, a limiting instruction was required to avoid juror confusion and prejudice. The Court rejects defendant’s arguments as moot. Ante at 501-02, 662 A.2d at 321. I, however, believe they warrant reversal of his death sentence.
The trial court, in overruling defense counsel’s objections to the State’s rebuttal witnesses’ testimony and in denying defendant’s motion to strike the rebuttal evidence, found that the rebuttal evidence did not dispute the existence of child abuse but was nonetheless proper because it disputed the value placed on the evidence by the defense expert. To determine what “value” defendant’s expert placed on her own evidence, the Court must first examine what Dr. Kleinman said.
Dr. Kleinman stated:
Well based on everything that I have read, my experience with — my interviews with Mr. Mejia, which occurred before I reviewed the other documentation, it’s my opinion that he was abused as a child, that he suffered both physical, severe physical abuse, he suffered serious and severe psychological abuse, he suffered early emotional deprivation, really abandonment from his father and later from his mother and then later from his father, that he really never had a chance to develop and grow and become a healthy adult in this environment.
He never had a shot at learning the skills and the emotional development and developing the emotional wherewithal to function in a society at large, that he really — this was destroyed m him, that every baby that comes into this world has lots of different potential, all have different potential, but you take that child and *519you raise it one way or you raise it another and in this case I believe that he learned violence, he did not learn coping skills, didn’t learn how to deal with this. He was also raised with tremendous anger. If you are deprived emotionally and physically you grow feeling angry, you grow feeling angry and you can’t tolerate it, you don’t have the ability to tolerate slight infractions, normal things that we all have to tolerate but you cannot, too oversensitive, too over-reactive, for him being called a name was such a terrible humiliation.
He never developed the ability to trust, he developed suspicion, never formed close relationships, to be able to have a close relationship with a woman.
I found he has a problem with alcohol, that’s my opinion, and substance abuse problems, starting from a young age, that he — I think he [has] some depressive features of a depressive disorder, I think he had to turn off his ability to feel and when you turn off feeling pain, you also turn off feeling joy.
He never felt the joys, either, and it makes him unable — if you can’t feel your own pain you can’t feel other people’s pain, you have to feel yours, and I think watching the tape, his mother said when he was ten he stopped at some point, he has stopped feeling, and that meant he couldn’t feel other people’s either, because if you can’t feel someone else’s pain you don’t feel your own.
I think that he went from being — I think he sees himself as a failure in life, I think he views himself that way, I think he’s always felt himself to be a failure, I think that the land of suspiciousness you call paranoia comes from if you are constantly on guard, not knowing where the next attack is coming from, you have to be on guard for people, you have to be a [sic] watch, you mistrust their motives, people in your environment were not trustworthy, so I think that comes from this.
I think that he knows right from wrong in an abstract sense, but in his value sense, right from wrong his different because of what his parents taught him. And I think that he was clearly victimized and that’s how he evolved into somebody who could behave as he’s done recently.
A fair assessment of Dr. Kleinman’s testimony was that it did not purport to express a clinical analysis or diagnosis in the sense of demonstrating that defendant had any particular mental illness, but was rather directed towards establishing that he had been the victim of severe abuse, which left him with a gravely inadequate personality and severely inappropriate behavioral characteristics. It assuredly was not proffered as an excuse for the murder. As a final question on direct, defense counsel asked Dr. Kleinman whether abused children will always grow up to be murderers. She responded:
I would tell you people who are severely abused in the same complex pattern Rigoberto had and the same family environment are prone to violence. Okay. They are going to be violent in some way. Some are violent in the families. He couldn’t hack it enough even to have — he couldn’t even have a relationship with a *520woman. Otherwise, you might have seen the violence occur in the family with his or™ wife and children which is where it often goes.
There are lots of factors. " " So that they may not all turn out to be murderers but they all — people who are abused as severely as Kigoberto was I would say all end up deeply disturbed.
Thus, the testimony of Dr. Kleinman did not place defendant’s mental,health at issue, nor was it offered for any purpose other than to explain defendant’s personality and character as a basis for determining whether he deserved to die.
On cross-examination, Dr. Kleinman, to defense counsel’s surprise, testified that she thought defendant suffered from “post-traumatic stress disorder” although she declined to make a definitive diagnosis. She also noted that he had traces of an antisocial personality disorder. Indeed, defense counsel specifically objected to that line of cross-examination, claiming that direct examination had not gone into any diagnostic opinions. The objection was overruled.'
On surrebuttal, when asked, “is there research to support the conclusion that Mr. Mejia’s behavior and personality came about as a result of suffering from some severe child abuse?” Dr. Kleinman responded, “Yes there is.” She than went on to state, “... he was a victim of child abuse. And that his early family history accounts for his current behavior.”
In sum, Dr. Kleinman’s testimony was intended to demonstrate the horrendous circumstances of the defendant’s childhood., That evidence was directed solely at the issue of whether the defendant deserved to die, not whether he was responsible for his actions or otherwise culpable. The testimony was directed toward mercy, not exoneration. Dr. Kleinman was clearly interested in establishing the nature and extent of the .abuse the defendant suffered and in explaining the impact of abuse on a child’s subsequent development. She did not make a definitive diagnosis of the defendant. To some extent, her testimony is susceptible to the interpretation that defendant’s abusive childhood, inferentially, was a cause of his violent actions. However, measured against the thrust of her testimony, it is evident that the expert was not suggesting that *521defendant had a mental condition that could serve as a medical cause, and legal excuse, for the murders. Nevertheless, as a result of the relatively slight turn in the defense testimony elicited during cross examination — which was immediately objected to by the defense but uncorrected by the court — the State then concentrated on disproving that either a mental disorder or an abusive childhood caused defendant to commit murder. The clear, and only, effect of that evidence was to convince the jury that defendant’s abusive childhood, which was not itself disputed, should be disregarded or discounted not only as an excuse for murder, but as a reason to show mercy.
Dr. Michals testified that defendant did not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, or an antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Michals also testified that whatever antisocial traits the defendant might possess, they would not inhibit him from “operating within a structured society or structured organization.” He did not dispute the existence of defendant’s abusive childhood. Dr. Coram’s testimony was more pointed. He noted that the defendant suffered from multiple personality disorders and noted that “he may in fact be sociopathic.” He also noted that the defendant was “always on alert possibly to act out against others.” Finally, Dr. Coram offered his opinion that it was impossible to isolate the effect of one factor, such as child abuse, on the course of a person’s subsequent behavior. He did not dispute the existence of childhood abuse but severely discounted it as a cause for murder. ' ^
Defendant characterizes that rebuttal testimony as a “penalty-phase gone dangerously awry.” Whereas defendant sought to establish only the existence of severe child abuse and to comment on its relevance to the defendant’s deathworthiness, the State responded by suggesting on the one hand that the defendant was in control of his behavior, i.e., not mentally-ill, and on the other that he might be sociopathic — almost a calculated killer — and a danger to others. Defendant insists that the State’s rebuttal miscasts the intent of the defendant’s proffer of mitigating evi*522dence and in fact interjects non-statutory aggravating factors into the penalty trial. I agree.
In these circumstances, the trial court clearly should have given a limiting instruction, especially in light of the fact that defense counsel had so vehemently objected to the implications raised by the testimony elicited on cross-examination of Dr. Kleinman and by the admission of the State’s rebuttal evidence. At a minimum, the testimony elicited on cross-examination should have been subject to a limiting instruction. It should not have been exacerbated and augmented through rebuttal testimony and further escalated through surrebuttal.
A trial judge has a heightened and non-delegable responsibility to ensure trial fairness, even when such an assurance can be met only by intervention. See State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 232, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) (Handler, J., dissenting) (stating that capital trial elevates a court’s supervisory duty to assure adherence to the prosecutor’s particularly stringent ethical obligations in capital cases); Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 42, 594 A.2d 172 (“whatever lack of zealousness and vigor one might ascribe to defense counsel in no way diminishes trial court’s duty to ensure that defendant is sentenced by a fair and impartial jury”); Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A.2d 641 (stating that court has an obligation “to preserve the integrity of the jury and minimize the danger that prejudice will infiltrate the adjudicatory process”).
Correct jury instructions are essential for a fair trial. State v. Rhett, 127 N.J. 3, 5, 601 A.2d 689 (1992); State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15, 573 A.2d 1359 (1990); State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379, 545 A.2d 119 (1988). The importance of a correct jury charge is enhanced in capital cases in light of the irreversibility of the penalty. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 508, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988); State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 563, 651 A.2d 19 (1994) (Handler, J., dissenting).
Here, the court abrogated its obligation to assure a fair trial not only by admitting the rebuttal testimony over defense counsel’s *523objection, but also by failing to reduce and neutralize the harm by issuing a limiting instruction. The court should have recognized, in light of defense counsel’s protestation, that the State’s rebuttal testimony was unrelated to the mitigation testimony proffered by defendant and that a limiting instruction as to the jury’s appropriate use of this testimony was warranted.
Rose, supra, involved the highly problematical use of “prior bad acts” as rebuttal to mitigating testimony of character witnesses in the penalty-phase of a capital case. This Court noted that in a “death penalty context, in the face of ... abundant and inflammatory evidence ... the necessity for a careful and precise limiting instruction ... was clear and compelling.” 112 N.J. at 508, 548 A.2d 1058.
This case presents a similar “clear and compelling” need for “careful and precise limiting instructions.” Dr. Kleinman testified that the defendant’s violent tendencies were precipitated from the domestic abuse he endured as a child. The State, on the other hand, did not actually rebut the mitigation of the existence and significance of an abusive childhood. Rather, it marshalled the other doctors to contradict Dr. Kleinman’s statement that defendant suffered from a mental illness. Although Dr. Kleinman did state in vague terms that defendant did exhibit symptoms of a personality disorder, Dr. Kleinman did not purport to make a specific psychological diagnosis. Thus, the rebuttal did not directly challenge Dr. Kleinman’s testimony that defendant was abused as a child, and that often times child abuse can lead to violent adult behavior. The effect of this expansive rebuttal testimony was that the jury was left to compare testimony of an abusive childhood and its long-term effects on defendant on the one hand with testimony that defendant’s abusive childhood did not result in a personality disorder that could excuse defendant’s murder on the other.
The problem with rationalizing these two evidentiary propositions is that the former is relevant for mitigation purposes, i.e., it tends to support reasons why defendant should not be executed *524for his crime, while the latter is both irrelevant to rebut such testimony and inadmissible to prove aggravation. Rather, this “rebuttal” testimony is the sort of testimony that would be relevant to disprove a diminished capacity or insanity defense. Its use in the penalty phase only left the jurors believing that defendant was trying to prove that he was not personally responsible for his actions. Because the jurors, having convicted defendant of murder, found that defendant’s abusive childhood and its enduring effects could not excuse defendant’s act of murder, there is no likelihood that it would believe those same factors would render defendant any less deserving to die for the murder. With defendant’s mitigation successfully undermined, the jury was denied the opportunity to properly measure his culpability. That kind of injustice should have been addressed by the trial court and redressed, now, by this Court.
Ill
For the additional reasons expressed here, I concur in the judgment of the Court, reversing defendant’s murder conviction and death sentence.-
HANDLER, J., concurs in the result.
For affirmance in part and reversal in part — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 6.
Opposed — None.