dissenting.
In my view, the Majority is substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. The question before us is whether the trial judge abused his discretion by entering and then refusing to remove the non pros. Recently, our Supreme Court had occasion to discuss the proper review of discretionary actions by trial courts. In Paden v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 540 Pa. 409, 658 A.2d 341 (1995), a unanimous court reversed the Superior Court when we engaged in a prejudice analysis to support a determination of trial court error in enforcing a Rule of Civil Procedure. In its discussion, the Court stated:
There is little doubt that this is a situation in which Rule 126 might appropriately have been applied, had the trial court deemed it to be required in the interest of justice. Nevertheless, the trial court having rejected the reprieve allowed by Rule 126, we do not deem the striking of the improper joinder to show manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. Thus, even if we might have reached a different conclusion had the decision been ours in the first instance, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule as it did.
... it is not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to enforce the rules of civil procedure, even when the result has a serious adverse effect on the party violating the rules
540 Pa. 415, 658 A.2d at 344.
I conclude that the trial judge correctly analyzed this case and properly entered the non pros. There was over a two year delay. It is disingenuous to blame that delay on the insolvency of the insurer of one of the parties, since no stay of *493litigation against its insureds was issued. Most importantly, the plaintiffs complaint included both a breach of contract claim and a negligence claim. It was filed against Nosker Lumber, Inc. who then joined Jode R. Delp as an additional defendant. It was Delp’s insurer that was insolvent.
Two aspects of the case are important. First, the breach of contract claim was for payment for timber removed and would not be covered by insurance, therefore the insurers insolvency had no bearing on this count. Second, it was the additional defendants insurer that was insolvent, again this did not effect the claim against the original defendant.
Also, this Court has held that a claim of possible settlement negotiations is an insufficient reason to excuse delay. Pennridge Electric, Inc. v. Souderton Area Joint School Authority, 419 Pa.Super. 201, 615 A.2d 95 (1992). A claim that a party is awaiting what will happen to the insurer of an additional defendant should be treated the same. The case could and should have proceeded against the original defendant.
The Majority misinterprets the application of the Supreme Courts decision in Penn Piping, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 529 Pa. 350, 603 A.2d 1006 (1992). The trial court had granted a non pros for inactivity exceeding two years. On appeal, this court reversed finding that there was no showing of prejudice against the defendant from the delay. The Supreme Court reversed this court, holding that there is a presumption of prejudice after two years. It went on to state:
Thus, if there is a lack of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude; if there is no compelling reason for the delay; and if the delay is for two years or more, the case may be dismissed for lack of activity on the docket.
529 Pa. at 356, 603 A.2d 1006.
This courts engaging in a prejudice analysis was rejected in Penn Piping, and in Paden. It should be rejected in this case. Since I cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the non pros, I dissent.